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ABSTRACT 
The financial crisis of 2008 was the most severe crisis since the great depression: millions of 
jobs and billions of pounds of household income were lost, resulting in pervasive 
unemployment, inequality and a rise in suicide rates (Barr et al., 2012).  The failure exhibited 
complex organisational properties, such as tight coupling (e.g. the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers triggered the collapse of other key organisations), the prioritisation of production 
over safety (e.g. profit over the wellbeing of clients) and a collective inaction to heed early 
warning signs (e.g. surrounding credit derivative swaps).  
 
Yet, research in the financial sector has failed to capture critical information on how the 
behaviours and practises (e.g. systemic rate rigging) within the industry eroded risk 
management processes, and led to organisational failure (Power, Ashby, & Palermo, 2013; 
Ring, et al., 2014).  This thesis draws on human factors theory and methodology that have 
successfully been applied in other high-risk domains (e.g. aviation) and applies them to a 
financial trading organisation to investigate whether human factors approaches help 
understand error in the financial trading domain.  
 
To achieve this, four articles and three additional chapters have been developed for this 
thesis. Chapter 1 (introduction) conceptualises financial trading as a high-risk organisation 
and considers the implications of this for the domain, and the field of human factors. Chapter 
2 (Article 1, published in Journal of Risk Research) conducts a systematic literature review of 
19 studies in financial trading in order to establish the relevance of non-technical skills theory 
to the domain. Chapter 3 reports on the development of a methodology for capturing 
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operational incidents within a financial trading firm: the Financial Incident Analysis System 
(FINANS). Chapter 4 (Article 2, published in Human Factors) uses FINANS to analyse 
1,000 incidents and reveals the human factors issues that underlie operational incidents (e.g. 
1% of trades are erroneous and the most common causes are slip/lapse and problems in 
situation awareness and teamwork).  Chapter 5 (Article 3, under review at Human Factors) 
analyses a further 1,042 operational incidents and establishes the role of human skills for 
capturing error and indicates financial traders to be the ‘last- line of defence’ for preventing 
incidents. Chapter 6 (Article 4, published in the Journal of Business Ethics) analyses ten 
high-profile trading mishaps in the UK, and shows safety culture problems in each as 
underlying the failures. Chapter 7 reviews each study and discusses the findings, implications 
and limitations of each. Chapter 8 concludes that the application of human factors concepts in 
financial trading generates meaningful insight into how risk is managed in this domain, and 
extends human factors research into a previously unexplored environment. 
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THESIS FORMAT 
The format for this thesis is a PhD-by-publication, with human factors theories and 
methodologies being applied to financial trading through a series of discrete research papers 
(Chapters 2-6). The context and implications of these studies are drawn together through an 
introduction (chapter 1), critical discussion (chapter 7), and conclusion (chapter 8). 
 
Chapter 1 (introduction) conceptualises financial trading as a high-risk organisation and 
considers the implications of this for the domain, and the field of human factors. Chapter 2 
(Article 1, published in Journal of Risk Research) conducts a systematic literature review of 
19 studies in financial trading in order to establish the relevance of non-technical skills theory 
to the domain. This is common approach to investigating human factors issues in other 
industries, and reveals the viability and utility of applying non-technical skills concepts to 
financial trading. Chapter 3 reports on the successful development of a novel methodology 
for capturing operational incidents (errors) within a financial trading firm: the Financial 
Incident Analysis System (FINANS). Through analysing 1000 FINANS incidents using a 
human factors taxonomy (based on article 1), Chapter 4 (Article 2, published in Human 
Factors) shows human factors issues to frequently underlie operational incidents, and to 
cause substantial losses. Specifically, the analysis reveals 1% of trades to be erroneous and 
the most common causes of operational incidents to be slip/lapse (e.g. fat fingers) and 
problems in situation awareness (e.g. attention) and teamwork (e.g. coordination).   
 
Chapter 5 (Article 3, under review at Human Factors) examines how trading errors might be 
minimised, and analyses a further 1,042 operational incidents in order to establish the role of 
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human skills for capturing and averting error. Focussing on near misses, it shows that 96% of 
errors (52% of which are caused by slip/lapse) are averted through the non-technical skills of 
financial traders (in particular teamwork and situation awareness). Consistent with more 
recent theorisations in the human factors literature (in particular “Safety II”), it indicates 
financial traders to be the ‘last- line of defence’ for preventing incidents, with organisational 
culture being essential to providing the motivation and environment for doing so. Chapter 6 
(article 4, published in the Journal of Business Ethics) examines this further, and establishes 
safety culture theory as an overarching framework through which to explain risk-related 
activities in financial trading. This study analyses ten recent high-profile trading mishaps in 
the UK, and shows safety culture problems (e.g. related to management commitment to 
safety) in each as underlying the failures; this counters prevailing narratives that focus on 
unethical ‘rule breakers’ rather than systemic problems.  
 
Chapter 7 is a critical discussion of the thesis and reviews each study (aim) undertaken within 
this PhD and discusses the findings, implications and limitations of each study (aim). Chapter 
8 draws together the main findings from each research study. It concludes that the application 
of human factors concepts in financial trading generates meaningful insight into how risk is 
managed in this domain, and extends human factors research into a previously unexplored, 
complex socio-technological environment.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 17 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The overall aim of this PhD is to apply human factors theories and methodologies to financial 
trading. This is intended to yield original insights and methodologies for managing risk in 
financial trading, and to extend human factors concepts into previously unchartered domains. 
This chapter first provides the personal context to the PhD, and then delivers a description of 
the financial trading domain. It then reviews financial trading literature in order to situate the 
current research, and then considers the integration of financial trading into human factors 
literature. Finally, based on the initial review, a series of macro- and micro-level research 
questions are outlined.  
 
1.1 Personal statement 
 
In the fall of 2012, a little over two years into my professional placement with the 
participating organization (a medium-sized commodity trading company), I approached 
senior management about the potential opportunity to build a tool to capture human-driven 
incidents that were occurring on the trading floor. Routinely, we were encountering the same 
set of incidents, typically driven by a poor shared understanding and lack of communication 
between the trading department teams that were dependent upon each other to achieve 
successful transactions, but we did not possess a means of collecting, monitoring, analysing 
and learning from these incidents. What I had been observing for some time was that 
dangerous preconditions would go unnoticed or be ‘worked around’ because of the inherent 
difficulty in handling the bulk of information in out-of-date systems and a constantly 
changing set of conditions on the trading floor. The incident could be so complex, vague or 
dynamic that the information available at any one time would be dispersed across several 
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teams and locations, meaning that when the risk teams tried to make sense of the problems, 
they found that individuals and teams often held contrasting and changing interpretations of 
the same situation. I became instantly fascinated with how to capture and manage the relevant 
information and create a means for the organization to learn from it.  
 
In my privileged role on the trading floor I have seen first-hand the cost of human error, yet 
incidents have not been investigated in a systematic way. Moreover, the issues that crop up in 
a single trading floor are not dissimilar to the issues that underpin more critical incidents, like 
those of the recent and highly publicised trading misconduct scandals (e.g. LIBOR rigging 
and mis-selling).  For this reason, I am interested in improving how incidents can be collected 
and learnt from. With support from the participating organization, I began to investigate a 
way in which we could collect the incidents we were observing on the floor and construct an 
ambient, holistic form of measurement embedded within the organization.  
 
The work undertaken in this thesis is driven by a professional capacity (e.g. informing 
organizational risk management, generating feedback to the organization on current issues 
and delivering interventions), as well as an intellectual drive (e.g. developing a methodology 
and a philosophy for how risk should be managed in financial trading, and contributing to the 
field of organizational psychology and human factors).  
 
1.2 Financial trading 
 
The trading environment is where products (e.g. equities, short-term, long-term, options) are 
bought and sold by financial traders in order to manage investment portfolios and generate 
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profit for investment banks, energy companies and brokers. Trading requires an ability to 
anticipate market trends (i.e. for buying and selling) and negotiate large wholesale trades, and 
due to the sums of money and time-pressure involved in trading, it is a well-paid but stressful 
occupation. It is inherently risky, with reward systems incentivizing risk-taking that results in 
profit. Whilst this should reward analytical decision-making processes, profit can also emerge 
from 'noise trading' (irrational and erratic trading activities that reflect somewhat random 
decision-making), which in turn can negatively influence 'rational' trading (and therefore 
penalize logical decision-making).  
 
The trading floor itself is a large, noisy and socio-technological space wherein traders (and 
support teams) watch monitors and interact by phone, internal chat sys tems or in small 
groups. Each desk is intentionally grouped as a specialized desk (e.g. the teams are divided 
according to the financial instrument or commodity that they trade or support, such as 
equities, bonds, natural gas, coal etc.) and it is the successful interactions across these 
heterogeneous desks that underlie organizational performance (Beunza, 2004). 
 
The spatial configuration of the trading floor is standardized across most trading houses to 
provide the socio-spatial resources to promote a situated awareness or sense making 
capabilities (Beunza, 2004; Hicks, 2004). Workstations are in close proximity in order to 
allow traders to communicate with each other without leaving their individual workstation. In 
terms of joint activity, traders typically cycle between working alone and in collaborative 
teams; they monitor other desks’ activity, share information, work with spatially distributed 
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team members via phone and interpret the ‘noise’ of the floor (Hicks, 2004; Willman, 
Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson, & Soane, 2006).  
 
1.3 Scoping literature review 
 
This section conducts a preliminary review of the existing literature in order to identify 
instances where human factors concepts have been either applied, or recognized as relevant, 
to the financial trading domain. This literature review was non-exhaustive1; however this was 
done in order to permit a better understanding of human error and failure in the financial 
trading domain through the lens of industry ‘experts’, and to position this work’s 
contributions into the broader literature on error analysis in financial trading.  
  
In terms of a description of the literature that has been identified and reported on, the 
literature broadly exists within the realms of management studies and behavioural economics, 
with editorials and articles most popularly found in management journals such as 
Management Science, Academy of Management, Human Relations, Harvard Business 
Review, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of Finance, Journal of Behavioural 
Decision Making and Journal of Behavioural Finance, or risk management related journals 
such as Regulation and Governance and Journal of Risk Research. Both being relatively new 
domains of academic scholarship, the majority of the papers deemed relevant were published 
after 1990, with a clear uptick in impressionistic editorials and case study analysis following 
the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent cases of trading misconduct.  
                                                 
1 A systematic literature review of existing empirical studies of non-technical skills in 
financial trading is presented in Chapter 2. 
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In regards to specific areas of study, there is a notable bias towards retail banking, with topics 
varying from consumer decision making, e-banking and trust, judgements around 
loans/mortgages and, more broadly, critiques regarding the effectiveness of emerging 
regulation, audit and compliance strategies. The literature search filtered out non-trading 
domains and the final body of literature that remained essentially fell into one of two 
theoretical foci: behavioural economics or regulation and governance. A tertiary batch of 
literature that tended to focus on highly generic cross-sectional data on leadership styles (e.g. 
transformational versus transactional leadership). However, the leadership literature was 
greatly decontextualized and the results were primarily derived from case study analysis of 
large banking institutions, and therefore less directly relevant to the trading domain and the 
aims of this work.  
 
1.3.1 Behavioural economics literature 
The first set of work that was examined sits in the behavioural economics domain. 
Behavioural economics rejects the rational actor model of neoclassical economics and instead 
promotes the idea that actors are ‘boundly rational’.  
 
Bounded rationality. Bounded rationality refers to how perfectly rational decisions are often 
not feasible in practice due to certain limitations (e.g. cognitive resources, intractable 
decision problems, time pressure), and therefore traders often must compensate for this by 
making less than optimal decisions (Simon, 1991).  
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This theory attempts to account for the behaviours that underpin financial failure and 
scandals through the application of psychological concepts to understand financial decision-
making. For example, literature that positions itself within this body of work tends to focus 
on decontextualized micro-aspects of decision-making, such as the heuristics and biases in 
decision-making with non-expert participants (e.g. students) (Awamleh & Gardner, 1999; 
Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Geyery & Steyrer, 1998; Howell & Hall-Merenda; Lee, Cheng, 
Yeung, & Lai, 2011; Shahin & Wright, 2004; Singh, 2008). A key paper by Garling and 
colleagues summarizes this body of literature and its impacts in the general financial services 
domain well, ultimately presenting the argument that financial markets overtax the actors’ 
capacity to make rational judgements and decisions – and that cognitive bias 
(overconfidence, over-optimism, influences of nominal representation) underpins the 
behaviours and practices observed in cases of misconduct across the financial domain 
(Garling, Kirchler, Lewis, & van Raaij, 2009).  
 
Information ‘gaps’. The idea that traders operate within bounded cognitive fields is 
repeatedly acknowledged in the literature, where several articles point to problems in the 
distribution and interpretation of critical information as underpinning poor decision-making. 
For example, studies suggest that perhaps key information about trades and activity is not 
available to central team members who could understand its significance, and that this leads 
to ‘gaps’ in knowledge within and between the teams (e.g. front office and middle office) 
(Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, & Willman, 2003; Michel, 2007). These ‘gaps’ in 
information have a range of identified causes such as non-participatory decision-making 
leading to groupthink of senior management and traders in determining risk tolerances, 
human-machine interface design flaws (e.g. information not made available in a digestible 
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way to the operators) and procedural drift (e.g. the modelling of risk within the financial 
institutions is too mechanic, with human input all but removed from the decision-making 
process) (Hicks, 2004). It is argued that these processes that led to the creation of information 
‘gaps’ are compounded by the intangible and complex nature of financial products, where 
vast amounts of uncertainty and information vacuums exist (Beunza, 2004; Willman et al., 
2006).  
 
Moral hazards. Finally, some studies draw upon the ‘moral hazards’ problem in explaining 
the extreme decision-making observed in financial trading. Meaning, where self- interested 
parties expose their market counterparts to excessive amounts of risk, they argue that this is 
because the risk-taking party does not bear the full costs associated with the activity, yet does 
gain all of the associated benefits (Dowd, 2009; Edmonds, 2007).  
 
Limitations. Although the psychological concepts explored in the behavioural finance 
literature do possess some explanatory value and have been seminal in terms of documenting 
decision-making heuristics, for example by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, 1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), their practical implications for 
financial trading are somewhat limited. In fact, relatively few of the studies empirically 
explore the behaviours in-situ, and therefore their findings are relatively decontextualized. 
The methods, materials and settings of such experimental work do not accurately replicate 
‘real-world’ trading environments (i.e. ecological validity), and therefore their findings can 
be difficult to operationalize (Brewer, 2000; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Such work shows 
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the importance of cognitive biases and affective influences in shaping trading decisions (e.g. 
overconfidence, optimism, loss aversion), albeit in a relatively decontextualized way (e.g. 
ignoring expertise, situational constraints and organizational environment). Therefore, whilst 
laboratory-style studies are useful for outlining broad principles on decision-making in high-
stakes finance, the work in this thesis is geared to working with ‘in-situ’ research and 
methods adapted to a more ecological approach (Cacciabue & Hollnagel, 1995).  
 
1.3.2 Regulation and governance literature 
A second set of literature that aims to conceptualize failures in the financial trading industry 
is regulation and governance literature. This set of literature conceptualizes error in the 
financial domain as the product of a lax set of accounting standards and internal compliance 
regimes. This body of literature argues that repeated cases of misconduct might also be 
understood as a result of ‘Thatcherite’ reformist policies (e.g. reduced role of government in 
regulatory oversight) and the proliferation of self- regulation across the industry. Topics 
generally focused on are audit cultures, corporate governance structures, economic policy, 
credit failure, monetary policy and organizational restructuring (Cumming, Dannhauser, & 
Johan, 2015; Power, 2009). The methods used in these studies primarily relied on cost-
benefit analysis and post-hoc case study analysis of misconduct and impressionistic accounts 
of post- financial crisis phenomena (e.g. explorations of why macro-economic models failed, 
and historical anecdotes of financial crisis and ethical drift).  
 
Applications. Practical interventions aimed at improving risk management that are generated 
from this body of research include the mining of large amounts of trade data (e.g. for 
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portfolio compression and reconciliation); third-party trade matching (e.g. a third party 
matches the trades between two counterparts to ensure all trades are booked into the 
individual organizations’ portfolios); the emergence of targeted corporate governance codes 
(e.g. the Bank of England Senior Management Regime, SMR); new areas of work driven by 
legislation such as Basel II, MFID and EMIR (e.g. operational compliance teams); and a 
more central role for the Financial Conduct Authority (UK). The aims of increasing 
regulation are standardization, transparency, predictability and a reduction in acts of 
misconduct (e.g. fraudulent practices) (Edmonds, 2007; House of Commons Treasury 
Committee, 2009).  
 
Limitations. Other high-risk industries that have similarly reacted to cases of failure and 
human error with increasing regulation and enhanced oversight (e.g. aviation and healthcare) 
have suffered from the ‘bureaucratization of safety’ that undermines organizational ability to 
reach a desired state of safety (Dekker, 2014). Aspects of the ‘bureaucratization of safety’ 
include the snowballing proceduralization of risk (undermining critical thinking in deference 
to procedures), the proliferation of out-of-date rules, a drain on organizational resources and 
greater difficulty capturing contextual sensitivities (e.g. nuances and changes in tools, 
insights and experiences) (Amalberti, 2001). These effects also manifest in the financial 
trading domain, where trading houses transact hundreds of trades daily across thousands of 
licensed counterparts, meaning the sheer volume of data to be processed can overwhelm the 
local capacity (e.g. drain on the resources) of regulators. Also, the technology and financial 
instruments used in the finance domain are continually evolving and adapting in order to 
maintain competitive advantage in a globalized market – this is remarkably challenging for a 
regulator, who is generally less informed about the day-to-day business of trading houses and 
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therefore less equipped to stay up-to-date on the latest tools and technology, leading to 
difficulty in capturing the contextual nuance.  
 
Therefore, although increasing regulation may lead to a short-term modification of 
organizational behaviours and practices (e.g. new operating procedures, creation of oversight 
teams and dedicated whistle-blower posts), the solutions put forth in this literature are 
superficial and do not target the deeper-held beliefs and environmental factors (e.g. culture) 
that support and promote the behaviours and practices that lead to error.  
 
1.3.3 Summary 
Following a scoping review of both sets of relevant and existing literature, it is evident that 
neither sets of literature offer the methodological tools to understand in-situ error data or the 
theoretical concepts to identify and synthesize the observed behaviours and practices that 
lead to and capture error in the trading domain. Therefore, this thesis looks to work in other 
risky domains (e.g. high-risk organizations) to identify a theory or set of concepts to guide 
the investigation.  
 
1.4 High-risk industries 
 
This section aims to examine the potential benefits of taking a human factors approach to 
financial trading. It does this by comparing some of the core ‘features’ of financial trading to 
other high-risk industries, and through this reflecting on the concepts and methodologies that 
might be useful for understanding and improving risk management in financial trading.  
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1.4.1 The investigation of financial trading using human factors methods 
In other high-risk work domains, for example aviation, military and healthcare, in-depth 
analyses of the specific behaviours important for risk management within a given occupation 
are driven by human factors theory. Usefully, human factors theory offers a range of 
methodological tools (e.g. questionnaires, critical incident techniques, interviews) to 
understand in-situ error data, and provides theoretical frameworks for exploring how the 
behaviours and practices identified through error analysis underpin organizational 
performance.   
 
Human factors methodology is relevant to the financial trading domain because it is used to 
manage problems that are similar in nature in other high-risk domains, and thus offers a way 
of organizing, analysing and better understanding the operational trading incidents that are 
reported. Also, the results of human factors analysis have led to interventions and training 
programmes for improving safety across a wide variety of high-risk domains and could be 
usefully adapted to the financial trading domain (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008; 
Weigmann & Shappell, 1997). Moreover, human factors theory, and organizational 
psychology more generally, provides access to a wider field of literature to draw on to 
explain the behaviours observed on the floor. 
 
Notably, human factors approaches typically investigate safety in safety-critical organizations 
(e.g. nuclear, aviation, healthcare), where risk is engineered out of the system in order to 
achieve the desirable ‘state of safety’. Comparably, financial trading must also ensure that 
risk is continually managed and reduced where possible, and similarly, systemic problems in 
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human performance can place the organization and wider social and economic system at risk. 
Yet dissimilarly, the success of financial trading organizations also hinges on a level of overt 
risk-taking by traders (as this leads to a competitive advantage). For example, judgement is 
essential to making effective trading decisions, and with every trade there is the possibility of 
loss and profit.  
 
1.4.2 Financial trading as ‘ultra-resilient’  
Financial trading organisations are consistent with Amalberti’s (2013) description of an 
‘ultra-resilient’ organization. These are organizations where risk-taking is essential to 
success, and rather than engineering risk out of a system (e.g. through automation), it is 
managed through understanding and continually improving the employee skills required for 
effective performance (e.g. decision-making) whilst also ensuring systems are designed to 
reduce the likelihood of error (Amalberti, 2013). Defining financial trading organisations in 
this way is helpfully frames any further human factors investigations.  
 
In fact, drawing upon the safety profiles work developed by Amalberti et al (2013), finance 
can be situated within the greater HRO (high-risk organization) literature, usefully enabling 
the comparison of the financial trading domain to other high-risk domains (see figure 1).  
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Figure 1: ‘Riskiness’ of Financia l Trading, adapted from (Amalberti, Auroy, Berwick, & 
Barach, 2005) and based on data from studies 2 and 3 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the ‘riskiness’ of trading activity, and provides a descriptive risk profile of 
the domain compared to other established high-risk domains. Reflecting on the nature of the 
financial trading context, the domain possesses unique properties, where there is a trade-off 
between authorized, deliberate risk-taking (e.g. creating trading opportunities) and 
undesirable risk (e.g. unauthorised risk-taking and people risk). The organization expends 
ample energy in sustaining the balance of high productivity (e.g. creating trading opportunity, 
generating revenue) whilst maintaining ultra-high levels of safety (e.g. daily modelling and 
measuring of value-at-risk, market volatility and changes in market and credit risk exposure).  
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Incidents in the trading domain are defined as ‘operational incidents’. Operational incidents 
are situations where trading activity results in an avoidable financial loss (e.g. making a trade 
without assessing market-related risk), or compliance failures (e.g. breach of trading limits) 
which place the integrity of the financial organization at risk even if no loss has occurred 
(e.g. overexposure to volatile markets: (Zhao & Olivera, 2006)). The organization’s adaptive 
capacity to detect (e.g. cross check of roles) when an operational incident occurs (e.g. a 
trading breach) is key to maintaining a resilient safety profile and limiting failure. 
 
Importantly, the classification of ‘ultra-resilient’ situates financial trading within high-risk 
research and provides evidence to expand the set of domains considered as ‘high- risk’ to 
include financial trading. This justifies adopting a human factors approach within this 
domain.  
 
1.4.3 The significance of conceptualizing financial trading as a high-risk industry 
This shift in the conceptualization of finance importantly moves away from regulatory-based 
models and towards more human-centred models of error analysis, such as those employed in 
the human factors and safety domain. This reconceptualization is novel in the financial 
trading domain, yet parallels can be made between the recent work in other socio-
technological domains such as cyber security, which has identified the relevance of human 
factors theory and advocated a more humanist framework to better understand and improve 
safety (Dekker, 2014).  
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The traditional conceptualization of ‘safety’ in human factors has long been considered as a 
state where the number of things that can go wrong is as low as possible. From this 
perspective, the purpose of ‘safety’ or risk management is to ‘measure’ and ‘manage’ safety 
through the inspection of failures. This works well in tractable systems, where the common 
factor is the breakdown, failure or malfunctioning of machinery or technology with more 
obvious and generally linear cause-effect relationships (e.g. accident models).  
 
Yet the modern economy (e.g. of which financial trading is a part), and the technical and 
socio-technical systems that are attributed to it, continues to innovate and is shaped by 
increasingly powerful information technology – this means that systems and work 
environments have progressively become more intractable (Hollnagel, Wears, & Braithwaite, 
2015). More precisely, automation and new technologies have resulted in new roles, 
decisions and vulnerabilities, while staff is also faced with new levels of complexity, 
adaptation and constraints. This means that methods and models of traditional systems (e.g. 
tractable systems) are less able to deliver the necessary and desirable ‘state of safety’ that 
these organizations seek.  
 
1.4.4 Summary 
Although not a safety-critical industry, the risks posed by the financial domain can be equally 
as disastrous as those observed in other risky domains. The failure of the financial industry in 
2008 and subsequent trading misconduct scandals have had far-reaching societal 
consequences. At a national level, the monetary impact was widespread and required 
government bailouts of unprecedented proportions (850 billion GBP) (National Audit Office, 
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2010), which in turn led to pervasive austerity measures and  curtailed government spending 
on social structures (e.g. hospitals, education). At the societal level, millions of jobs and 
billions of pounds of household income were lost, resulting in persistent unemployment and 
escalating levels of inequality and poverty.   
 
The socio-technical complexity and intractability of financial trading is reflective of the 
changing economic landscape – where rapid technological change redefines the relationship 
between people and systems, transforms work processes and practices and increases the 
operational requirements of operators. Existing theoretical work has identified the need for a 
‘New Era’ of human factors research that challenges the prevailing worldview (e.g. safety as 
a focus on what goes wrong) and promotes a more humanist interpretation of safety (e.g. 
safety as a focus on what goes right) (Dekker, 2014).  
 
Financial trading would benefit from being a high-risk domain subject to human factors 
analysis. This is because human factors approaches are useful for understanding recurrent and 
systemic problems in risk management and can lead to insight on the number and types of 
incidents occurring within an organisation, their consequences, and the complex network of 
issues (e.g. errors, skill gaps, resources) that underpin them.  Furthermore, reconceptualizing 
finance through the application of human factors challenges the field of human factors to 
engage with a non-traditional (e.g. high-risk, but not safety-critical) domain. In doing this, 
aspects of the prevailing worldview in human factors ‘safety’ thinking and financial risk 
management practices might also be re-imagined.  
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1.5 Research aims 
 
Thus, human factors theories and methodologies appear conceptually relevant and practically 
useful for explaining and improving risk management in financial trading; however, this 
remains to be established. This is examined in the current PhD through investigating and 
applying two of the most commonly used concepts within human factors literature: non-
technical skills and safety culture.  
 
First, non-technical skills relate to the behaviours and abilities of operators that can both 
cause and protect against failures to manage risk. This is important for unders tanding both 
how operational incidents are generated (e.g. human error), and also how they can be averted. 
In high-risk industries (e.g. aviation, nuclear, healthcare) that face similar challenges to 
financial trading (e.g. stress, complexity, risk, severe consequences for failure), human 
factors research has investigated the non-technical skills (e.g. teamwork) of operational staff 
essential for performance. In-depth analyses of behaviours and tasks are used to support the 
analysis of critical incidents (e.g. to understand the causes of human error), and to identify 
the context specific skills that underpin effective performance for a given task or situation. 
Analyses can lead to the change or redesign of working environments and tasks (e.g. 
technology, culture, protocols) in order to support non-technical skills, or the design and 
implementation of assessment and training packages (e.g. teamwork, hazard identification) 
for improving behaviour and performance (Helmreich, Anca, & Kanki, 2010; O’Connor et 
al., 2008). 
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Second, safety culture theory is used to examine how the organizational environment shapes 
the way people behave and think in relation to risk. This is important for understanding the 
conditions under which risk in financial trading can be effectively managed. Although 
different approaches exist to theorize and measure organizational culture (Cameron & Quinn, 
2005; Erez & Gati, 2004; Hofstede et al., 1990), safety culture has become the dominant 
theory used to understand how cultural factors determine risk practices in industries that must 
balance competing demands of productivity and safety (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Nordlöf et 
al., 2015). This is because safety culture explains how social environments directly influence 
risk practices, and because problems in safety culture often underlie mishaps within other 
high-risk domains (e.g. aviation, healthcare, energy). Although financial trading is not a 
safety-critical industry, mishaps are highly damaging for organizations and economies, and 
their causes (e.g. managerial pressure to increase profit, ineffective procedures) are similar to 
those in other high-risk industries (Leaver & Reader, 2017).  
 
Through utilizing these concepts, the following primary research aim is addressed: to 
investigate whether human factors approaches help understand error in the financial trading 
domain. To elaborate on this primary aim, the following sub-aims are posed, with each aim 
being explored through an empirical study;  
 
1. To establish whether non-technical skills are critical to risk management in 
financial trading (Study 1) 
2. To develop a methodology for capturing operational incidents within financial 
trading, and drawing on this (Study 2),  
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3. To examine the human factors issues (and in particular non-technical skills) 
underlying operational incidents within financial trading (Study 3) 
4. To investigate whether operational incident reports contain data important for 
understanding how operational incidents are averted (Study 4) 
5. To establish the utility of safety culture for understanding risk-related 
activities in financial trading (Study 5) 
 
We examine these specific research aims in greater depth below. Through addressing them, 
this thesis examines whether risk management in financial trading can be improved through 
adopting human factors theories and methods, with approaches for doing this being outlined 
and tested. Furthermore, it explores the idea that – because of the causes and consequences of 
failures in financial trading – the industry should be conceptualized as a high-risk industry, 
with implications for policy and research. This will expand the types of domains of interest to 
human factors researchers, with financial trading being a particularly complex domain due to 
the importance of both risk-taking and risk management for organizational success. 
 
1.5.1 Description of the research aims  
The structure of this thesis is that a chapter will broadly map onto each of the research aims 
outlined above. Each aim is addressed through an empirical study. In aggregation, these 
attempt to reconceptualize financial trading as a high-risk industry. Each aim is reviewed 
below.  
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Aim 1. Establishing whether non-technical skills are critical to risk management in financial 
trading 
 
The first aim of this thesis is to establish whether non-technical skills are critical to risk 
management in financial trading. This is important, because it investigates the principle that 
the behaviours and skills of human operators can both create and prevent risk within financial 
trading. This is an integral part of human factors approaches to managing risk in other 
industries, and establishing whether financial trading also shows these features is a first step 
to reconceptualizing it using human factors concepts.  
 
This aim is addressed in chapter 2 (article 1) through a systematic review of studies reporting 
on non-technical skills and behaviours in the financial domain. The study i) identifies ‘real-
world’ (e.g. non- laboratory) research reporting behavioural data in financial trading; ii) 
examines and reports on data on non-technical skills (and other human factors issues) found 
to underpin good or poor performance and risk management in financial trading; and iii) 
considers the quality and coverage of research investigating non-technical skills in financial 
trading and provides a scope for future research. The insertion of financial trading in the non-
technical skills literature is novel, and accesses a set of literature that previously had not been 
considered in this domain. Furthermore, it tests the wider principle that human factors 
concepts, and in particular non-technical skills, are important for understanding risk-
management in financial trading, and thus should be more formally applied.  
 
Aim 2. Developing a methodology for capturing operational incidents within financial 
trading 
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The second aim of this thesis is to develop a methodology for capturing and then analysing 
operational incidents in financial trading. The generation of a robust methodology is essentia l 
so that data can be retrieved on error and non-technical skills. To achieve this, the 
development of a system for capturing, monitoring and analysing operational incidents in the 
financial trading domain is described. The work in this chapter defines ‘op erational incidents’ 
in financial trading as trading activity that results in an avoidable loss (e.g. making a trade 
without assessing market-related risk) or compliance failures (e.g. breach of trading limits), 
which place the integrity of the financial organization at risk even if no loss has occurred 
(e.g. overexposure to volatile markets: (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). 
 
This study is reported in chapter 3 ‘Development of an Incident Collection Tool’. The 
methodological work described here forms the core of the PhD thesis. Specifically, the 
chapter recounts the design, development and early testing of an operational incident 
collection and analysis tool for financial trading: the Financial Incident Analysis System 
(FINANS). Notably, within financial trading there is no precedent for incident reporting in 
terms of either methodology for collecting incident data, defining and understanding what 
constitutes an incident, or informing organizational learning initiatives. Therefore the 
extension of human factors methodology to the financial trading domain is novel, and 
provides the opportunity to empirically evidence the premise that human factors theory and 
concepts are relevant in the trading domain and that risk management is improved through 
the application of human factors concepts.  
 
Aim 3. Examining the human factors underlying operational incidents within financial 
trading 
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The third study of the thesis presented in chapter 4 examines i) the frequency and 
consequences of operational incidents in financial trading; and ii) the role of non-technical 
skills and other human factors issues as contributors to them. Through the process of 
analysing incidents, the reliability and validity of the FINANS methodology is tested.  
 
This aim is addressed in a two-part study presented in chapter 4 (article 2). The study reports 
on the application of the FINANS, which was designed to achieve three goals: first, to 
provide a standardized method for collecting data on operational incidents that occur on the 
trading floor; second, to develop a reliable method for analysing and extracting human 
factors-related contributors to operational incidents; and third, to provide practical insight 
into how these contributors might be ameliorated.  This study marks an expansion of current 
empirical and theoretical applications of incident reporting and human factors theory to a 
high-risk (but not safety-critical) domain. Furthermore, the work undertaken in this chapter 
reconceptualizes the way financial trading is considered, providing key evidence to the social 
and cognitive nature of error in this domain.  
 
Aim 4. Investigating whether operational incident reports contain data important for 
understanding how operational incidents are averted 
 
The fourth aim of the thesis is to examine what can be learnt in terms of the skills and 
systems important for avoiding operational incidents. This is important because it 
demonstrates that the skills of human operators can both create and prevent error within 
financial trading, and empirically establishes that incident data contains relevant human 
factors information important to understanding how incidents are captured and detected. 
Moreover, this research also shows how data from incident monitoring systems can be 
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analysed in a fashion more consistent with averting error. This resonates with the safety II 
literature, which examines the good practice for mitigating, rather than reducing, error. 
 
This aim is addressed in chapter 5 (article 3) “Near Misses in Financial Trading: Skills for 
Capturing and Averting Error”. This chapter examines the utility of near-miss data to identify 
the core social-psychological skills that are used to capture and ameliorate error. As near-
misses regularly occur in financial trading, the study aims to identify opportunities for 
organizational learning through examining the recovery mechanisms that led to the detection 
of incidents before failing. Specifically, the study reports on three sets of analyses. First, the 
assessment of the reliability of coding for the human factors skills that capture and ameliorate 
error on the trading floor is analysed in order to ensure the coding consistency and 
robustness. Second, the study identifies the frequency with which various human factors 
skills cause – and for the first time in human factors literature – ameliorate near misses. To 
achieve this, a frequency analysis of the coded incidents is undertaken. Third, an analysis of 
the skills and systems used to detect and prevent error and the causes of error together, the 
purpose of which is to illustrate how the skills that cause error and the skills that ameliorate 
error may interrelate. This work reconceptualizes finance through the application of human 
factors, and challenges the field of human factors to engage with a non-traditional (e.g. high-
risk, but not safety-critical) domain. In doing this, aspects of the prevailing worldview in 
human factors ‘safety’ thinking and financial risk management prac tices might also be re-
imagined (e.g. supplementing a focus on what goes wrong with a focus on what goes right). 
 
Aim 5. Establishing the utility of safety culture for understanding risk-related activities in 
financial trading 
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The final aim of the thesis is to examine whether risk management in financial trading can be 
understood from a safety culture perspective.  
 
At this point, the research in this thesis expands beyond the focus on non-technical skills and 
human error, and considers the wider system within which behaviour occurs. This is 
important, because behaviours in relation to risk do not occur within a vacuum; they are a 
product of wider norms, values and institutional systems (Chen, Sawyers, & Williams, 1997; 
Kaptein, 2011; Saini & Martin, 2009). Understanding how the macro-level trading 
environment might shape micro- level risk-related behaviours of traders is critical for 
intervention and change. It is also important for conceptualizing financial trading as akin to 
other high-risk industries.  
 
This aim is addressed in Chapter 6 (artic le 4) entitled “Safety Culture in Financial Trading: 
An Analysis of Trading Misconduct Investigations”. In this chapter, safety culture theory is 
applied to conceptualize and explain failures to manage risk within financial trading in a 
standardized way, using FCA Final Notices. Identifying the human factors that underpin error 
in the trading domain on their own cannot ensure that failure will be avoided. The analysis of 
the human factors that underpin operational incidents must be layered with an understanding 
of the culture within the organization; it is meaningless if the culture of the organization is 
not incentivized to act on the information provided from the analysis.  
 
Furthermore, the chapter counters narratives focusing on traders who are unethical ‘rule 
breakers’, and emphasizes the value of a systematic approach, whereby safety culture theory 
is used to explain why risky behaviours in financial trading occur. This work demonstrates 
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that safety culture shapes how operators behave and think in relation to risk, and this is 
central to understanding the conditions under which risk in financial trading can be 
effectively managed.  
 
1.5.2 Summary  
The work undertaken in this thesis reconceptualizes how we understand financial trading 
(and financial services more generally) in terms of human factors, and it also contributes to 
the expansion of human factors theory through its application to the financial trading domain. 
The Financial Incident Analysis System (FINANS) developed and tested within this thesis 
not only allows us to test and provide evidence to this premise, but also delivers a 
contextualized description of the behavioural nature of the problems in financial trading and 
illuminates how these are often a product of environmental factors such as culture.  
 
Furthermore, the application of human factors theory in financial trading challenges the field 
to engage with a non-traditional (e.g. high-risk, but not safety-critical) domain. This will 
expand the fields of interest to human factors researchers, with financial trading being a 
particularly complex domain due to the importance of both risk-taking and risk management 
for organizational success. The application of human factors concepts in this industry 
generates meaningful and novel insight into how safety is managed in a complex socio-
technological domain.    
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CHAPTER 2: NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS  
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2. NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS 
 
2.1 Preface 
 
The first aim of this thesis is to establish whether non-technical skills are critical to risk 
management in financial trading. This is important, because it investigates the principle that 
the behaviours and skills of human operators can both create and prevent risk within financial 
trading. This is an integral part of human factors approaches to managing risk in other 
industries, and establishing whether financial trading also shows these features is a first step 
to reconceptualizing it using human factors concepts.  
 
This aim is addressed in study 1 through a systematic review of studies reporting on non-
technical skills and behaviours in the financial domain (chapter 2). The literature review 
presented in chapter 2 (article 1) entitled “Non-technical Skills for Managing Risk and 
Performance in Financial Trading” has three aims: i) identify ecologically valid (or ‘real-
world’) research studies investigating the relationship between non-technical skills and 
performance within the domain of financial trading; ii) examine the data on the non-technical 
skills found to underpin good or poor performance in financial trading and to report on this 
data in order to provide a first-stage overview of the non-technical skills (NTS) important for 
performance on the trading floor and iii) consider the quality and coverage of research 
investigating NTS in financial trading and identify potential areas for future research.   
 
The insertion of financial trading in the non-technical skills literature is novel, and accesses a 
set of literature that previously had not been considered in this domain. Furthermore, it tests 
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the wider principle that human factors concepts, and in particular non-technical skills, are 
important for understanding risk management in financial trading, and thus should be more 
formally applied.  
 
The results of the systematic literature review are presented and grouped into two categories: 
the cognitive skills (e.g. situation awareness, decision making) and social skills (teamwork, 
leadership). Whilst not a comprehensive guide to non-technical skills in financial trading, the 
framework captures and presents existing knowledge. Arguably, the cognitive and social 
skills are inherently intertwined and do not sit distinctly apart. However, for the sake of 
creating a structured framework to draw upon, they are presented separately.  
 
The journal article (article 1, “Non-technical Skills for Managing Risk and Performance in 
Financial Trading”) that follows was authored by Leaver and Reader (2015) and published in 
the Journal of Risk Research. Leaver designed and carried out the case study and systematic 
literature review, authored the main drafts and contributed to roughly 80% of the content. 
Reader provided key supervisory assistance, editorial suggestions and contributed to roughly 
20% of the content. Three anonymous reviewers provided helpful feedback, suggested edits 
and ultimately approved the article for publication.  
 
The Journal of Risk Research  has an impact factor of 1.34 and is currently ranked 29/96 
(social sciences, interdisciplinary).  
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Abstract 
Recent financial incidents have been found to be caused, in-part, by human factors-related 
issues in financial trading (e.g. leadership and decision-making). Yet, there has been relatively 
minimal application of human factors research to understand effective risk management in 
financial trading. In other high-risk environments, the non-technical skills (i.e. leadership, 
decision making, situation awareness, teamwork) of organisational actors performing risk-
related roles are examined in order to specify the behaviours and standards required for safe 
activity. This study i) identifies 'real-life' (i.e. non-laboratory) research studies investigating 
the relationship between non-technical skills and performance within financial trading, ii) 
examines and synthesises data on the non-technical skills found to underpin good or poor 
performance, and iii) considers the quality and coverage of research investigating non-technical 
skills in financial trading, and identifies potential areas for future research. Twenty studies were 
reviewed, and a qualitative association between non-technical skills and performance in 
financial trading established. The review found a range of decision-making (e.g. heuristics and 
biases, intuitive DM, emotional regulation) and leadership skills (e.g. setting standards, 
monitoring behaviour, encouraging speaking-up) to have been identified as essential for the 
management of risk in financial trading environments. Furthermore, situation awareness (e.g. 
information search and assessment strategies, vigilance, identifying 'noise' data) and teamwork 
(e.g. avoiding 'role' conflict, communication between traders) were found to often be essential 
for good risk-management, yet remain less explored within the literature, and should be the 
focus of future research. Non-technical skills are essential for effective risk management within 
the financial sector, yet further field research is required to examine the context-relevant  
behaviours that underpin safe activity. This will facilitate the development of evidence-based 
systems for assessing and training non-technical skills competencies. 
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Introduction 
Effective risk management in financial trading 1 relies on a combination of technical and non-
technical skills. Non-technical skills (NTS) are the social (teamwork, leadership) and cognitive 
skills (situation awareness, decision-making) that underpin the effective performance of 
individuals and teams working in complex and risky organisational settings (Flin, O’Connor, 
and Crichton 2008). Due to the importance of good communication and decision-making in 
financial trading, non-technical skills are identified as essential for effective risk management 
in this setting (Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2003; Hicks 2004; Kahn and Cooper 1996). This is 
similar to other industries that manage risk, yet in financial trading the meaning of ‘risk’ can 
differ somewhat. In financial trading, risk refers to activities that lead to losses, or threaten the 
stability of the organisation (but not physical damage) as well as the opportunity that can be 
realised from activity . More specifically, ‘operational risk’ involves the operating mechanisms 
of the market and organisation (e.g. failure of the trading software), and ‘behavioural risk’ is 
the risk that the staff will either commit an error or engage in behaviour that results in financial 
losses (Willman et al. 2002). Thus, the ability of financial traders to cope with operational risk 
(i.e. to cope with the environment) and avoid behavioural risk (i.e. decision-making errors) 
underlies organisational performance.  
 
In high-risk industries (e.g. aviation, nuclear, healthcare) that face similar challenges to 
financial trading (e.g. stress, complexity, risk, severe consequences for failure), human factors 
research has identified the non-technical skills that are essential for effective risk management. 
This work is used to support the analysis of critical incidents, the assessment of non-technical 
competencies, and training to enhance staff skills (Kanki, Helmreich and Anca 2010; O’Connor 
                                                                 
1 For the purpose of this review, the term financial trading refers to “high stakes trading activities” and is 
associated with investment banking, and financial and commodity trading activities (including the trading 
support domains) where the failure of the institution would cause catastrophic social, political, economic 
damage. 
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et al. 2008a). Within financial trading, interventions and solutions for improving risk 
management have tended to focus on regulation and management rather than human-factors 
related issues (Hutter and Power, 2005; Power, 2004). Yet, research has long shown how 
psychology shapes financial decision-making (Tversky, Kahnemen and Choice, 1981). In this 
article, we review research investigating the non-technical skills that underpin the effective 
performance and management of risk in financial trading. We focus primarily on the role of 
the ‘traders’ who make high-risk decisions (e.g. buying and selling assets) within financial 
organisations. The purpose is to examine current knowledge on non-technical skills within the 
trading environment, to place, interpret, and synthesise this within a non-technical skills 
framework, and to identify future areas of investigation.   
 
Human factors and financial trading  
As discussed above, human factors approaches to managing organizational risk may provide 
useful insight for understanding performance in financial trading (Sutcliffe, 2011). In-depth 
analyses of the specific behaviours important for risk management within high risk work 
domains such as aviation, military and healthcare (e.g. according to working environment and 
role) have led to interventions and training programmes for improving behavioural safety 
(Weigmann and Shappell 2005; Flin, O’Connor and Crichton 2008). Yet, analogous  
frameworks do not exist within the domain of financial trading.  
 
However, recent and high-profile incidences within financial trading have exemplified the 
vulnerability of the financial sector to human factors related problems, and the need for a better 
understanding of human performance. In particular, catastrophic problems in the performance 
of traders have led to financial institutions receiving large fines, billion dollar losses, and huge 
reputational damage. Recent cases have included rogue trading on stock futures at Societe 
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General in 2008 (resulting in -£3b in losses and fines) (Clark 2012), the manipulation of the 
Libor rates (foreign exchange markets) at UBS, RBS, and Barclays in 2011 (-£300m) (Enrich 
2012), money laundering at HSBC in 2012 (-£1.2b) (Smythe 2013), and electricity price 
rigging at JP Morgan (-$405m). Whilst such incidences have typically been seen as caused by 
‘rogue traders’ (employees making unauthorized trades on behalf of their institution) and 
organisational cultures which facilitate poor behaviour (e.g. rewarding recklessness, little 
oversight), investigations also reveal a range of non-technical skill problems in the trading 
environment. For example, managers failing to lead and monitor behaviour on the trading floor, 
traders incorrectly interpreting risk-related data, poor communication between traders on 
critical information pertaining to trades (e.g. risk exposure), and traders not taking action on 
identifying irregular trading activities by colleagues. 
 
To further illustrate, table 1 outlines some of the human factors problems recently identified 
by the Senate Subcommittee investigative report (2013) into the JP Morgan Chase rogue 
trading scandal in 2012. This is generally considered to be one of the most serious recent 
financial trading scandals of modern times. It resulted in a loss of $1B (USD) in paid fines, 
$9.2B in legal fees, a proposed wide ranging settlement figure of $20B (USD), and serious 
reputational damage to the financial industry (Schwartz and Silver-Greenberg, 2012; Silver-
Greenberg and Craig, 2012). It was caused by traders recklessly staking billions of dollars on 
the performance of derivative credit default swaps.  
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Table 1: Human factors issues identified in the JPMorgan trading scandal of 2012 
Key Events 
 
Human Factors problems 
Jan 2012: Inaccurate speculation by the trading 
desk regarding the default (bankruptcy) of Eastman 
Kodak. Nine days of straight losses followed, with 
traders attempting to hold onto trades in a falling 
bond market, resulted in a total loss of £50M.  
 
Poor anticipation and recognition of the risks 
associated with position taking. 
Overconfidence and a clear lack of understanding 
of market volatility and direction (resulting in risk 
not being hedged). 
Jan – Mar 2012: Accumulation of outsized 
positions in the credit default swap market (CDS) 
and incorrect speculation on bond defaults by the 
trading desk left the organisation grossly 
overexposed to market fluctuations. CDS positions 
were not unravelled in time, and a market crash in 
Europe meant the risk could not be hedged quickly 
enough. As losses accrued, traders attempted to 
cover them up, leaving the bank further exposed. 
Losses totalled at least $2bn. 
Poor coordination of activities between trading 
staff, and failures to exchange information 
following a “trading spree”, led to an oversized 
trading position (leaving the bank overly exposed to 
market volatility). 
Failures to accurately evaluate risk in the bond 
market underlay the failure to close the trading 
position before massive losses were incurred.  
Trading limits were repeatedly breached by the 
trading desk, yet no disciplinary action was taken 
by leadership. 
Failure by the trading desk to respect or recognise 
the long term impacts of breaching trading limits. 
Failure by the risk control team to understand the 
risk posed by the CDS position, and lack of 
agreement within the team on whether to take 
action (resulting in inertia). 
 
Jan 2012 - Ongoing: Software problems led to an 
inability to retrieve accurate pricing, with up to 
80% of traders experiencing technical and 
functional limitations in trading activities. Traders 
adjusted their prices ‘experientially’ rather than 
using reliable and consensus based market prices, 
with the market value being distorted. 
 
Inconsistent access to vital benchmarking price 
information led to problems in decision making for 
active traders (e.g. a lack of accurate information). 
A lack of standardisation in trading decision-
making processes, and manipulations of pricing 
mechanisms, and led to inaccurate representation of 
trading positions, which further compromised 
decision-making. 
 
Apr 2012: Large losses were realised by the Chief 
Investment Officer (CIO), however no remedial 
action was taken by senior management to curtail 
aggressive trading patterns.  
The losses and problems in trading patterns were 
not considered a major issue by senior 
management, and they remained unaware of the 
frequency and magnitude of poor trading activity. 
Breaches in trading limits were regular and not 
punished, meaning the standards on trading limits 
were not respected by trading teams or 
management.  
 
May 2012: Failures in providing full information 
on the trading scandal to regulators resulted in 
increased speculation and a loss of confidence in 
the firm 
  
Poor oversight by organisational leadership on the 
on-going failure. 
Poor coordination between organisational 
leadership and traders. 
Problems by senior management in assessing the 
severity of the situation, and in coordinating with 
the regulator.  
 
Consistent with models used to explain organisational accidents (Reason, 1990, pp202), a range 
of active (e.g. traders ignoring trading limits, poor coordination between trading desks) and 
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latent (e.g. software problems, poor organisational culture) failures were identified in the US 
Senate Subcommittee report (2013) into JP Morgan Chase. Problems in non-technical skills 
were central, for example, failures by traders to accurately assess, remain updated on, and judge 
the derivative credit default swap (CDS) market, and poor decision-making by traders (e.g. on 
responding to the losses) and senior management (e.g. on downplaying the problems) 
throughout the incident. Furthermore, failures in teamwork and communication between teams 
(e.g. trading desks, management and the trading floor support teams) and within teams (e.g. 
whether to take action on suspect trading in the risk control teams) were critical, exacerbated 
the crisis, as did a lack of leadership on both the trading floor (e.g. for not punishing trading 
limit breaches) and senior management (e.g. in retaining awareness of trading activities ).  
 
Such activities can be understood using non-technical skills theorem relating to situation 
awareness, decision-making, teamwork, and leadership. To respond to organisational crises in 
other industries, human factors research have utilised NTS theory to develop behavioural 
assessment and training programmes, with positive results in terms of attitudes towards risk, 
enhanced learning, and behavioural change (Salas et al. 2000; Salas et al. 2006). However, in 
finance, interventional analyses tend to be compartmentalised; involving the segregated 
collection of information about uncertainties and lacking the social and collective beliefs about 
risk taking and control (Beck 1992; Hutter and Power 2005). Additionally, interventions also 
tend to focus on regulation rather than the embedded human-factors related issues within the 
industry (Hutter and Power 2005; Slovic 1972; Power 2004).  
 
However, as the focus on ‘risk culture’ within financial organisations  increases, it is recognised 
that human factors approaches are potentially valuable for explaining and avoiding critical 
failures (Young 2011; Power 2011; Ashby, Palermo and Power 2012). In discussing the 2008 
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financial crisis, Power (2011) observes; “The scale of interconnectivity that increased prior to 
the crisis had ‘normal accident’ properties, in the sense that the complexity of chains of claims 
and claims on claims made the ‘counterparty risk’ of collateralized debt obligations practically 
unknowable and beyond control” (Power 2011, 30). This focus on interconnectivity within 
systems and institutions illustrates how activity in financial organisations must be understood 
from a human factors perspective, with failure occurring due to a mixture of increasing market 
uncertainty coupled with poor risk management and coordination at the operational level 
(internal controls, auditing, procedures and capital). Crucially, it emphasises the need to 
develop a better understanding of the behaviours required for effective performance at the 
operational level of financial organisations – i.e. the trading environment (LaPorte 2007).   
 
The trading environment 
The trading environment is where products (e.g. equities, short-term, long-term, options) are 
bought and sold by financial traders in order to manage investment portfolios and generate 
profit for investment banks and brokers. Trading requires an ability to anticipate market trends 
(i.e. for buying and selling) and negotiate large wholesale trades, and due to the sums of money 
and time-pressure involved in trading, it is a well-paid but stressful occupation. It is inherently 
risky, with reward systems incentivising risk-taking that results in profit, and profit can emerge 
from 'noise trading' (irrational and erratic trading activities), which in turn can negatively  
influence 'rational' trading (and therefore penalising logical decision-making). The trading 
floor itself is a large, noisy and high technology filled space wherein traders (and support 
teams) watch monitors and interact by phone, internal chat systems or in small groups. Each 
desk is intentionally grouped as a specialised desk (e.g. the teams are divided according to the 
financial instrument or commodity that they trade or support such as equities, bonds, natural 
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gas, coal etc.) and it is the successful interaction across these heterogeneous desks that underlie 
organisational performance (Beunza and Stark 2004, see figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Typical Trading Floor Layout 
The spatial configuration of the trading floor is standardised across the settings so as to provide 
the socio-spatial resources to promote a situated awareness, or sense making capabilities 
(Beunza and Stark 2004; Hicks 2004). Traders typically cycle between working alone and in 
collaborative teams; they monitor other desks activity, share information, work with spatially 
distributed team members via phone and interpret the ‘noise’ of the floor (Hicks 2004; Willman 
et al. 2006).  The floor is an intensely social space where the close proximity of the workstations  
allows traders to communicate to each other without leaving their individual station. Thus, 
good non-technical skills are integral to effective risk management both in terms of avoiding 
errors (e.g. situation awareness, decision-making) that result in large losses, and ensuring that 
teams of traders work effectively together and are able to identify and act on irregular or poor 
performance.  
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Non-technical skills in financial trading 
Non-technical skills (NTS) are the cognitive and social skills that comp lement a worker’s 
technical skills, and underpin safe performance in high-risk environments (Flin 2003). Table 
two presents the definitions for the key non-technical skills identified and utilised in the NTS 
research literature (Flin, O’Connor and Crichton 2008), and to initially frame our focus on the 
non-technical skills essential for effectively managing people risk in financial trading. 
 
Table 2: Principle Non-Technical Skills Definitions 
NOTECHS Principle Definition 
Situation Awareness (SA) A dynamic, multifaceted construct that involves the maintenance and anticipation 
of critical task performance events. Individuals monitor and perceive information  
within the task environment, interpret this information within the context of their 
wider knowledge, and then anticipate ahead. The NTS literature specifies 
activities associated with SA as gathering information, interpreting information  
and anticipating future state (Flin et al 2008, pp.17). The definition of SA is still 
undergoing academic debate regarding the meaning in terms of the mechanisms  
and models of the cognitive processes. 
 
Decision Making (DM) The process of reaching a judgement or choosing an option, sometimes called a 
course of action, to meet the needs of a give situation. DM is often interwoven 
with situation awareness processes, as individuals base decisions on their 
understanding of a particular task environment. The NTS literature specifies 
activities associated with decision-making as defining problems, considering 
options, selecting and implementing options, and evaluating decision success 
(Flin et al, 2008, pp41). Conditions for DM can vary in relation to time pressure, 
task demands, feasibility of options and what level of constraint, support and 
resource exists for the decision maker (Flin et al, 2008, pp41). 
 
Teamwork (TW) Coordination amongst a group of people with different expertise who have to 
cooperate on the same tasks, and must form a shared understanding of their 
activities, roles, and norms of behaviour. The NTS literature specifies activities 
associated with teamwork as; supporting others, solving conflicts, exchanging 
information and co-ordinating activities (Flin et al, 2008, pp93). Common 
understandings of the shared tasks are fundamental to achieve an efficient team 
outcome. Group process models are used to illustrate how individual differences, 
leadership and team structures affect team behaviour (Flin et al, 2008, pp95).  
 
Leadership (LD) Team member, who coordinates the work of others, motivates, sets standards, and 
provides vision. The NTS literature specifies activities associated with activities 
associated with leadership as using authority, maintaining standards, planning and 
prioritising, managing workload and stress (Flin et al, 2008, pp129). They are 
tasked with directing and coordinating the activities of team members, assessing 
performance, motivating and planning. The thoughts and behaviours of others in  
the team are influenced by the team leader’s ideas and actions).  
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The history of non-technical skills research is grounded in several high-risk industries, but 
especially in aviation. To reduce pilot errors caused by problems in social (e.g. team 
coordination) and cognitive (e.g. vigilance) performance, human factors researchers pioneered 
the use of non-technical skill assessment and training systems. These systems detail the non-
technical skills and behaviours crucial for safe in-flight operations, and create taxonomies of 
the behaviours indicative (e.g. communication as indicative of teamwork) of a particular skill 
(Wiener 1993; O’Connor 2007). Assessments of behaviour are then used to appraise the skill 
proficiencies of operators, and to identify training requirement. NTS assessment and training 
systems have now been developed for many different industries (Byrdorf 1998; Flin 1996; 
Helmreich and Shaeffer 1994), and are based on theory relating to social and cognitive 
psychology. Systems are developed to reflect the contextual demands of a working 
environment (e.g. the operating theatre, maritime command deck), and to reflect the skills and 
behaviours required to fulfil a specific role (e.g. anaesthetist, first officer).  Thus, to provide a 
fine-grained analysis of the non-technical skills essential for financial trading, behaviour must 
be understood within the context and nature of taskwork on the trading floor. 
 
Yet, to date, non-technical skill assessment and training systems have not been developed for 
financial trading. Nonetheless, there is growing consensus within the financial literature on the 
importance of non-technical skills for managing risk (Garling 2009, LaPorte, 1996, Shefrin 
2008; Ramanujam and Goodman 2003, 2010, 2011; Power 2010; Etzioni 2009, Akerlof and 
Shiller 2008; Shleifer 2000), and experimental research in finance has identified a variety of 
psychological heuristics and biases to influence decision-making in finance (Fox, Rogers and 
Tversky; 1996; Shattuck and Miller 2006).  
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Thus, there is a requirement to more formally describe and outline the key non-technical skills 
(and behaviours indicative of them) essential for managing risk within financial trading. The 
process of identifying non-technical skills important for performance in a work domain 
typically begins with a literature review (Reader et al. 2006). This allows for key research 
findings on non-technical skills to be integrated, and for an initial non-technical skills 
framework to be outlined. To date, there has not been a literature review of the non-technical 
skills important for managing risk in financial trading, and in this article we review research 
investigating non-technical skills within real-life contexts in the financial trading environment. 
We emphasise 'real-life' because a large experimental literature, led by ground-breaking 
research by psychologists such as Tversky and Kahneman (1986; 1973; 1981) and Kahneman 
and Tversky (1972; 1973; 1979; 1984) and Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), has 
documented numerous heuristics and biases to influence financial decision-making. Although 
the algorithms and principles derived from these studies are hugely interesting, they can be 
difficult to operationalize within real trading environments (Kahneman and Klein 2009).  
 
In financial trading, correlations between hypothetical decision-making for financial scenarios 
and decisions for live market transactions are poor (Lo, Repin, and Steenbarger 2005), and 
behaviours in the financial environment are shaped by a range of contextual factors (e.g. 
pressure, rewards systems, risk, and stress), with traders using a variety of information sources 
(e.g. spread sheets, databases, publications, colleagues, news features) to assess and predict 
future trading scenarios and likely decision events (Hicks 2004). Investigations of non-
technical skills typically focus on how context-specific behaviours and activities of operators 
relate to risk and safety. This is in order that non-technical skill assessment and training tools 
reflect the working environments in which they are used, and can be associated with good or 
poor outcomes (i.e. that they are not generic). To do this it is necessary to examine in detail 
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how task context and social environments shape activity, and how behaviour in turn shapes 
organisational risk (Rasmussen 1986; Vicente 2002; Woods 1994; Hutchins 1995; Klein 1989). 
Although this review focuses upon 'real-life' research, it is notable that the experimental 
literature on decision-making in finance has been reviewed extensively elsewhere (e.g. Garling 
2009). Such work shows the importance of cognitive biases and affective influences in shaping 
trading decisions (e.g. overconfidence, optimism, loss aversion), albeit in a relatively 
decontextualized way (e.g. ignoring expertise, situational constraints, and organisational 
environment). 
 
Therefore, whilst laboratory-style studies are useful for outlining broad principles on decision-
making in high-stakes finance, this review focuses on research of a more ecological nature 
(Cacciabue and Hollnagel 1995). Specifically it focuses on research investigating non-
technical skills and the management of risk in financial institutions (e.g. case studies, 
qualitative research, and observational studies). 
 
Literature review aims 
The current literature review examines research on non-technical skills within the trading 
environment so that the behaviours and non-technical skills associated for effective and safe 
performance can be described. The literature review has three aims.  
 
First, to identify 'real-life' research studies investigating the relationship between non-technical 
skills and performance within the domain of financial trading. Second, to examine data on the 
non-technical skills found to underpin good or poor performance in financial trading, and to 
synthesise this data in order to provide a first stage overview of the non-technical skills 
important for performance on the trading floor. Third, to consider the quality and coverage of 
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research investigating non-technical skills in financial trading, and to identify potential areas 
for future research.  
 
Method 
The literature review was performed through the following steps: 
1. Identification of relevant research papers on non-technical skills in real-world financial 
trading environments. 
2. Data extraction of methodological and non-technical skill related information from the 
selected papers.  
3. Data synthesis to outline and summarise knowledge on non-technical skills within 
trading settings.  
 
Identification of relevant research papers 
The search strategy for the literature review was as follows. Research papers within a number 
of academic databases (EconLit, SocIndex, Web of Knowledge, Business Source Complete, 
SciVerse and PsycINFO.) were identified using the following keywords: human factors, 
decision making, situation awareness, leadership, teamwork, nontechnical skills, trading, 
finance, failure, and banking, stress management, fatigue. These terms were chosen based on 
their applicability to the subject and relevance to the aims of the review. These databases were 
chosen based on their scope of peer reviewed literature and their relevance to the topic search 
terms. Search date restrictions for this review were defined all available peer reviewed 
literature published in a peer reviewed journal or book after 1970.   
 
Within the initial research stage, titles and abstracts were inspected in order to identify whether 
articles contained primary or secondary data on non-technical skills within a financial trading 
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context. Context specific refers to studies which took place in a financial trading floor or, a 
high simulation trading floor environment. In regards to the study criteria, studies were 
excluded if they contained data from laboratory studies and did not use professionals working 
in the financial trading domain (high reliability simulated environment studies were 
considered).  During this stage, studies were collected regardless of the type of methodology 
used (e.g. no methods restrictions); however primary and secondary data sources were noted 
by the researcher as an indicator of study quality. Titles were screened, as were key words and 
abstracts of the articles. Full text articles were retrieved for those studies appearing to meet the 
criteria, as well as for those where the title, key words, abstract gave insufficient information 
for immediate conclusion. Upon retrieval of the text, the eligibility of the study was determined 
by an additional reviewer. The first author is a finance expert studying human factors and the 
second reviewer is an established human factors and non-technical skills expert. Figure 2 
reports the literature review process. 
 
 
Stage 1: Initial Search 
Electronic Search: EconLit, Web Knowledge, Swetwise, SocINDEX, SciVerse, 
PsychINFO, Business Source Complete 
Keywords: Title or abstract contain trading OR banking OR finance AND human 
factors AND non-technical skills AND situation awareness AND teamwork  AND 
leadership AND decision making  
Limitations: Articles in English and published after 1970 
Results: 652 
Stage 2: Screening of results  
Filter:  Titles examined for relevance to the topic, Relevance of abstract examined 
in order to assess information presented in the study  
Filter: no biases, heuristics, loss aversion, quantitative risk measurement  
Results: 67 
Stage 3: Filters applied  
Setting: Real world research environment, not a lab simulation  
Context: Expertise in trading finance 
Results: 20 
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Figure 2: Literature search strategy 
 
 
Data Extraction 
A range of data was extracted from the selected articles in order to characterise studies (e.g. 
methods) and generate data on non-technical skills. This included the following:  
i. Study characteristics. The type of data collected, the study setting, the use of expert or 
novice participants, and the methods used for data collection  
ii. Non-technical skills related content. Data within each article (e.g. on behaviour) on 
activities within financial settings that were consistent with any of the four non-
technical skills outlined in table 2 were extracted.    
iii. Study outcomes. Where possible, associations between data on non-technical skills 
and performance outcomes in financial settings were extracted.  
 
Data synthesis  
Non-technical skills data were sorted and labelled according to the NTS categorises described 
in table 2 (situation awareness, decision making, teamwork, leadership). Data were then sorted 
and placed within a table of results presenting key findings for each study. Then, for all of the 
studies, data was grouped according to non-technical skill category, and synthesised to create 
a prototype non-technical skills framework. This summarises and amalgamates key findings 
from the literature review. The purpose of the framework is to consolidate the existing literature 
as well as highlight the limitations (or gaps) and the opportunity for future improvement / 
continued research.  
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Results 
 
Research papers selected for review 
Of the 67 articles that met the research criteria, 20 studies were identified as having investiga ted 
non-technical skills in a financial setting using primary in-situ or high fidelity simulated study 
methods.  All studies were peer reviewed articles. The data collection methods used for the 
(20) studies included in the review varied; (four case study based, six interview based, four 
questionnaire survey, one longitudinal content analysis, three ethnographic studies, one 
simulated environment (trading games) and one biofeedback analysis). Of the 20 studies, all 
were executed in the high stakes financial domain (banking, investment, trading), although one 
study compared behaviour between staff in the banking sector to a hospital setting (Ramanujam 
and Goodman 2010). An overview of the characteristics of the reviewed studies, their sample 
data (where applicable), methods and key findings are presented in table 3. 
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Table 3. Summary of findings from the systematic literature review 
Authors  Study Aims Methods Key Findings  Data on non-technical skills and performance in financial trading 
    Situation Awareness Decision Making Teamwork Leadership 
Sefrin and 
Statman 
1985 
Investigates whether 
traders realise the 
occurrences of losses 
differently than gains. 
Method: Secondary data 
analysis  
Domain: Trading and 
investment banking 
Details: Utilises 
secondary data from 
Schlarbaum et al. (1978) 
on stock trading history 
and aggregates data on 
mutual fund trades 
where transaction costs 
were negligible to illicit  
information on decision 
making and financial 
outcomes. 
Loss aversion found to 
impact DM in uncertain 
trading conditions (e.g. 
for keeping losses too 
long). 
Not Reported Heuristics and biases, 
specifically the 
disposition effect, 
negatively influence 
trading decisions (e.g. 
the tendency to sell 
winners too quickly and 
hold on to losers). 
Not Reported Not Reported 
Hartzmark 
1991 
Investigated traders ex-
ante predictions and ex 
post realisations to elicit 
the influence of biases 
and heuristics on trading 
behaviour.  
Method: Secondary data 
analysis 
Domain: Financial 
trading 
Details: CFTC 
(Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission) 
end-of-day reports on the 
commitments of large 
traders were analysed to 
extract information on 
the relationship between 
decision making 
techniques and trading 
performance. 
Finds traders to not have 
a specific skill to 
consistently earn profits, 
with chance being a 
determining factor. 
  
Not Reported Predictions in the market 
can made randomly, yet 
result in better than 
average trader 
performance (for a 
period of time). 
Feedback on trading is 
difficult to recognise due 
to “noise” in the 
financial markets, which 
influences the ability to 
take future decisions.  
Not Reported Not Reported 
Roberts and 
Libuser 
1993 
Explores the utility of 
High-Reliability 
Organisation (HRO) 
principles in trading. 
Method: Case study 
Domain: Finance 
(trading support 
domains) 
Details: Case studies of 
two banks are presented 
from the perspective of 
HRO and error theory. 
Identifies the following 
principles for teams 
reducing their exposure 
to error and risk in 
trading: flexible decision 
making, appropriate 
checks and balances, 
and authority and 
accountability. 
 
Not Reported  A lack of segregation 
and clarity for team roles 
(e.g. in audit and loan 
departments) creates 
incentives to hide 
mistakes (e.g. bad loans), 
failures to occur, and 
team members to have 
conflicting roles (which 
result in a loss of 
Leadership reward 
schemes for aligning 
success with high-risk 
strategies result in 
conflicting risk and 
performance goals, with 
risk-taking being 
encouraged and the long-
term organisational 
stability threatened.  
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objectivity and poor 
team coordination).  
Menkoff 
1998 
Investigates how traders 
exploit and use different 
information types to 
make decisions under 
uncertainty. 
Method: Questionnaire 
Survey 
Domain: Financial 
trading 
Details: Survey of 92 
banks in Germany to 
illicit  information on 
how ‘rational’ traders 
use non-fundamental 
analyses to exploit 'less 
rational' noise traders. 
Finds non-fundamental 
market information 
types (e.g. beliefs and 
sentiments) to influence 
both rational and not 
fully rational actors in 
market decision making.  
Noise (erratic and 
irrational) traders cause 
risk by (potentially) 
driving the price away 
from the market 
fundamental value 
(actual value), with non-
fundamental information 
becoming internalised 
within rational traders 
(negatively shaping their 
comprehension and 
anticipation of the 
market). 
Decision-making for 
'rational' actors is shaped 
by non-fundamental 
information.   
Not Reported Not Reported 
Sheaffer, 
Richardson, 
and, 
Rosenblatt  
1998 
Investigates the utility 
and validity of an early 
warning framework to 
detect critical failures in 
trading. 
Method: Case study  
Domain: Financial 
trading 
Details: The Barings 
Bank collapse in 1995 is 
examined for failures to 
detect early warning 
signs. 
Demonstrates the 
importance of chief 
decision makers 
acknowledging the 
existence of early 
warning signs as an 
antecedent to the bank’s 
collapse. 
The lack of attention to 
financial indicators leads 
to a poor understanding 
of the risk associated 
with trading positions 
  
Top-down decision-
making reduces 
important input from the 
sharp end team members 
on strategic decisions. 
Poor or unclear 
communication 
procedures between 
teams leads to increased 
uncertainty on 
information (e.g. on 
definitions of financial 
tools).  
Unclear responsibilities 
and poor information 
sharing result in team 
conflict. 
Leadership that creates a 
culture of fear for error 
or incident reporting 
results in warning data 
being overlooked or 
ignored by traders. 
 
Willman et 
al. 2001 
Explores how traders 
utilise market knowledge 
to make decisions.  
Method: Semi Structured 
interviews 
Domain: Investment 
banking  
Details: Interviews of 
118 experienced traders 
and 10 managers in 4 
banks. 
Finds traders to believe 
that technical 
information is not 
enough for effective 
decision-making, quasi-
scientific information 
also being utilised. 
Not Reported Traders learn decision-
making strategies 
through 'doing', however 
this can generate noise 
trading information (e.g. 
on irrelevant market 
information, or on 
effective behavioural 
strategies) that overly 
influences decision-
making. 
Not Reported The management priority 
of advocating output (£) 
over communicating 
long term strategy may 
lead to management 
problems (such as traders 
hiding losses).  
Willman et 
al. 2002 
Examines the 
management of traders 
in financial markets from 
the perspective of 
agency and prospect 
theory. 
Method: Semi Structured 
interviews 
Domain: Investment 
banking 
Details:  Interviews of 
118 experienced traders 
and 10 managers in 4 
banks. 
Finds trading mangers to 
focus on avoiding losses 
rather than making 
gains, with trader 
performance and 
behaviour being 
influenced by the 
intensity of monitoring 
and incentive structures. 
Not Reported Behavioural rather than 
performance-based 
evaluation of traders 
increase risk adversity in 
decision-making 
Low supervision when 
losing money can result 
in greater trader risk-
taking 
Not Reported Managers increase their 
monitoring of traders 
when they are losing 
money, and generally 
give significant 
autonomy and trust 
during the remaining 
periods.  
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Lo and 
Repin 
2002 
Investigates the roles of 
rationality and emotion 
in the governance of 
financial markets. 
Method: Biofeedback 
analysis 
Domain: Financial 
trading 
Details: The 
physiological responses 
of 10 traders were 
measured during high 
and low trading activity 
in live sessions. 
Find trader rationality in 
decision making is 
shaped by emotions 
associated with 
changing markets. 
Not Reported Decisions made under 
uncertainty and high-
pressure are influenced 
by emotive responses 
(e.g. physiological 
changes) to the context, 
with trader fallibility to 
overconfidence and 
previous decisions being 
increased. 
Not Reported Not Reported 
Beunaza, 
and Stark 
2002 
Analyses the 
organisation of trading 
floors to examine how 
special factors influence 
awareness and learning.  
Method: Ethnographic 
and interview study 
Domain: Financial 
trading 
Details: Ethnographic 
study of a wall street 
trading room (160 
persons) with follow up 
interviews with 
managers.  
Demonstrates how the 
social aspect of trading 
aid developing an 
understanding of the 
sophisticated market 
instruments.   
Traders need awareness 
(a "sense”) of the market, 
and knowledge on how 
to utilise financial tools 
appropriately combine 
with their reading of the 
market. 
Situation awareness is 
supported by the socio-
spatial attributes of the 
trading floor.  
Not Reported Not Reported Not Reported 
Ramanujam
, Goodman 
2003 
Investigates errors in 
financial organisations 
through applying HRO 
theory. 
Method: Case Study 
Domain: Financial 
trading 
Details: Explores error 
and organisational 
culture in the collapse of 
Barings bank 
Argues Baring bank 
collapse illustrates the 
susceptibility of HRO's 
to latent errors and poor 
organisational culture. 
Overly routinized tasks 
reduce vigilance to 
identifying problems, and 
led to latent errors that 
remained unidentified by 
the organization. 
 
 
Narrow definitions of 
risk and trading options 
heighten the likelihood 
of error and poor 
decision making 
 
A lack of segregation of 
team member duties and 
poor team coordination 
creates extreme risk 
through reducing 
information sharing and 
creating conflicting 
demands. 
A lack of monitoring and 
leader vigilance on trader 
activities results creates 
opportunity for poor 
trading activities. 
Failures to maintain and 
demonstrate standards 
heightened the likelihood 
of error/risk taking. 
Fenton-
O’Creevy et 
al. 2003 
Examines how 
perceptions of control 
influence the 
performance of traders. 
Method: Questionnaire 
Domain: Financial 
trading 
Details: Survey of 107 
traders in 4 UK 
investment banks on 
influencers of decision 
making. 
Indicates traders to 
operate in conditions 
whereby unrealistic 
perceptions of control 
may be supported, and 
vary according to 
individual. 
Not Reported Situational pressure such 
as stress, t ime pressure, 
and competition 
influence decision-
making strategies and 
performance relating to 
financial instruments, 
with traders believing 
they have greater levels 
of control over trading 
outcomes than they 
actually do (illusions of 
control are exacerbated 
by stress levels). 
Not Reported Not Reported 
Hicks 2004 Investigates how a user 
centric (human – centric) 
design approach can 
enhance trader’ 
performance. 
Method: Interviews and 
observations on the 
trading floor 
Domain: Financial and 
commodity trading 
Finds improvements in 
trading to occur through 
analysing trader 
workflow and improving 
Traders cycle between 
working alone and in 
small and distributed 
teams (2-3 people) in 
order to maximise 
Decision-making 
strategies are based on 
previous experiences of 
traders, with precise 
numbers being less 
The segregation of 
responsibilit ies between 
the teams ensures 
controls over procedures 
and standards (such as 
Teams with autocratic 
head trader have fewer 
interactions, and less 
input from novice traders 
on system problems (e.g. 
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Details: Two case 
studies, examining how 
technological design 
shape activity on the 
trading floor.  
ergonomics (data 
display).   
information gathering 
and time management.  
Effective traders 
maintain awareness of 
trading patterns and their 
trading health through 
constantly searching their 
trading books. 
relevant, and traders 
seeking patterns based 
on previous experiences 
of market movement.  
execution, validation and 
confirmation occurring 
in separate departments) 
software design) and 
strategy of the trading 
desk which limits 
performance.  
Lo, Repin 
and, 
Steenbarger 
2005 
Investigates the links 
between emotions and 
rationality in trading 
performance. 
Method: Questionnaire 
Domain: Financial 
trading 
Details: Examination of 
how emotion influences 
the decision making of 
80 volunteer day traders.  
Finds extreme emotional 
responses (in response to 
loss) as be 
counterproductive for 
trading performance. 
Not Reported Trader performance is 
linked to emotional state, 
with extreme emotional 
states leading to reduced 
rational decision making 
and lower performance 
outcomes.  
Not Reported Not Reported 
Willman et 
al. 2006 
Investigates 
organisational influences 
upon noise trading 
behaviours. 
Method: Semi Structured 
interviews 
Domain: Investment 
banking  
Details:  Interviews of 
118 experienced traders 
and 10 managers in 4 
banks focused on how 
noise on the trading floor 
influences performance. 
Shows organisational 
culture to influences 
trader risk appetite and 
individual behaviour. 
Trader’s base decision on 
assumptions of the 
market (alongside 
quantitative information), 
for example anticipations 
of sentiment in price 
fluctuations and their 
impact on trading 
performance.  
 
Unclear bonus structures 
lead traders to develop 
riskier trading strategies 
which are based on 
inferred hypotheses 
regarding payment 
calculations. 
Coordination on 
interbank activity allows 
traders to positively 
influence market asset 
prices, and achieve 
higher output.   
Bonus structures that are 
team or individually 
focused positively 
influence the level of 
risk tolerated in the 
team's strategy (e.g. 
higher bonus tend to be 
given to greater risk 
taking teams) 
Managers monitor 
trading more closely 
when they are aware of 
losses occurring, 
however grant 
considerable autonomy 
when making gains. 
Michel 
2007 
Examines how cognition 
is influenced by 
uncertainty in investment 
banking.  
Method: Ethnographic 
and questionnaire study 
Domain: Investment 
banking 
Details: Two year 
ethnographic study in 
two banks (with 84 
formal interviews, 48 
days of observation, 136 
formal semi structured 
questionnaires, and 120 
informal interviews). 
Establishes different 
modes of cognition (e.g. 
deductive versus 
inductive) are required 
for performance in 
different types of 
financial organisations.   
To manage uncertainty in 
understanding trading 
scenarios, junior actors 
utilise other employees 
or resources such as a 
spreadsheet in order to 
establish 'cues' that will 
determine decision-
making  
Not Reported Uncertainty management 
tools change patterns of 
communication within 
teams  
Not Reported 
Cheng 2007  Investigates how 
overconfidence effects 
trading performance in 
the open outcry (visual, 
verbal, interactive) and 
the electronic trading 
(less interactive, more 
Method:  Simulation of 
trading games 
Domain: Trading 
Details: Electronic stock 
trading games in the 
trading pits of Singapore 
with 50 trainee traders.  
Finds trader interactions 
lead to increased 
overconfidence, with 
overconfident traders 
tend having relatively 
poor performance. 
Not Reported  More experienced 
traders show better self-
awareness (e.g. more 
realistic perception of 
their exposure to the 
market) and trading 
performance due to a 
Not Reported Not Reported 
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individual centric) 
settings  
reduced level of 
overconfidence 
influencing decision-
making.   
Overconfident traders do 
not tend to have well 
diversified portfolios 
because they believe too 
strongly in their stock 
picks.   
Ramanujam 
and 
Goodman 
2010 
Explores the existence 
and outcomes of latent 
errors in the banking 
system 
Method: Case Study 
Domain: Investment 
banking  
Details: Identifies human 
factors underlying errors 
at an investment bank, 
and compares to a 
hospital  
Demonstrates how 
trading organisations 
experience major 
adverse outcomes as a 
result of underlying 
human factors issues in 
their operations 
 
Not Reported Not Reported Effective role divisions 
and team coordination 
act as a control 
mechanism to ensure 
traders follow rules and 
helps to limit systemic 
risk in the organisation. 
A lack of coordination 
between the member 
departments (e.g. 
internal audit and 
account reconciliation 
processes) results in poor 
teamwork and 
performance..  
Failures of management 
to ensure trading rules 
are followed potentially 
allow and unknowingly 
facilitate irregular and 
dangerous trading 
activities (e.g. trading 
and settling 
simultaneously).  
  
Hensman 
and Sadler-
Smith  2011 
 
Explores ‘signalling’ and 
managerial decision 
making techniques in the 
financial setting. 
Method: In-depth semi-
structured interviews  
Domain: Investment 
Banking 
Details: Interviews with 
15 executives to examine 
how intuition influences 
decision making under 
uncertainty.   
Presents a conceptual 
framework to 
understand the influence 
of intuition in 
managerial decision 
making in the financial 
sector, particularly in 
uncertain conditions.  
Not Reported For complex, uncertain, 
and time-pressured 
decisions, experiences 
and “gut feelings” are 
utilised to identify 
optimal decisions (e.g. 
where there are two 
equally plausible 
options) 
Individual and intuitive 
decisions require 
cooperation with other 
stakeholders in order to 
implement the decisions, 
and to validate and 
ensure they are best fit  
solutions.  
Managers  set standards 
for good decision-
making in order to 
demonstrate and achieve 
expected performance 
outcomes, although this 
can limit participation 
and input of team 
members 
Mention, 
2011 
 
Investigates associations 
between incident 
reporting and  
management culture in 
finance 
Method: Longitudinal 
content analyses 
Domain: Investment  
banking 
Details: Nine years’ 
worth of data was 
analysed 
Identifies growing 
awareness in the need 
for strong management 
process and the role of 
corporate culture in 
trading 
Awareness and 
recognition of reporting 
rules resulted in 
improved internal control 
(IC) reporting  
 
 
Not Reported Not Reported Directive and strong 
management is important 
for setting standards and 
encouraging internal 
control reporting  
Fenton-
O’Creevy, 
et al. 2011  
Investigates emotional 
influencers upon trader 
decision making  
Method: Semi Structured 
interviews (Extended 
from Willman et al. 
2006) 
Domain: Investment 
banking  
Details: Interviews of 
118 experienced traders 
Illustrates how different 
strategies for different 
emotional regulation 
have material influence 
on trader performance 
and behaviour.  
Not Reported Traders who regulate 
their emotions (e.g. in 
anticipating and 
controlling emotional 
responses) before they 
influences behaviour 
perform better than those 
whose behaviour and 
Not Reported Not Reported 
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and 10 managers in 4 
banks focused emotion 
and decision-making 
expression is shaped by 
emotion (response-
focussed). This is 
because 'response-
focussed' traders are less 
able to reflect critically 
on intuitive based 
decisions (which may or 
may not be accurate). 
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Of the (54) studies not included in the final selection, many did not investigate non-technica l 
skills in real-life settings, and instead focused on decontextualized micro-economic aspects of 
decision making, or on heuristics and biases in decision-making with non-expert participants 
(e.g. students). Other studies excluded were those based in retail banking, or those reporting 
highly generic cross-sectional data on leadership (e.g. transformational leadership) in financ ia l 
organisations not specific to trading environments, and without fine-grained behavioura l 
analyses (Awamleh and Gardner 1999; Lee et al. 2011; Singh 2008; Bantel and Jackson 1989; 
Geyer and Streyrer 1998; Howell and Hall-Merenda 1999; Shahin and Wright 2004).  
Additionally, the studies extracted on stress and fatigue was primarily in the retail banking 
sector and indicate that although these factors play an important role in decision making, traders 
don’t perceive stress and fatigue as influential in their task performance. One study was found 
that links stress to reduced capacity for decision making in financial trading however no 
empirical study was completed and it was therefore not included in this review (Oberlechner 
& Nimbade, 2005).   
 
Non-technical skills and performance in financial trading 
In the sections below we consider cognitive and social non-technical skills.  
 
Cognitive skills and performance in financial trading 
The sections below summarise and discuss the key findings reported in table 3 relating to the 
non-technical skills of situation awareness and decision-making, which in HF research are 
essential for identifying, mitigating, and controlling risk in a range of high-risk settings. 
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Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness refers to the “maintenance and anticipation of critical task performance 
events” in order that “potential problems can be corrected before they escalate” (Shrestha et al. 
1995, 52). SA is generally considered to have three levels: perception, comprehension, and 
anticipation (Endsley 1995).  Eight of the 20 studies (40%) covered an aspect of situation 
awareness. Of the selected studies, two ethnographic studies, two case studies, two interviews, 
one longitudinal content analysis, and one questionnaire investigated the concepts of situation 
awareness. All of the studies considered SA from the perspective of attention and situationa l 
recognition.  
 
Perception. Situation awareness related findings highlight the importance of traders perceiving 
and attending to task-related information. For example identifying financial cues that provide 
insight into trading positions, and maintaining a “sense” of the wider market in order that 
decisions are appropriate (Sheaffer, Richardson, and Rosenblatt 1998; Beunza and Stark 2004). 
A range of information sources are used to maintain and develop SA, such as trading screens, 
spreadsheets, trading books, and other trading team members, with the arrangement of the 
trading floor and ergonomics influencing attention and information gather activities (Beunza 
and Stark 2004; Hicks 2004; Michel 2007). Vigilance to risk-related data is shaped by the 
extent to which task are routinized, with traders actively seeking out cues that determine trading 
strategies, and a lack of attention to risk increasing instances of error (Ramanujam and 
Goodman  2003; Michel 2007). Additionally, the time that is available to integrate and update 
information, as well as assess new risks is key to maintaining situation awareness.  
 
Comprehension and anticipation. In terms of comprehending informational cues, and 
anticipating ahead, the review identified some examples of this. Traders are found to base 
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decisions on their anticipations of price fluctuations and their comprehension of markets, and 
better comprehending of situations and rule-systems increases instances of internal control 
reporting (Willman 2006; Mention 2011).  Traders seek out patterns of information (consistent 
with previous experience) that are indicative of particular market conditions and likely 
successful trading strategies (Hicks 2004). Furthermore, Menkoff (1998) indicates that ‘noise’ 
traders (who engage in erratic and illogical trading patterns) negatively influence how ‘rationa l’ 
traders comprehend the market (if they cannot distinguish 'fundamental' from 'non-
fundamental' information), with the ability to identify 'noise' being critical. Furthermore, 
ensuring trading teams understand and share insight on risk is critical (Mention 2011), and 
Michel’s (2007) ethnographic research highlights how cognition and understanding is 
distributed and shared across people and structured tasks (e.g. the use of complex 
spreadsheets).  
 
Decision making  
Decision making refers to the selection of options (either by the leader on behalf of the team or 
amongst the members of a team) through the integration of information and perceptions from 
the members of the team (Klein and Zsambok 1997).  It is highly associated with SA, as 
arguably decision-making is seen as the ‘end product’ of situation assessment.  15 of the 20 
(75 %) extracted papers explored the NTS concept of decision making. Of the 15 papers, two 
case studies, six interviews, three questionnaires / survey, one simulation, one biofeedback and 
two quantitative data comparison were completed.  
 
Intuitive and experience-based decision-making. Several of the research studies highlighted the 
importance of intuitive and experience in trader decision-making. As discussed in the previous 
section on SA, trading strategies are often based on previous experience, with traders using 
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seeing out patterns of information (consistent with previous experience) indicative of likely 
successful decision strategies (Hicks 2004). In particular, within complex, uncertain, and time-
pressured situations, successful traders report utilising intuitive feelings to make decisions 
(Fenton-O'Creevy et al. 2011). Furthermore Willman et al (2006) describe how, due to the 
organisational context (e.g. time pressure, level of uncertainty, riskiness), traders decisions are 
partially led by their underlying market assumptions, which are driven by non-technica l 
variables such as experience and sentiment (Willman et al. 2006). Yet, the extent to which 
intuitive decisions are appropriate is shaped by a number of factors. For example, traders who 
learn decision-making through “doing” can integrate noise data into their strategies, and 
extreme emotional states are found to lower decision-making capability, with the ability of 
traders to regulate their emotions and reflect dispassionately on chosen courses of action, 
shaping their performance (Lo, Repin and, Steenbarger  2005; Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 2011).  
 
Rationality. Consistent with the experimental psychology literature, the role of rationality and 
heuristics and biases have also been explored in real-life trading. The ‘rational’ decision-
making processes of traders have been found to be influenced by ‘non-fundamenta l’ 
information and emotional factors. Above average trader performance can be produced by 
random (i.e. non-rational) market predictions, and trader performance has been associated with 
emotional state (Hartzmark 1991; Menkoff 1998; Lo, Repin and, Steenbarger 2005). For 
example, using biofeedback processes in a study of day traders, Lo, Repin and, Steenbarger 
(2005) illustrate that emotional arousal is a significant factor in real time financial decision 
making and assessments of risk (for both novice and expert actors). A number of the cognit ive 
heuristics and biases commonly identified in the behavioural economics literature are also 
found to negatively influence trader performance. For example, in terms of picking winners  
and tendencies for loss aversion (e.g. a preference to sell successful assets, and hold onto those 
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that lose money) (Sefrin and Statman 1985), ‘illusions of control’ (which increase under stress 
in decision-making outcomes despite challenging trading conditions (Fenton-O’Creevy et al.  
2003)), and overconfidence in decision-making abilities (e.g. in not maintaining diverse stock 
profiles) (Lo and Repin 2002; Cheng 2007). Such factors are found to be shaped by emotiona l 
states and experience, yet solutions or interventions for reducing the impact of heuristics and 
biases in trading appear relatively few, and may benefit from approaches used in other 
disciplines (Croskerry, 2003).     
 
Collaborative decision-making. Decision-making research has focussed on how social aspects 
of trading environments shape performance. A lack of collaborative decision making (e.g. top 
down decision making) has been associated with poor performance outcomes in finance 
(Shaeffer, Richardson and, Rosenblatt 1998). Common themes in the reviewed studies include 
demonstrating the influence of communication pathways in organising team decision making. 
Hierarchy was found to influence trading decision-making outcomes (e.g. how non 
collaborative decision making is linked to ineffective team decision making), for example 
Ramanujam and Goodman (2003) explore the idea that the nature of the HRO (as hierarchica l) 
influences the organisations ability to balance risks and outcomes. A top down strategy leads 
to poor strategic decision making for financial organisations, for example to enter into a new 
market activity that leads to large losses (Ramanujam and Goodman 2003). Yet overall, the 
research literature provides relatively little insight into the communication pathways that 
underlie collaborative decision-making remain.  
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Summary 
Consistent with the long history of psychological research investigating financial decision-
making, research on cognitive non-technical skills demonstrates their importance for financ ia l 
trading. Application of the situation awareness concept to interpret research findings shows 
how effective traders gather information (i.e. information sources, search strategies), using this 
to understand the task environment (i.e. the market, the trading environment), and to think 
ahead (i.e. anticipate market changes and the effect of individual trading). Such processes 
influence decision-making, with a number of studies highlighting the often intuitive nature of 
trader decision-making. Yet, decision-making processes are influenced by a number of factors, 
including emotional responses, heuristics and biases, and collaboration with colleagues. 
Detailed examinations of human error in trading decision-making were not found (e.g. causes 
and consequences, wider trend patterns), and data on aspects of SA and decision-making were 
quite general (e.g. task-analysis techniques were not applied to understand risk and cognition 
at different stages of the trading process). Examples of potential interventions to improve SA 
were identified (e.g. ergonomics, floor space), however interventions to improve decision-
making were not identified. Interestingly, collaboration in decision-making was seen as 
important for being developing SA and for ensuring effective decisions, and the following 
section considers the role of teamwork and leadership in financial trading.  
 
Social skills and performance in financial trading 
The sections below summarise and discuss the key findings reported in table 3 relating to the 
non-technical skills of teamwork and leadership. In work environments where risk is partly 
managed through collaborative activities, the communication, collaboration, and leadership of 
groups is integral to successful performance.  
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Teamwork  
Teamwork refers to a “distinguishable set of two or more people who interact, dynamica l ly, 
interdependently, and adaptively toward a common and valued goal / objective / mission, who 
have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform and who have a limited life -
span of membership” (Salas et al. 1992, 4).  Of the research literature identified, eight of the 
20 (40%) papers explored teamwork in financial trading, often as an influencing factor on the 
occurrence of error. Of these articles, four were case studies, three were interview studies and 
one was an ethnographic study (and questionnaire).  
 
Team roles. Much of the research on teamwork focussed on how team roles shape behaviour 
and performance. Specifically, several papers focussed on the influence of ‘role segregation’ 
(e.g. team member role clarity and congruent team goals). Ramanujam and Goodman (2003) 
and Roberts and Libuser (1993) found a lack of role segregation in financial teams to result in 
extreme risk exposure for the organisation (e.g. a lack of segregation in the audit and loan 
departments resulted in errors being more likely to be hidden). Furthermore, a lack of role 
segregation was found to lead to poor team coordination and performance (Ramanujam and 
Goodman 2003; Roberts and Libuser 1993), for example in financial institutions which have 
trading operations that are either co-located or in distributed work settings (e.g. a head office 
in London and a satellite office in Singapore). Such dislocation means that the trading activit ies 
of the institution may be located in Asia, whereas the oversight and funding operations are 
located in Europe, with poor performance occurring due to poor operational coordination and 
temporal gaps in activity (Ramanujam and Goodman, 2003).   
 
Coordination and communication. As described above, clarity and interdependencies upon 
traders with different roles is a key influencer of trading performance. Underlying this is the 
30 
 
way in which trader roles shape communication and coordination. Poor communication is seen 
as undermining performance, with the analysis of the Barings Bank collapse showing poor or 
unclear communication procedures creating uncertainty on how information is interpreted, and 
team conflict on its management (Shaeffer, Richardson and, Rosenblatt 1998). Patterns of 
communication are found to be shaped by how uncertainty is managed, and bonus structures 
shape (e.g. individual or team) strategies (Willman et al. 2006, Michel 2007). Hicks (2004) 
observed that trader performance is linked to the recognition of the trader as a team member, 
as energy and financial trading organisations are complex socio-technical systems that are risk 
and performance critical. An overly strong reliance on automation can undermine team 
coordination and communication (e.g. for sharing risk-related information), and 
communication between different organisational departments (e.g. internal audit and account 
reconciliation) is especially critical (Hicks 2004; Ramanujam and Goodman 2010). 
Furthermore, for managerial decision to be optimal they require cooperation and validat ion 
from other stakeholders, highlighting the importance of interactions between traders and 
management (Hensman and Sadler-Smith 2011).   
 
Leadership  
Leadership in operational work settings (i.e. the trading floor) refers to how team member are 
directed, coordinated, and motivated to achieve organisational goals (Salas, Burke and, 
Cannon-Bowers 2000; Flin, O’Connor and Crichton 2008). The literature review highlighted 
the importance of effective leadership for ensuring the performance of financial trading teams. 
10 of the 20 (50%) papers explored an element of leadership. Of these papers, four were case 
studies, five interviews, and one longitudinal content analysis that explore the concepts of 
leadership.  
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Leadership structures. Studies of leadership in the financial domain were often focussed upon 
the hierarchical nature of organisational leadership. For example, authoritarian structures are 
generally found to inhibit knowledge sharing within hierarchy trading system (e.g. between the 
trading floor and management), and to promote a culture of fear of reprisals that leads to a 
reduced ability within the organisation to detect early warning signals in the lead up to 
organisational failures (i.e. traders feel unable to highlight problems observed in the trading 
floor) (Mention 2011; Shaeffer, Richardson and, Rosenblatt 1998; Hensman and Sadler-Smith 
2011).  Top-down leadership structures that encourage and reward high levels of risk taking 
implicitly penalise more conservative strategies, potentially threatening organisational stability 
(Roberts and Libuser 1993). Such factors are of increasing interest to regulator and researchers 
in risk culture (Power 2011). 
 
Leadership strategies. Research in the trading environment shows organisational and 
operational leaders to employ a range of strategies in managing trading teams.  For example, 
in an investigation of noise trading behaviour, Willman et al. (2001; 2002; 2006) explored how 
leadership behaviours vary according to the situational factors experienced by the trading team. 
They observed that way leaders monitor and adhere to procedures is directly linked to the 
incoming revenue of the team (e.g. if the team is making money, team leaders monitor less 
closely the activities and risks of the team members). This illustrates the ‘contingent’ nature of 
team leadership in the financial setting, whereby leadership behaviours can be adapted 
according to the situation. This is broadly consistent case studies of financial scandals whereby 
management are shown as reluctant to interfere in teams they perceive to be performing 
exceptionally well, yet are actually covering-up substantial losses (Willman et al. 2002).  
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Furthermore, finance research has shown how the leadership style of the team leader influences 
team work outputs as well (Hensman and Sadler-Smith 2011; Hicks 2004). Specifically they 
show that executive leadership in the financial setting is typically autocratic. Employing a 
longitudinal study, Mention (2011) observes that strong, inclusive management (democratic 
style) is a crucial factor in challenging the culture of a fear of reprisals and leads to better 
reporting of error.  Ramanujam and Goodman (2003) explore this further citing that the lack 
of leader vigilance and monitoring (e.g. a lack of leader inclusiveness) leads to increased 
likelihood of deviation from standards and procedures and subsequently elevated instances of 
error. Shaeffer, Richardson and, Rosenblatt (1998) further argue that leadership style in finance 
is seen as “complacent, inward looking, indecisive and paranoid” resulting from a lack of leader 
inclusivity (autocratic style executive management) and crucially, this leads to the incubation 
of error in the organisation.  
 
Leader Engagement. Available research shows that a lack of engagement between management 
and the operational actors promotes the incubation of error. Sheaffer, Richardson and, 
Rosenblatt (1998) highlight how errors are incubated in the financial organisation due to a 
culture of reprisals and elimination of input from the sharp ends actors. As frontline team actors 
were alienated out of the decision making process, valuable information and warnings were 
ignored (e.g. senior management were unaware of the accumulation of risks in the Asian 
trading activities). In a time of stress, senior organisational members choose make key 
decisions autocratically, eliminating key information from the organisations junior players. 
This research is consistent with decision making style investigations in other high risk fields 
such as emergency services, military and aviation. The junior members of the organisat ion 
reported that the dominant top down decision making process inhibited them from reporting 
errors (Roberts and Libuser 1993).  
33 
 
 
Summary 
Research on the associations between social skills and performance in financial trading indicate 
the importance of teamwork and leadership for risk management and optimal decision-mak ing. 
Factors such as role definitions and conflict, communication strategies within and between 
organisational departments, and coordination influence performance. In turn, teamwork and 
risk-taking activities are influenced by leadership structures and strategy. Yet, despite the 
importance of teamwork and leadership for performance financial trading, research on these 
concepts is arguably scant.  For example, the specific communication and coordination 
strategies that underpin effective trading and risk management are not described, nor are the 
aspects of operational team leadership (e.g. managing resources, motivating team members, 
planning) found critical for performance in other domains (Burke et al. 2007). The role of 
teamwork problems as a precursor to trading incidents remains unexplored, with concepts such 
as team cognition (e.g. for understanding team strategies), shared situation awareness, and 
conflict being potentially useful concepts for understanding the performance of financ ia l 
traders.     
 
Data synthesis to develop an initial non-technical skills framework 
In order to summarise key findings on the non-technical skills important for performance in 
financial trading, table 4 synthesises the research literature described in table 3. Whilst not a 
comprehensive guide to non-technical skills in financial trading, the framework captures and 
presents existing knowledge. 
 
Table 4: Non-technical skills and performance in financial trading  
Non-technical skill 
category 
Skills important for effective trading performance 
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Situation Awareness   Constantly searching for new information in order to update 
market assessments 
 Use of a wide variety of information sources to support SA (e.g. 
trading screens, spreadsheets, trading books, and other trading 
team member) 
 Attention and integration of new information and recognition of 
risk, amount of available time to assess risks  
 Increased vigilance during highly-routinized tasks to avoid slips 
and lapses 
 Ability to distinguish 'noise' data 
 Methodical utilisation of information cues to anticipate trading 
scenarios and predict market behaviour and risk – monitoring 
conditions and re-interpreting SA if they change 
Decision Making  Use of experiential and intuitive decision-making strategies 
 Emotional regulation for dispassionately selecting courses of 
action 
 Ensuring 'noise' data does not negatively influence the evaluation 
of information and selection of decision-making strategies 
 Avoiding overconfidence, loss aversion, and illusions of control, 
as key influencers of decision-making (biases) 
 Utilisation of the team to assess and reflect on decision-making 
strategies  
Teamwork  Clear understanding of team member roles and responsibilities 
on the trading floor 
 Segregation of team member roles where they create conflict  
 Team coordination during shared tasks, and between different 
parts of the trading floor 
 Communication and information sharing on trader decision-
making 
 Shared understanding amongst traders for risk-related 
information and procedures  
Leadership  Monitoring of team member decision-making 
 Allowing autonomy  in trader decision-making where 
performance is effective 
 Ensuring standards are maintained, and procedures followed  
 Encouraging input from team members in problem solving, 
developing decision-making strategies, and conflict resolution 
 Avoiding reward structures that incentivise high-risk taking 
strategies 
 Encouraging speaking-up and reporting of critical incidents  
 
Discussion 
Whilst psychological concepts have long been applied to understand financial decision-
making, operator performance in financial trading remains relatively unexplored from a human 
factors perspective. The current literature review indicates that through adopting and applying 
the 'non-technical skills' paradigm to interpret research on the performance of financial traders, 
useful insights can be made for understanding the factors that influence performance, and the 
potential for intervention to improve risk management. In particular, the decision-mak ing 
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strategies of successful traders can be understood from utilising both cognitive theory on 
situation awareness (e.g. information gathering strategies, comprehension of complex market 
data, course of action), and also social psychology theory on the teamwork processes that 
support effective performance (communication, coordination) and leadership strategies that 
shape activity.  
 
In understanding why trading errors and risk-taking occur, the adoption of non-technical skills 
theory appears especially useful. Furthermore, in developing interventions, NTS theory 
potentially provides a more psychologically based method for improving trader performance. 
For example, rather than focussing on strategies for minimising cognitive heuristics and biases 
that influence decision-making (Crosskerry 2003), intervention strategies can focus on 
improving trader' situation awareness and decision-making through focusing upon team 
processes. Additionally, as public interest in the behaviour and actions of traders is growing, 
the formal assessment of human factors and non-technical skills could inform future regulat ion 
in this domain. 
 
Overall however, it might be argued that research investigating the non-technical skills that 
shape performance in financial trading is relatively embryonic. In comparison to domains such 
as aviation and healthcare (Leonard and Graham 2004; Helmreich 2000), thorough descriptive 
analyses of the human factors issues underlying critical incidents in financial trading are 
required so that a better understand of the specific causal and system factors underlying error 
can be developed. Task analyses may also be useful for identifying the specific risks associated 
with different stages in the trading process, and for precisely describing the cognitive (e.g. 
specific information patterns used for effective decision-making) and social skills (e.g. 
communication on risk) that underpin effective trading performance.  
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Limitations and future research 
The literature review has a number of limitations. First, the literature review search strategy 
may have failed to capture relevant papers with important NTS-related information. Often, the 
studies identified in the literature review did not focus on non-technical skills explicitly (e.g. 
situation awareness), rather they contained data that appeared relevant to NTS concepts was 
extracted. Other publications with data relevant to non-technical skills, but not reported using 
the terminology of the strategy, may have been missed.  Second, the focus on non-technica l 
skills meant that other factors underlying critical incidents in financial trading were not 
explored. These include political, regulatory and technical features (such as the human machine 
interaction failures) of the trading environment that might shape activity. Third, the 
methodologies applied to investigate activity in trading were very diverse. They included 
interviews, surveys, case studies, bio-feedback, and longitudinal analyses of financ ia l 
performance. Whilst diversity in research methodology avoids problems such as common 
method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003), there are limitations with each, and the extent to which 
results can be compared is debatable. The design and sampling strategy of each study are 
divergent (e.g. the interviews conducted are measured qualitatively to elicit the behavioura l 
patterns in team performance outcomes, whereas the biofeedback methods are deigned to focus 
on the quantitative outcomes of statistical analysis), and there are challenges in comparing 
research findings. Fourth, there is potential for bias in the analysis of research studies. In 
particular, data on non-technical skills (e.g. situation awareness) was extracted from papers 
that did not focus on these topics (e.g. a case study analysis). This means a level of data re-
interpretation has occurred, and there is a need for future research to explicitly focus on non-
technical skills and performance in financial trading.  
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Table 4 presents an initial framework of the NTS factors found to shape performance in 
financial trading. Further research (error analysis, task analysis, observational studies of 
performance, examinations of effective leadership behaviours) are required to develop a 
comprehensive framework. For example, Weigmann and Shappell (2005) remind us that 
incident investigation in a high risk setting should consist of five components; a human factors 
investigation system, a database, data analysis, data driven research and development of 
effective remedial actions. Classifying the nature of the events that occur is an important step 
in understanding the underlying weaknesses in the system. Such a model requires the balance 
of simple and broader categories for the accident reporting and coding forms. The application 
of NTS concepts to understand performance in financial trading will facilitate this type of 
investigation, and will contribute to developing error and performance models tailored to the 
context of financial trading. In turn, such data will be useful for supporting the development of 
tools (e.g. observational systems for assessing non-technical skills and providing feedback) for 
evaluating and improving non-technical skills on the trading floor.   
 
Conclusions 
The utility of human factors approaches for improving our understanding of performance in 
financial trading is increasingly recognised. However, to date, the methods and theories used 
to understand and improve operational risk management in other high-risk industries have not 
been fully applied to financial trading. In particular, in organisational settings where a 
combination of cognitive and social behaviours are critical for avoiding and managing error, 
non-technical skills theorem has been used to understand and improve the behaviours and 
abilities of front-line staff. In this literature review, we have demonstrated the importance of 
non-technical skills in the trading environment, with a combination of social and cognit ive 
skills being found to underpin trader performance. Yet, NTS research remains at an embryonic 
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stage within financial trading, and there is a need to better understand the specific behaviours 
and cognitive strategies that underpin effective trader performance. This will provide an 
empirical basis for the development of contextually specific interventions for reducing error 
and improving performance.  
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPERATIONAL INCIDENT LOG 
 
 
The second aim of this thesis is to develop a methodology for capturing and then analysing 
operational incidents in financial trading. The generation of a robust methodology is essential 
so that data on error and non-technical skills can be retrieved. To achieve this, the 
development of a system for capturing, monitoring and analysing operational incidents in the 
financial trading domain is described in the following chapter. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Studies of major organizational accidents (e.g. Chernobyl disaster, Kings Cross fire accident) 
indicate that many risks remain hidden, go unnoticed or are misunderstood for long periods 
of time before an accident. Significantly, the collection and interpre tation of incident data has 
the potential to identify a range of warning signs (J. Reason, 1997; Turner, 1994; Vincent, 
Taylor-Adams, & Stanhope, 1998). Identifying problems, interpreting what they mean and 
then learning from them are essential aspects of organizational life (Pidgeon, 1991). For 
example, Van de Shaaf (1991) argues that near-miss data and the reporting of minor incidents 
increases the available information and provides a better understanding of how to prevent 
further accidents (Van der Schaff, 1991). Yet incident reporting can be challenging due to 
fear of disciplinary action, attitudes that error is ‘inevitable’ and a more general culture of 
blame. The management of error in socio-technical systems requires the acceptance of error 
with equal consideration given to the individual human behaviour (e.g. the observed risky 
practices) and the factors that influence the behaviour (e.g. the culture within the organization 
that supports or undermines safe or risky practices) (Waring, 2005; Waterson et al., 2015). 
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Therefore, it is essential that an organization creates a ‘safety culture’ in order to overcome 
these barriers.  
 
Within financial trading, there is no precedent for incident reporting in terms of either 
methodology for collecting incident data, defining and understanding what constitutes an 
incident, or informing organizational learning initiatives. This chapter aims to tackle the first 
of these issues by describing the methodological process of designing, refining and 
implementing a data collection tool to capture incident data in the financial trading domain. 
This is an essential first step in retrieving data that is key to identifying the non-technical 
skills that underpin error.  
 
3.2 Literature review 
 
The section below identifies a set of literature that guided the development of the incident 
reporting system described in this chapter. The features and lessons learned from the 
application of incident systems that have been applied in other high-risk domains is 
described, the aim of which is to inform the development of a similar tool in the financial 
trading domain.   
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3.2.1 Incidents in financial trading 
Chapter 2 shows that non-technical skills are important for managing risk in financial 
trading. Effective traders have good technical and non-technical skills that allow them to 
quickly sort through large amounts of information in order to exploit market volatility and 
make judgments about the future state of market conditions. However, the complexity 
and pressure of trading leads to errors and risk taking. This combination can result in 
‘incidents’, whereby trading activity results in an avoidable financial loss (e.g. making a 
trade without assessing market-related risk) or compliance failures (e.g. breach of trading 
limits), which place the integrity of the organization at risk even if no loss has occurred 
(e.g. overexposure to illiquid markets). Crucially, such events are typically not caused by 
rogue traders (employees making unapproved financial transactions) but by systemic 
problems across an organization (e.g. failure of the system to generate breach reports) that 
impair human performance. Table 1 presents a few examples of incidents that have been 
interpreted using the non-technical skills framework presented in study 1. The data in 
Table 1 provides contextualized examples of the type of reports that are collected through 
FINANS in order to provide a clearer conceptualization of what error looks like in the 
trading domain. Furthermore, the incidents provide evidence of the underlying human 
factors that influence the occurrence of error, as well as the human factors that assist in 
the detection of error. 
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Table 1: Example data of potential reported incidents   
Example Incidents Key human factors problems identified in the cases  
A middle office analyst sent a request to the trading systems (TS) team to set up a 
new rule (as systems rights and access rules do not permit them to carry out this 
change) for a specific type of financial contract to be downloaded so that it would  
no longer create a physical position in the book. The rule did not work the first time, 
however middle office (risk analyst) spotted it during a procedural check. The rule 
did not work the second time and the front office (trader) spotted it. This could have 
created an incorrect physical position. 
 
Failure of the TS team to gather enough relevant information (SA)  
Poor coordination of shared task work (TMWK) between the TS and MO teams in 
obtaining shared goals (e.g. working system) 
Poor systems maintenance and testing (HCI)  
Good attention (SA) to procedural work by the MO and FO teams 
 
Middle office (MO) saw a loss during their morning procedures that created a 
discrepancy of 93,000 (GBP) between the database and their independent (manual) 
check.  MO looked into reasons for this loss and saw that the estimation on a 
particular deal had moved from the day before (the deal was in the past and 
therefore should not change). After discussing with the trading systems team, it was 
discovered that this was due to the book crashing and the opening failing, which in  
turn caused the parameters on the estimation for the route to be deleted from the 
beginning of the month. This meant that the book was using the previous version of 
the parameters that were out of date and hence the estimat ion was incorrect leading 
to inaccurate estimation of the interest rates in the risk position. This would have 
been easily spotted and discovered if MO had access to the database that stores that 
previous day’s data (a system defence to be used when these issues happen), 
however it  was not available as it had been refreshed and displayed what the live 
book was displaying. The estimation was fixed by entering the correct parameters 
for the route for the reference day of the beginning of the month. The formula then 
recalculated and gave the correct estimation, making back 93k£ (e.g. P&L neutral). 
 
Good gathering and interpretation of information skills by the middle office (SA) 
Communication and coordination of shared tasks between the TS and MO teams 
(TMWK) as well as knowledge sharing between the teams (TMWK) 
Seeking advice on a decision (DM) 
System maintenance and use of tools (HCI) 
 
Front office (t rader) modified their shared freight file without explicitly notifying  
middle office (MO) about it. Therefore, MO’s estimation of the P&L for the freight 
curves was incorrect for several days. Because there is only a small risk position, it  
was difficult to spot (e.g. it generates very little P&L). The discrepancy was finally  
Poor communication of shared task work and knowledge between the teams 
(TMWK) 
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noticed when the two curves diverged enough that it was obvious in  the P&L 
estimation (e.g. MO’s estimation was not in line with the freight desks estimation). 
 
Interpretation of information (SA) to detect the error  
The coal operations team sent a shared email asking middle office (MO) to link a 
sale to a purchase in the book. When MO checked the volumes for the purchase in 
the book they discovered only a quarter of the specified volume was booked (25%), 
after checking the shared email h istory and speaking to Front office they found out 
that FO d id not ask MO to update the book correctly for the full volume and instead 
only 75% of the volume was booked, hence 25% of the volume was not entered into 
the book. This missing volume was added by MO and then linked to the sale 
volume. The issue was resolved quickly as the full volume was agreed with the 
counterpart hence it was only missed in the book. However, if this was not agreed 
with counterpart and FO only assumed it  was, then the desk would have oversold 
(e.g. too much risk). Another issue is the risk was incorrectly represented hence the 
hedging done by the desk was also wrong. This led to a within day P&L impact.  
Communication and coordination of shared task work between the teams (TMWK), 
discovered through communication and gathering of relevant information (SA) 
 
A formula in  the book is contractually specified as: a *X + b. where b is the freight 
component as per the technical specificat ions of the concerned vessel. The contract 
was booked with a fixed b where it should be a variable depending on X and other 
components. The formula was booked by MO and detected by MO when they had a 
handover of tasks the following day and the formula and contract was second -
checked by another middle officer.  
Lack of gathering of relevant information when checking the contract parameter 
against the book information (SA) 
Coordination of shared task work (during handover of task work) led to the 
detection of the problem (TMWK) 
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The incidents provided in Table 1 helpfully contextualize the type of reports that the Incident 
Reporting Form (IRF) described in this chapter collects. These reported incidents will be 
drawn on throughout the chapter to help illustrate the information the tool aims to collect and 
the output of the human factors framework used to analyse each incident.  
 
The way an organization deals with incident data reveals a lot about its risk management 
strategy. In other words, we can infer the safety maturity of an organization by investigating 
how it deals with incident data For example, organizations that actively seek out previous 
experiences of error in an effort to ensure they do not happen again (e.g. foster a learning 
culture), or an organization where staff routinely document and communicate the experience 
of error to enable learning (e.g. foster a reporting culture).  
 
Incident data also reveals the granular descriptions of behaviour within the organization, such 
as deviance to local procedures. Incident reporting systems usefully collect this data, and 
once analysed it helps to reveal patterns and descriptions of the conditions that lead to error 
(e.g. too many workarounds due to ill- fitting procedures). Once the data is aggregated, the 
patterns and analysis can be used to inform risk management decisions, improve training and 
foster organizational learning and awareness. This identification of trends reveals critical 
process ‘weaknesses’ and ‘strengths’ and is essential to improving risk management in the 
financial trading domain, and this begins with the collection of incident data.  
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Before describing the incident reporting form and collection database developed in 
this thesis, the following section reports on the relevant and available literature on 
incident collection in other high-risk domains. This is important because this was 
drawn upon as inspiration whilst developing the incident reporting form and database, 
and the literature set out below informed key decisions that were taken in the initial 
design phase of the incident reporting form.  
 
3.2.2 The purpose of incident collection  
The purpose of collecting incident data is to gather information (e.g. error and near-
miss data) that is present in the day-to-day life of high-risk organizations, in order to 
learn from previous experiences and improve organizational performance and safety.  
 
Developing an incident collection tool is crucial because it equips the organization 
with a means of centrally gathering data on risk-related problems (e.g. mishaps, 
errors, human-computer interface issues) experienced by staff. This data can be used 
to identify the types and sources of problems within and across the organization (e.g. 
slips, knowledge-based errors, rule-based errors), error types (e.g. active or latent) and 
the antecedents to failure, all which helps to reveal problems in the system design or 
procedures (Rasmussen et al., 1981; Reason, 1990; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Moreover, 
if strong feedback is shared with the participants, these systems promote the ability to 
self-assess, share knowledge and learn from error, and promotes the resolution of 
conflict within the organization (Carroll, 1998; Johnson, 2002; Kaplan, 2003). In 
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order to achieve this, the organization must gather reliable, insightful and organic 
(derived from the frontline actors) incident data using an incident reporting form.  
 
3.2.3 Incident collection in other high-risk domains 
Theories of error developed in aviation and other high-risk domains suggest that 
errors are likely to occur in all complex systems. Given this projection, the reporting 
of incidents, including both failures and near-misses, is increasingly seen as an 
essential component for improving safety. Domains with established incident 
reporting procedures, such as aviation, benefit in several ways from the additional 
analytical and theoretical insight. For example, greater insight into the relative 
proportion of particular classes of ‘human error’ (e.g. teamwork, decision making, 
situation awareness) assists the organization in directing resources (e.g. systems 
augmentation, targeted training), as well as identifying the barriers that prevent 
adverse situations from developing into a major incident (e.g. near-miss cases). 
Additionally, feedback from incident reporting systems can be shared with staff to 
promote participation and engagement. Finally, these lessons can be shared across 
industries to promote the establishment of standards and common solutions (e.g. 
sharing of lessons learned) to routinely observed issues.  
 
Similarly, financial trading is a highly complex and risky industry that would benefit 
from the collection and analysis of incidents. Recent large-scale failures across 
several organizations in the financial trading domain (e.g. UBS, Libor and JPMorgan) 
resulted in multi-billion dollar fines, and extensive investigations into their causes 
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have revealed human factors-related issues in managing risk. For example, the 
investigation of trader performance has highlighted the importance of non-technical 
skills (e.g. communication, attention) and human-computer interface issues for 
influencing performance in financial trading (Leaver & Reader, 2015). This outcome 
is similar to many other high-risk sectors (e.g. aviation, nuclear power), yet relatively 
little is known about the link between human factors related problems and incidents in 
trading.  
 
The existing human factors literature provides an empirically- tested and theoretically-
driven foundation for developing an incident reporting system in the financial trading 
domain. In fact, incident reporting systems have been used extensively to identify and 
understand safety problems in a number of high-risk domains.  
  
 For example, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS; developed by the 
Federal Aeronautics and Space Administration) is a voluntary and confidential 
incident reporting system used by pilots and engineers (via a web-based platform) to 
report near-misses and incidents (Billings & Reynard, 1984; Helmreich, 2000). This 
data is then used to understand the role of employees and systems in detecting and 
coping with incidents, and to identify systemic and growing threats to safety. In other 
industries, for example healthcare, incident reporting systems have also become 
relatively commonplace, although they are generally not as developed in comparison 
to aviation (Itoh, Omata, & Andersen, 2009; Wu, Pronovost, & Morlock, 2002). For 
example, in healthcare staff often experience cultural barriers in reporting incidents, 
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effectively contributing to poor attitudes on incident reporting that can limit 
institutional learning (Anderson, Kodate, Walters, & Dodds, 2009; Waring, 2005).  
 
The methodology being developed for financial trading draws on the experiences of 
previous error researchers across other high-risk domains, such as aviation, rail and 
healthcare, to frame the development of an incident collection system in the financial 
domain. Systems that have successfully collected, analysed and reported on errors and 
near-misses, such as the ASRS, were used as inspiration for the incident reporting 
form and database described in this chapter.  
 
3.2.4 Review of existing incident reporting systems  
A review of existing incident reporting systems in other domains (below) reveals the 
common characteristics of successful systems and identifies where system 
deficiencies exist. For example, it reveals that incident data tends to be collected 
through two mechanisms. First, through automatic and mandatory systems (e.g. 
computer monitoring systems in aviation, observable mishaps) which lead to a formal 
incident investigation. Second, through voluntary staff incident reporting systems. 
This typically involves staff completing a narrative text and/or structured report on 
incidents they observed or participated in.  
 
Incident reports usually contain information on the types of events that took place 
(e.g. mechanical, procedural), the personnel involved (e.g. identifying the teams), the 
activities leading to the incident (e.g. behaviours), and how the event was detected 
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(e.g. system, observation). Depending on the industry and organization, incident 
reports can be anonymous or identified, and can supplement existing monitoring 
systems (e.g. near-miss data in aviation) or be the primary source of data on mishaps.  
 
Importantly, researchers on incident monitoring have argued that systems require the 
following properties: they must have strong procedures for capturing incidents (e.g. 
independent, with non-punitive results); generate high-quality data (e.g. freeform 
narrative of the event promotes a broader, more ecological explanation of the event) ; 
and be underpinned by strong analytics – for example, where experts interrogate the 
data and generate meaningful insights on the types of incidents that occur and root 
causes (Mahajan, 2010). Finally, to ensure these insights are utilized, robust feedback 
and learning mechanisms are required (e.g. for developing interventions, sharing 
lessons learned across the organization).  
 
In order to extract valid insights and promote organizational learning within the 
financial trading domain, there is a requirement to better understand and adopt the 
specific aspects of incident reporting systems featured in the literature. Incident 
reporting systems are a key source of information on the development of a new tool in 
the financial trading domain where no robust system for the collection of incident and 
near-miss events exists.  
 
In deciding on the format for the incident reporting form in financial trading, the 
experiences of other error researchers were taken into account, such as those 
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identified above, and particularly those in the aviation, rail and healthcare domains. 
Below, the characteristics of three systems across three different domains that served 
as inspiration for the development of an incident reporting form and collection system 
in the financial trading domain are examined.  
 
Aviation. Incident collection and analysis research is primarily rooted in the aviation 
domain, where millions of reports have been collected since the establishment of error 
collection tools in the 1980s (Billings, 1998; Billings & Reynard, 1984; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2001). Two reporting systems operate simultaneously in the aviation 
domain: one mandatory system with the primary purpose of holding providers 
accountable and focused on errors that result in serious injury or death; and a second 
system – the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) – with the goal of quality 
improvement, which is voluntary and focused on the collection of near-miss data in 
order to identify potential vulnerabilities within the system.  
 
The ASRS is credited with helping to improve the safety of airline travel in the USA 
over the past three decades. For example, according to the Federal Aviation 
Administration, the risk of dying in a domestic jet flight was 1 in 2 million (1967-
1976) and fell to 1 in 8 million by the 1990s, due in some part to the benefits of 
accident analysis and the introduction of human factors interventions (e.g. incident 
reporting, team training). Below, some of the primary characteristics of the ASRS that 
have been used to frame the development of a tool in the financial domain are 
discussed.  
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The ASRS is a voluntary, confidential reporting tool that is maintained by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and funded by the Federal 
Aviation Association (FAA). The purpose of the ASRS is to collect, de-identify, 
catalogue and analyse incident reports based on human factors concepts such as: 
relevant conditions preceding an incident, causal/contributing factors, chain of events, 
and the processes that led to the detection of an incident (Beaubien & Baker, 2002; 
Billings, 1998; Sarter & Alexander, 2000). The ASRS provides separate reporting 
forms for pilots, air traffic controllers, cabin crews and mechanics. Each form 
contains a series of fields that describe the relevant conditions (e.g. type of flight, 
phase of flight, weather) that immediately preceded the incident. Space is also 
provided for a text-based narrative so that the reporter can provide additional details, 
such as causal/contributing factors, the chain of events and suggestions for preventing 
the event’s recurrence. The incident narratives are stored as text (Beaubien & Baker, 
2002).   
 
There are several lessons from the ASRS that informed the development of a similar 
system in financial trading. Firstly, the importance of consensus amongst stakeholders 
in designing the system and the use of set categories. In defining the categories, 
experts from within the participating organization were consulted on variables such as 
detection mechanisms, risk types and departments involved (in order to capture the 
migration of error across the floor). Moreover, lessons regarding the provision of 
feedback from the ASRS – in the form of database search requests and quick 
turnaround data analyses distributed to internal stakeholders across departments – 
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were considered in the development of the incident reporting system in the financial 
domain, with the aim of investigating unsafe practices, planning corrective action and 
learning from the incidents.  
 
The UK-based version of a similar reporting tool, known as the Confidential Human 
Factors Incident Report Program (CHIRP), was also incorporated to frame the 
development of the incident reporting system in financial trading. Similar to the 
ASRS, operational staff submit the reports voluntarily and de-identified feedback by 
newsletter, summary statistics and topics of interest are distributed to the participants 
to encourage further contribution. Uniquely, this system includes an exhaustive 
glossary to classify and code the textual information, which helps to establish 
consistent feedback across domains. This aspect is considered within the development 
of the financial incident analysis system; however, due to the low number of reports 
in the database it was not found to be applicable. Nevertheless, the addition of a 
glossary of terms could enhance the coding ability of the tool in future iterations.  
 
Lastly, the Australian version (Confidential Aviation Incident Reporting, CAIR) was 
also considered, as it is similar to the previous two systems but with a focus on 
systems and procedures as opposed to individual events. The concepts coded in this 
system do not distinguish between an accident and an incident (similar to Reason, 
1990), but take a more complete approach at the systems level (e.g. no primary or 
contributory causes). After considering the requests of organizational management 
within the participating organization (who are interested in the categorization of 
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causes to highlight process weaknesses and strengths), it was decided to take a finer-
grained approach to identifying the primary and contributory causes in the data 
analysis.   
 
The purpose of the incident collection tools outlined above (ASRS, CHIRP and 
CAIR) is to allow the user to identify broad safety trends and process weaknesses 
(e.g. procedural and technical), and this aim is shared with the incident reporting 
system outlined in this chapter. The systems are typically web-based, voluntary and 
provide textual data for analysis – characteristics that have also been adopted in the 
tool described in this chapter. Also, these incident collection tools are typically 
supplemented with a more fine-grained human error coding framework, such as the 
human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS), to provide a richer 
analysis of the human factors principles that underlie performance (Beaubien & 
Baker, 2002; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). This aspect is a key guiding principle in 
the development of the incident reporting system in the financial domain, as it 
provides evidence as to whether human factors methods and concepts are relevant in 
the financial trading domain.  
 
Box 1 presents an example report from the ASRS reporting system and illustrates the 
lessons that can be derived from the data.  
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Box 1: ASRS Sample Report with interpretation 
Sample Report 
 
“The aircraft never stalled, but it was literally only a few seconds/knots from doing so…My failure to 
maintain an adequate scan was the primary cause of this near stall incident. I relied too much on the 
automatic pilot and allowed myself to become distracted with my chart review. That should have been 
done at cruise, with the captain ‘covering’ for me while I had my head in the books. Also, the PNF 
(Pilot-Not-Flying) might have noticed the low speed sooner if he’d made his PA announcement at 
level-off, not in climb.” (ASRS Report Number 278353).  
 
Type of Analysis:  
Link the flight phase – relationship between flight phases during the monitoring errors (e.g. during taxi, 
take-off, climb, cruise, descent, landing).  
Identify the consequences – adverse safety consequences from monitoring error (e.g. altitude 
deviations, runway incursions, departure from desired speed). The data can be benchmarked to 
contextualize the severity.  
 
Lessons from the analysis:  
The busier the crew is in non-monitoring tasks, the more likely it is that monitoring performance will 
decrease. Crews reported zero at most, one flight related task as being conducted – this shows that 
monitoring errors are not limited to high workload, multiple task periods and it implies that monitoring 
is a discipline, which must be practised constantly and consistently, regardless of workload.  
 
Actionable feedback:  
Develop a framework for improvement: management of air carriers and other aviation operations, as 
well as regulatory officials must realize that is it incumbent on them to provide crews with clearly 
thought-out guidelines to maximize their monitoring of aircraft trajectory, automation and systems. 
Procedures that conflict with crew monitoring must be minimized or eliminated.  
 
Flight crews must constantly exercise monitoring discipline and practise the operational guidelines 
designed to improve monitoring.  
 
On long-haul flights in which crew monitoring may not be sustained, particular attention should be 
devoted to altitude and course changes .  
 
Inspired by the report, analysis and outcomes presented in Box 1, the incident 
collection form for financial trading was designed so that it would provide similar 
trend data. For example, the input of date and time were replicated to identify the 
approximate time of day the error occurred (e.g. similar to flight phase identification 
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in the ASRS), as well as adding a text input in the form to describe the ‘possible 
consequences’ of the reported error. Emulating central aspects of the systems outlined 
above is desirable because the data that is generated from these aspects of the system 
can be used to identify broad safety ‘hotspots’ (e.g. altitude deviations, runway 
incursions, departure from desired speed) that can be targeted with tailored 
interventions. Moreover, the data can be used for benchmarking aspects of safety 
across the industry, to contextualize the severity or ‘hotspots’ and identify and 
prioritize key areas of improvement.  
 
Incident reporting is well-established in the aviation domain, where robust feedback 
and reporting procedures promote organizational learning and permits benchmarking 
across the industry. In the healthcare domain, tools informed by the aviation domain 
have been met with some success. However, the domain has also had to tackle key 
issues undermining reporting and make key modifications to the systems to better 
reflect the specific task work in the healthcare domain. In developing a tool for the 
financial trading domain, these challenges and modifications revealed in the 
healthcare literature are considered.   
 
Healthcare. Incident collection tools in healthcare were first established over two 
decades ago and were informed by similar tools in the aviation domain. Currently, 
incident reporting systems in the medical domain cover a wide range of the 
organizational sector and are established for many different types of incidents (e.g. 
surgical, anaesthesiology, ICU).  
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Unlike the aviation industry, the healthcare domain is plagued with issues of 
underreporting that threaten the ability of the systems to accurately quantify and 
measure harm reduction. Several factors underpin the reluctance to report: fear of 
retribution, driven by a culture of blame (e.g. high-profile cases act as a powerful 
disincentive to participate, stigma of whistle-blowers); the perception of additional 
training of staff as a burden; poor investigatory procedures (e.g. perceived utility of 
reporting, feedback); and increasing evidence-based medicine where errors are 
violations of protocol or procedures and therefore seen as punitive.  
 
The challenges to reporting systems in the healthcare setting reveal crucial lessons 
that were considered when developing a system for incident collection in the financial 
trading domain. For example, it is observed in the medical field that only a small 
percentage of doctors report incidents formally. The reasons for this can be variable, 
such as a fear of retribution, fear of legal action or deeply entrenched beliefs in 
medicine that only ‘bad doctors make mistakes’ (Mahajan, 2010). Similarly, there is a 
culture of blame and stigma around whistle-blowing in the financial trading domain 
that deters reporting by key frontline staff. In this situation, it is essential that data 
input is non-punitive and independent, and that the analysis of events is administered 
systemically, resulting in direct action that improves safety. Improving mechanisms 
for incident reporting can enable greater staff participation and reduce – if not 
eliminate – the stigma of reporting.  
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Moreover, it has been noted that systems with too many closed questions do not allow 
for free expression of ‘what actually happened’, and that staff must be allowed to 
narrate their own version of events. Therefore an emphasis on staff testimonies is 
beneficial, as it promotes a more ecological description of the event and a more 
comprehensive understanding of the multitude of factors that link together in the 
evolution of an event (Mahajan, 2010). This observation was helpful in framing the 
initial development of the incident reporting form in the financial trading domain.  
 
Furthermore, in the analysis, it was found that systems for incident collection in the 
healthcare domain draw on experts from the specialty to interrogate the data and 
generate meaningful learning outcomes. In anaesthesiology, the Australian Incident 
Monitoring System (AIMS) successfully collects and identifies anaesthesia-related 
incident data. Key examples from the collected incidents include drug administration 
errors (e.g. pharmaceutical preparation error), equipment errors (intravenous/venous 
line errors) and communication errors (e.g. miscommunication of the placement of a 
regional block). These examples identify the contributory factors such as work 
overload, lack of emergency procedures, fatigue, and inadequacies in the layout and 
processes of the system. Subsequently, this has generated improvements such as 
universally standard color-coded drug labelling, changes to workload management 
(e.g. reducing both the need to operate at night and continuous hours of work), and 
training (Abeysekera, Bergman, Kluger, & Short, 2005). 
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Rail. The characteristics of the incident collection tool (e.g. the reporting form) that 
were found to be relevant in the aviation and healthcare domains have similarly been 
found to be influential in the rail industry and have been adapted accordingly. In the 
UK rail domain, CIRAS (Confidential Incident Reporting and Analysis System) is the 
national system for reporting and analysis of railway near-misses. It was developed in 
1996 as a result of an initiative by ScotRail and the University of Strathc lyde, and 
subsequently rolled out across the entire UK rail network in 2000 (Davies, Wright, 
Courtney, & Reid, 2000).  
 
In CIRAS, reports are voluntarily submitted through two avenues: by mail (using one 
of the CIRAS forms available in workplaces, or included with each copy of the 
CIRAS Journal) or by telephone. Once a report has been mailed or telephoned in, 
CIRAS staff perform a critical incident interview with each driver involved, during 
which detailed forced-choice questionnaire data is collected to provide technical, 
environmental and personal information (e.g. shift time, nature of work, weather and 
rail conditions) (Wright & Van der Schaaf, 2004). The CIRAS database is secure and 
protected, data is stored on a removable hard drive (which is kept safe overnight), and 
the computer itself is ‘stand-alone’ and non-networked (to limit the risk of hacking). 
Once the interview is complete, the original report form is returned to the employee 
and no copies are made or retained (all identifying information is redacted) (Davies et 
al, 2000). Although the reporting form is quite different to the incident reporting form 
developed for the financial trading domain (e.g. paper form versus web-based), there 
are similarities in the intended use of the data. For example, CIRAS maintains a log to 
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keep track of issues that have been closed and those that remain unresolved, and this 
has been used in the web reporting form in the financial trading domain.  
 
In terms of improvements, short-term corrective actions are frequently taken 
following the reports in CIRAS, such as the repositioning of mirrors and monitors, 
changes to braking procedures on disc-brake sets and the erection of barriers at illegal 
crossing points (Davies, Wright, Courtney & Reid, 2000). In the longer term, CIRAS 
offers scope for collecting generic human factors data that can provide a resource for 
the industry to learn from error to improve performance and safety. For example, 
trend data and patterns can be used to enable the industry to determine physical 
locations prone to error, particular times (e.g. during shifts) and conditions that 
underpin the occurrence of error, and error-promoting conditions (e.g. procedural 
inadequacy, fatigue). This data is used to exchange lessons learned within the industry 
and share safety solutions, in particular driver fatigue.  
 
Although the intention of incident reporting is to improve safety and performance 
outcomes in high-risk domains, there are practical challenges in the administration of 
the systems and key limitations in the outcomes from incident analysis that have been 
observed across all the domains where incident reporting is on-going.  
  
3.2.5 Incident collection: limitations and challenges observed in other domains 
The use of incident reports in several high-risk domains such as aviation and 
healthcare is increasingly acknowledged as an important tool for organizational 
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learning about incidents, human factors and safety (Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000). Error 
reporting systems have led to the successful identification of system deficiencies 
across several high-risk domains, helped to identify the barriers that prevent adverse 
situations from developing into a major accident, and helped analysts to identify 
where additional support is required to guarantee the future benefit of safeguards, as 
well as the creation of national standards for safety. However, the extent to which this 
type of tool can capture a representative sample of incidents remains a topic of debate 
within the literature (van der Schaaf & Kanse, 2004), and the challenges within the 
data must be carefully considered when drawing comparisons to the financial trading 
domain.  
 
Underreporting is a key weakness in the data collected from incident reporting 
systems. Underreporting results in a bias in the type of reported errors and reduces the 
organization’s ability to quantify and accurately measure how risk management 
processes lead to improvements in safety and performance.  
 
The reasons why underreporting is prevalent vary and are well summarized by van 
der Shaaf & Kanse (2004) in a systematic four-tier framework: i) fear (e.g. ‘blame 
culture’, litigation, disciplinary action); ii) risk acceptance (e.g. incidents as just ‘part 
of the job’, or a ‘macho’ culture that suppresses reporting) ; iii) useless (e.g. the 
perceived attitudes of management, lack of follow-up actions, handling the incident 
alone); and iv) practical reasons (e.g. time constraints, insufficient information, lack 
of incentives) (van der Schaaf & Kanse, 2004). In the scope of the current study, these 
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four principles are relevant and underpin the future efficacy of the tool. Therefore it is 
critical to acknowledge the existence of these limitations in the data (e.g. 
interpretations of broad causality) so that the findings from the dataset are not 
overstated, as well as to develop a tool with these principal limitations in mind (e.g. 
ensure targeted and active feedback and clear procedures for data entry).  
 
In addition to this four-tier framework, a sub-category may be the human behaviour 
limitations, such as the level of awareness of the participants (how they may not 
report because they don’t know what the error is), and ignoring the error or covering 
it up (Rouse & Rouse, 1983; Sanne, 2008; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Also, studies of 
human recall show that recall of events is made up of segments of recollection with 
gaps that may be filled with bias and extraneous information, and therefore must be 
treated cautiously when analysing individual narratives, which may or may not be 
complete (O’Connor, O’Dea, & Melton, 2007). The psychological processes in which 
risks and warning signs are initially identified and interpreted within the organization 
are complex and shaped by local norms, objectives, policies, values and knowledge 
(Macrae, 2009). Likewise, shared attitudes and beliefs are central pillars to an 
organization's safety culture (e.g. adhering to rules, tolerance of violations) and can 
influence the early risk- identification process, although these impacts are not yet fully 
understood (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000). Knowing 
this, caution was taken when interpreting the data and exploring the findings within 
the financial trading domain, keeping in mind the limitations that may serve to skew 
the data. Furthermore, lessons can be learned from how other high-risk industries 
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have promoted positive reporting cultures, and these lessons were considered in the 
development of a tool in the financial domain.  
 
Recommendations from the medical field to foster ‘just’ reporting practices and 
overcome these limitations include the provision of participant feedback, as people 
will only contribute to the system if they believe their contribution will be acted on 
(Johnson, 2002; Kaplan, 2003). The promotion of collecting near-miss data is 
important, as it is more frequent than ‘harm’ data and also carries less ‘baggage’ to 
the person reporting it, therefore it may be more open and honest (Kaplan, 2003).  
 
In the development of an incident reporting tool in the financial trading domain, 
attempts to manage these concerns by de-identifying the incident data prior to 
analysis and ensuring that the attribution of responsibility is team-specific (e.g. 
individual failings are not monitored, only team failures) were undertaken. This is 
illustrated in the incident data provided in Table 1. The perceived attitudes of 
management are guided through consistent feedback (e.g. short daily reports and more 
in-depth monthly reports) regarding the incidents and activity on the floor and across 
the teams, as well as active incentivizing of operational personnel to report incidents 
(e.g. during bi-weekly meetings, teams who report are well-acknowledged). 
 
 Also, events identified as ‘major’ by the management are openly discussed in action-
plan meetings, which encourage the mixed participation of the teams involved in the 
incident (analyst, supervisor and manager). In these meetings, representatives from all 
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departments involved in the incident are invited to present their understanding of their 
role in the incident, and share ideas on how the risks migrated within the organization 
(e.g. lack of adequate controls, poor role definitions) and discuss solutions (e.g. fixes). 
This meeting also aims to re- frame prevailing norms or attitudes regarding which 
incidents are acceptable or unacceptable within the organizational risk appetite. 
Admittedly, practical constraints such as time and perceived usefulness of the 
meetings are challenging to manage on the individual level, as the meetings are 
voluntary and depending on the time of day/day of the week and severity/complexity 
of the incident, participation varies.   
 
Following a review of the existing literature, consideration of the limitations that 
undermine the analysis of incident data and forward-planning of how to overcome the 
possible barriers to success, a careful process of system development guided by the 
principles laid out above can begin. The following section of this chapter presents the 
key steps in the process of the development of an incident reporting form and incident 
collection database (‘the system’). 
 
3.3 Process of developing an incident reporting tool for financial trading  
 
Following a review of the literature and the tools for collecting and identifying 
incidents that are used in other high-risk domains, the following section describes the 
design and development of a similar tool, adapted to the financial trading domain.  
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3.3.1 Collecting incident reports in financial trading 
To perform an analysis of human error on the trading floor, and to isolate data on the 
non-technical skills required for effective performance, it was necessary to access and 
collect data on trading incidents. To achieve this, the author designed an incident 
collection tool comprised of two parts: an incident reporting form (reporting interface) 
and an incident database (data repository).  
 
The practical design of the tool is driven by the principal features of incident 
reporting forms found in other domains and described in the first section of this 
chapter. For example, the collection system is voluntary, confidential and accessible 
on a web page on the local working stations of employees at the participating 
organization, and it offers drop-down menus for identifying date and time, risk type 
categories and teams involved. In addition, there is a freeform text box where staff 
generate the report in their own words. All of these features were cited in the 
literature as beneficial attributes to an incident reporting system.  
 
The incident log aims to provide a methodologically sound and theoretically informed 
system to capture data on the human factors skills that influence error on the trading 
floor. The vision of the system is a voluntary, confidential mechanism for trading staff 
to report incidents that they observe within the working environment. The goal of data 
interpretation is to provide broad trend data to management to help steer the creation 
of guidelines, raise awareness, develop training protocols and help the organization 
reflect on past experience in order to improve future risk management and 
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performance. Following the literature review in section one, the aim is to gather 
ecological narratives reported by expert staff that reflect the nature and complexity of 
error in this domain (e.g. the multitude of factors that link in the evolution and 
migration of error, see Table 1 for examples); to provide a reliable and standardized 
methodology to frame the analysis of the incidents; and to turn the reports into 
organizational lessons in order to generate meaningful learning outcomes.  
 
Crucially, the constraints to reporting, the implications of underreporting on the 
efficacy of risk management, and the existence of cultural (e.g. norms and beliefs that 
management prioritize safety reporting outcomes) and human behaviour variables 
(e.g. gaps in recollection) as essential determinants of the success of incident 
reporting systems in the field have been considered prior to undertaking the collection 
of incident reports.   
 
No analogous system exists; therefore, the work in this chapter develops a novel 
methodology to understand error in the financial trading domain through the 
expansion of the current human factors literature to include this domain. The first 
section of this study identified the key properties that make up the founding principles 
of the system (e.g. voluntary, non-punitive, confidential, web-based, active and 
targeted feedback from top to bottom of the organization). The creation of an incident 
reporting form and collection system in the finance domain contributes to human 
factors literature and finance literature. In fact, the testing of a system within the 
 108 
 
participating organization provides original empirical evidence that human factors 
techniques and methods can be successfully applied in the financial trading domain.  
 
Moreover, the development of an incident collection tool in this domain offers a novel 
perspective to the risk management literature, offering empirical evidence that 
incident collection can inform risk management, and theoretical evidence that social 
and cognitive skills are increasingly found to be relevant in avoiding error and 
financial loss. The first phase of development of the system, the incident reporting 
form, is discussed in the following section.  
  
3.3.2 The Incident Reporting Form (IRF) 
An incident reporting form (IRF), in its most basic shape, provides a detailed record 
of an incident that occurs within the workplace, such as a numeric input error on a 
trading floor. The incident may take two distinct forms: either a near-miss – a 
narrowly avoided, unplanned incident whereby the last defensive barrier within the 
organization is challenged but upheld; or a failure – the state or condition of not 
meeting the desired operational outcome. 
 
In designing the template for the IRF, the experiences of other error researchers were 
taken into account, particularly those of the Australian Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS; developed by the Federal Aviation Administration and NASA (Reynard, 
Billings, Cheaney & Hardy, 1986). The IRF was designed to include a narrative 
section to elicit a description of the incident in the reporter’s own words, and a 
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multiple-choice section (drop-down menu) to elicit contextual details about the 
incident regarding ‘what happened’, ‘why it happened’, ‘when and where it 
happened’ and ‘follow-up actions taken’.  
 
This format of questioning is inspired by the Socratic method of dialectic 
investigation, whereby a series of questions and answers are used to stimulate critical 
thinking and draw out ideas and underlying presumptions in the respondents, in this 
case the trading staff’s beliefs of incident causation. This method, or ‘e lenchus’, 
searches for general, commonly-held truths that shape beliefs, and scrutinizes them to 
determine their consistency with other beliefs or norms. In its most basic form, 
elenchus is a series of questions formulated as tests of logic and fact, intended to help 
a person or group to discover their beliefs about some topic (e.g. incident causation), 
while seeking to typify general characteristics shared by various particular cases 
(Vlastos, 1982).   
 
To allow the evaluation of the incident in light of a theory of the psychological basis 
of human error, the drop-down menu was structured into the following key areas: type 
of incident, migration of risk, departmental (e.g. staff) involvement (e.g. multi- tier or 
single team involvement), and suggested corrective strategies.  
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Figure 1: The interface of the incident reporting form used in FINANS 
 
The incident collection tool developed in financial trading captures voluntary, 
anonymous and self-reported, typically retrospective descriptive data about a mishap 
or near-miss incident, and aims to group the incidents by error categories. Below, an 
explanation and justification for the chosen inputs in the IRF is provided.   
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Date caused and date resolved. Participants are asked to log the date the incident was 
raised. This could be the date the error was logged, or a date in the past. The date does 
not default to the current day and must be manually selected from the calendar. The 
calendar input does not allow for a date entry in the future (day + 1). The date 
resolved field can be left blank or filled in with the use of the select calendar. The 
presence of these two categories permits an analysis of when the incident is ‘closed’ 
(e.g. detected and dealt with within the day) or indicates if it remains ‘open’ (e.g. still 
unresolved).  
 
This contributes to a better understanding of the complexity of the issue, and allows 
further diagnostics on the number of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ incidents within the systems 
in a given time period. Furthermore, each report is time-stamped in the database, 
which allows further analysis (e.g. emerging patterns) of when errors and near-misses 
occur (e.g. during peak workload hours or end of the day) in order to tailor 
interventions (e.g. scheduling breaks, drawing it to the attention of managers in order 
to re-balance workloads).  
 
Department caused by/department raised by. These two input variables are in a drop-
down format, where the participant can select multiple items. Participants can choose 
from a selection that includes all trading desks (e.g. grouped by commodity) and 
trading support teams (e.g. legal, risk control). Additionally, participants can choose 
local and/or disparate teams (e.g. Liquefied Natural Gas, London and Risk Control, 
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Houston). This is valuable in terms of data analysis as it better reflects the true nature 
of incidents on the floor (e.g. that they typically involve several teams).  
 
With this information, we can run diagnostics on how the risk migrates on the floor, 
detect patterns in causation and illustrate frequency of error origination and detection 
by desk. This is considerably valuable in helping to better understand breakdowns in 
communication and coordination between specific teams (e.g. risk control and a front 
office trading desk), as well as highlighting the success or weakness in certain risk 
management processes (e.g. maintaining standards) and recovery mechanisms (e.g. of 
near-misses).  
 
Risk type. The participants are asked to classify each incident into a risk type 
category. This step is not mandatory and may be left blank. In determining the set of 
standard risk types, a diverse team of trading experts including three traders, one risk 
manager, three risk control team members and a business applications developer 
informed the choices to ensure they were reflective of the task work and working 
environment.  
 
Adopting a grounded theory approach, the group of experts were asked to review a set 
of randomly selected incidents (n=150) and identify the types of r isks (from an 
extensive list) that emerged from the text to determine the risk categories that they 
found to be relevant. From here, a set of predisposing risk categories emerged. 
Following this observation, a drop-down menu with six of the most commonly 
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identified risk types (deal entry error; missing deal in the book; invoicing and 
confirmation issue; pricing; market parameters; and trading systems/IT bug) was 
generated.   
 
The risk types usefully help to classify the broad risk trends on the floor and aid in the 
reporting of events and error trends to management. Importantly, the risk types are 
reflective of the working environment and task work specific to this domain, and in 
that way are easily digested by management when presented in the form of monthly 
reports.  
 
What occurred and why. The expert participants are asked to provide a narrative 
summary of the incident in their own words in the text box provided. There are no 
character limits or restrictions (e.g. symbols). In fact, in some cases, the participants 
input calculations into the field as well as contract stipulations and financial 
evaluations. The provision of a free-form narrative section promotes a more 
ecological explanation of the events surrounding the incident, as well as providing a 
basis for text analysis. Using a form of content analysis, the text can be analysed and 
indexed in order to identify analytical categories, patterns and emerging themes on a 
regular basis that describe the incidents.  
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Feedback reports. Feedback in the form of a Microsoft SQL server report is delivered 
daily to stakeholders (e.g. senior management, risk managers, reporting staff 
members), and more in-depth analysis of the incidents is distributed monthly (e.g. 
thematic analysis, performance by department and risk category). The first page of the 
report outlines the internally approved definition of operational risk, presents the 
barriers to reporting that have been identified within the organization, and includes 
the date and key contact information.   
 
The second page of the report reveals historical trend data by desk, risk type and 
trading location, both within the reporting year and year on year. The third page 
presents a more granular analysis of the incidents that occurred within the last three 
months and within each month specifically, with an analysis of three to five key 
events. This provides a more nuanced interpretation of the incidents, gathers 
information on follow-up actions and offers a human factors interpretation of each 
incident. Most importantly, this report is shared amongst the stakeholders to promote 
organizational learning, training and awareness of safety and risk on the floor (e.g. to 
increase perceived utility of incident reporting).  
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3.3.3 Incident database  
The incidents collected using the incident reporting form (IRF) are stored in a 
database developed using Microsoft Access (2013). Access is Microsoft-based 
software that allows the user to create desktop databases. This software was chosen 
because it was readily available on the local workstations within the participating 
organization, and the author was relatively familiar with how to navigate it. Data is 
automatically assigned a sequential event number and stored in a Microsoft SQL 
server database for as long as the program is running. The data stored in the database 
can be extracted in two formats for analysis: .xls and .csv. The database is password 
protected and accessible only to the author and a business applications manager on a 
local computer.  
 
Staff members were given a demonstration of the incident collection tool prior to 
rolling out the front-end interface (e.g. the IRF) via a presentation to selected trading 
teams and one-to-one tutorials.  
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3.3.4 Tutorials and training 
 To train the trading staff how to report operational incidents, it was decided to adopt 
an approach using group demonstrations and individual sessions at employee 
workspaces. The author led group demonstrations on the trading floor; the groups 
were made up of participants from the trading department (e.g. risk control training, 
front office training, support services training).  
 
Trading staff were asked to recall incidents on the trading floor during a challenging, 
non-routine situation, as well as routine incidents that they had experienced. Each 
incident was discussed among the participating members and a final summary of the 
event was described (e.g. context, the problem narrative, identifiable solutions). The 
author then demonstrated to the group how to enter the incident into the IRF. A 
selection of the discussed incidents is included in Table 1, and is supplemented with a 
human factors analysis of the skills that underpin the occurrence of the error as we ll 
as the skills that helped to avert error.  The extracted example (Scenario 2) from Table 
1 reveals the type of incident that is reported in the log and discussed during the 
training:  
 
“Middle office (MO) saw a loss during their morning procedures that created a 
discrepancy of 93,000 (GBP) between the database and their independent check. MO 
looked into reasons for this loss and saw that the estimation on a particular deal had 
moved from the day before (the deal was in the past and therefore should not change). 
After discussing with the trading systems team, it was discovered that this was due to 
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the book crashing and the opening failing, which in turn caused the parameters on the 
estimation for the route to be deleted from the beginning of the month. This meant 
that the book was using the previous version of the parameters, which were out of 
date, hence the estimation was incorrect, causing a loss. This would have been easily 
spotted and discovered if MO had access to the database that stores the previous days 
results and information e, however this was not available as it had been refreshed and 
displayed what the live book was displaying. The estimation was fixed by entering the 
correct parameters for the route for the reference day of the beginning of the month. 
The formula then recalculated and gave the correct estimation, making back 93k£.” 
(Scenario 2, Table 1).  
 
This report usefully indicates the cognitive and manual process that the participant 
took to detect and avert the near-miss incident evolving into a realised error. 
Importantly, we discover how the incident was caused by a poor human-computer 
interface, specifically a lack of system flexibility (e.g. unavailable back-up database) 
and weak detection mechanism (e.g. to detect errors after a systems outage). 
Moreover, this example incident reveals the skills that helped to avert error  – in 
particular, teamwork (e.g. communication and coordination of pertinent information 
between the teams), situation awareness (e.g. gathering of relevant information), and 
decision-making (e.g. seeking advice from a team member).  
 
This type of data provides insight into how errors are averted on the trading floor 
through team processes, and sheds new light on the skills that support staff on the 
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floor. In terms of risk management, this importantly supports organizational learning 
(e.g. in the form of staff training) as well as highlighting how barriers to failure are 
not necessarily system-based but team-based. Each training session was followed up 
with a question and answer session with the author. The author completed three group 
trainings on the floor with separate trading teams (e.g. risk control training, front 
office training, support services training). Each training session lasted approximately 
1.5 hrs.  
 
Due to the constraints of the working environment and the difficulty for all staff to 
attend a group training session, the author offered individual training sessions with 
some participants. The structure of the training was similar to the group sessions and 
held at the participant’s workstation. All participants were given a booklet containing 
examples of logged incidents and instructions on how to access and log incidents.  
 
3.3.5 Monthly reporting and feedback 
A Microsoft SQL server report generated in the SQL server reporting services that 
builds a report that is sent out each morning (07h00 GMT) to the risk managers and 
supervisors, detailing the ten most recently logged incidents. Furthermore, the author 
publishes a monthly report that is sent by email to senior management and risk control 
participants. The report outlines several data metrics such as historical trends, the 
evolution of patterns of incidents, and feedback on solutions. The report is generally a 
three to four page PDF document; the first page is a title page, the second page details 
the historical incident analysis and the location of the incidents (e.g. which teams are 
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reporting error and which teams are causing error), and the third and fourth page 
provide a text-based description of incidents that occurred within the reporting month, 
in addition to potential or realized solutions. Figure 2 illustrates a sample of the 
analytics provided in the reports.  
 
 
Figure 2: Sample analytics in a monthly report (Leaver, 2017).  
 
The analytics provide a graphical visualization of the types of risks that occur on the 
floor and their frequency, as well as the location of the errors that are reported and the 
most common causal location (e.g. which desks cause most error, which desks 
‘capture’ error).  
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Oftentimes, as expected, error originates in the front office (e.g. risk taking) and is 
ameliorated by the trading support function (e.g. back office and middle office). The 
reports inform management about weaknesses in the defence against error (e.g. 
system maintenance and complexity) and essentially provide insight into the defences 
that work well (e.g. team coordination and communication). The outcomes of these 
reports support managerial decision-making regarding team training and the 
distribution of resources (e.g. staffing and workload distribution, system migrations), 
as well as highlighting the migration of error and revealing the existence of ‘safety 
nets’ in practice and daily processes.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the development of a system for capturing, monitoring and analysing 
operational incidents in the financial trading domain is described. The methodological 
work that has been described forms the core of the PhD thesis – specifically, through 
the development and early testing of an operational incident and analysis tool for 
financial trading, the Financial Incident Analysis System (FINANS). Drawing on 
current literature detailing successful collection tools developed in other high-risk 
domains such as aviation, healthcare and rail, the features of an ‘ideal’ electronic 
reporting form and database were identified and utilized in the design and 
development of FINANS.  
 
The central purpose of creating FINANS is to collect self-reported data on incidents 
(e.g. errors and near-misses) that occur in the financial trading domain in order to 
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identify the core competencies (e.g. the non-technical skills) that cause or capture 
error on the trading floor. This type of data usefully reveals trends and broad 
descriptions in error occurrence (e.g. location of primary error generation, peak times 
for error occurrence), as well as illuminating the detection mechanisms (e.g. skills and 
processes that help to avert error).  
 
Crucially, within financial trading, there is no precedent for incident reporting in 
terms of either methodology for collecting incident data, or defining and 
understanding what constitutes an incident. Therefore the methodology described here 
contributes to original research in this domain. Moreover, these findings can be 
utilized to support management decision-making and risk management more 
generally; for example, through actions such as the support of organizational learning 
initiatives (e.g. in the form of targeted staff training), the reallocation of resources 
(e.g. staff or capital), redistribution of workload during peak times and environmental 
modifications (e.g. updated seating charts to foster knowledge sharing amongst 
critical teams, updated workstations).  
 
The limitations of the tool are similar to those found in other high-risk domains, 
principally the effects of human observer bias and the fact that every aspect of 
performance cannot be captured (e.g. the trading staff’s ability to self-report and 
report on incidents where they were involved). Critical to the effective operation of 
the incident collection tool is the development of an incident analysis system to 
analyse the events through a human factors lens.  
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The next study reports on the development and testing of the Financial Incident 
Analysis System, FINANS. FINANS is designed with two aims in mind: first, to 
facilitate the extraction of human factors-related (and in particular non-technical 
skills) data from the incident log. The second aim is to create a system that can be 
used by trading companies more generally to analyse trading incidents. The use of 
such a system is common to many industries (e.g. aviation, healthcare), where human 
factors specialists have developed error analysis systems for the initial capture of 
baseline data (i.e. on the types of factors underlying error), to be used by trained and 
domain-expert staff in organizations (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999; Shappell 
& Wiegmann, 2001). 
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CHAPTER 4: HUMAN FACTORS IN FINANCIAL TRADING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124 
 
4.  HUMAN FACTORS IN FINANCIAL TRADING: AN ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS 
 
4.1 Preface 
 
The third study of the thesis presented in chapter 4 (article 2), entitled “Human 
Factors in Financial Trading: An Analysis of Trading Incidents”, examines i) the 
frequency and consequences of operational incidents in financial trading; and ii) the 
role of non-technical skills and other human factors issues that contributes to them. 
Through the process of analysing incidents, the reliability and validity of the FINANS 
methodology is tested.  
 
This aim is addressed in a two-part study presented in chapter 4 (article 2). The study 
reports on the application of the FINANS, which was designed to achieve three goals: 
first, to provide a standardized method for collecting data on operational incidents that 
occur on the trading floor; second, to develop a reliable method for analysing and 
extracting human factors-related contributors to operational incidents; and third, to 
provide practical insight into how these contributors might be ameliorated. 
 
This is important because incident reporting helps to identify threats to safety and 
organizational performance, and the collection and interpretation of incident data has 
the potential to identify a range of warning signs. This research provides data crucial 
for ameliorating risk within financial trading organizations, with implications for 
regulation and policy.  
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Traditionally, human factors theory has been applied in safety-critical domains (e.g. 
aviation, healthcare, nuclear), and this study marks an expansion of current empirical 
and theoretical applications of human factors theory to a high-risk (but not safety-
critical) domain. Furthermore, the work undertaken in this chapter reconceptualizes 
the way financial trading is considered, providing key evidence about the social and 
cognitive nature of error in this domain.  
 
The journal article that follows was authored by Leaver and Reader (2016) and 
published in the journal of Human Factors. Leaver designed the study, carried out the 
data collection and analysis, outlined the article and authored the main drafts, 
contributing to roughly 85% of the content. Reader provided key supervisory 
assistance and editorial suggestions, and acted as a second coder for 50% of the data 
analysis. Reader contributed to roughly 15% of the content. Three anonymous 
reviewers (experts in the field of human factors) provided critical feedback, suggested 
edits and ultimately approved the article for publication.  
 
Copies of participant instructions and other materials used to conduct the studies in 
this chapter can be found in the appendix of this thesis.  
 
Human Factors has an impact factor of 2.219, and is ranked 29/80 in Psychology, 
Applied and 3/16 in Ergonomics journals.  
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CHAPTER 5: NEAR MISSES IN FINANCIAL TRADING  
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5. NEAR-MISSES IN FINANCIAL TRADING: SKILLS FOR CAPTURING AND 
AVERTING ERROR 
 
5.1 Preface 
 
The fourth aim of the thesis examines what can be learnt in terms of the skills and 
systems important for avoiding operational incidents in financial trading. This is 
important, because it demonstrates that the skills of human operators can both create 
and prevent error within financial trading, and more generally establishes that incident 
data can be analysed to determine relevant human factors information important to 
understanding how incidents are captured and detected.  
 
This aim is addressed in chapter 5 (article 3), “Near-Misses in Financial Trading: 
Skills for Capturing and Averting Error”. This chapter examines the utility of near-
miss data to identify the core social-psychological skills that are used to capture and 
ameliorate error. As near-misses regularly occur in financial trading, the study aims to 
identify opportunities for organizational learning by examining the recovery 
mechanisms that led to the detection of incidents before failure.  
 
Specifically, the study reports on three sets of analyses. First, the assessment of the 
reliability of coding for determining the human factors skills that capture and 
ameliorate error on the trading floor is analysed in order to ensure the coding 
outcomes are consistent and robust. Second, the study identifies the frequency with 
which various human factors skills cause and – for the first time in human factors 
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literature – ameliorate near-misses. To achieve this, a frequency analysis of the coded 
incidents is undertaken. Third is an analysis of the skills and systems used to detect 
and prevent the error and the causes of error together, the purpose of which is to 
illustrate how the skills that cause error and the skills that ameliorate error may 
interrelate.  
 
This work reconceptualizes finance through the application of human factors and 
challenges the field of human factors to engage with a non-traditional (e.g. high-risk, 
but not safety-critical) domain. In doing this, aspects of the prevailing worldview in 
human factors ‘safety’ thinking and financial risk management practices might also be 
re-imagined. This work has identified the need for a ‘New Era’ of error and risk 
management research in the finance domain that promotes a more human-centred 
model of safety (e.g. supplementing a focus on what goes wrong with a focus on what 
goes right). In particular, conceptualising financial trading from a ‘Safety II’ 
perspective: this approach conceives of safety as a product of good rather than unsafe 
practise. 
 
The journal article that follows was authored by Leaver, Griffiths and Reader (2017). 
Leaver designed the study, collected the data and did the analysis, outlined the article 
and authored all main drafts, contributing to roughly 90% of the content. Reader 
provided key supervisory assistance and editorial suggestions. Reader contributed to 
roughly 5% of the content. Griffiths acted as a second coder for 25% of the cases in 
the data analysis phase and provided essential statistical input on the analysis and 
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results section. Griffiths contributed to roughly 5% of the content. The article is 
currently submitted to Human Factors and is under review.  
 
Human Factors has an impact factor of 2.219, and is ranked 29/80 in Psychology, 
Applied and 3/16 in Ergonomics journals.  
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Title: Near Misses in Financial Trading: Skills for capturing and averting error 
Submitted To: The Journal of Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
Manuscript Type: Research Article 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Objective: i) to determine whether near miss incidents contain information on 
the operator skills and systems that detect and prevent near misses, and if so, the 
patterns and trends revealed by these data and ii) to explore if particular operator 
skills and systems are found as important for avoiding particular types of error on the 
trading floor. 
Background: In this study, we examine a cohort of near miss incidents 
collected from a financial trading organisation using the Financial Incident Analysis 
System (FINANS) and report on the human-factors related skills and systems that are 
used to detect and prevent error in this domain.  
Methods: 1,000 near miss incidents are analysed using distribution, mean, 
chi-square and associative analysis to describe the data, reliability is provided. 
Results: Slip/lapse (52%) and Human Computer Interface (21%) often occur 
alone and are the main contributors to error causation, whereas the prevention of error 
is largely a result of teamwork (65%) and situation awareness (46%) skills. No matter 
the cause of error, Situation Awareness and Teamwork most often detect and prevent 
the error.  
Conclusion: Situation Awareness and Teamwork skills appear universally 
important as a ‘last-line’ of defence for capturing error and data from incident 
monitoring systems can be analysed in a fashion more consistent with a safety II 
approach. 
Application: This research provides data for ameliorating risk within financial 
trading organisations, with implications for future risk management programmes and 
regulation.  
INTRODUCTION 
Financial trading is an environment where staff are under pressure to take risks, and 
highly reliant on complex technical systems to complete their work. Human or 
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system-related errors lead to ‘operational incidents’: where trading activity results in 
an avoidable loss (e.g. due to not assessing risk). Operational incidents place the 
integrity of the financial organisation at risk, and careful analysis of the underlying 
problems and recovery mechanisms are essential to maintaining organisational 
performance and long-term integrity. Adopting principles used to manage risk in 
other high-risk domains (e.g. aviation, healthcare), research in financial trading has 
identified the factors underlying operational incidents: for example, teamwork skills, 
poor system interfaces, and slip/lapses. These allow for an analysis of the underlying 
causes of operational incidents, and where appropriate remedies for stopping their 
occurrence on the trading floor (e.g. training, system redesign). 
 
Yet, the reality of a complex and dynamic industry such as financial trading is that the 
nature of risk if likely to evolve, with the potential for human error remaining ever-
present (Amalberti, 2013). To detect this evolution, the collection and analysis of 
near-miss data is essential (Barach, P., & Small, 2000; Gnoni & Lettera, 2012). This 
is where a failure has occurred, but was detected and resolved before a loss was 
incurred. Analysing near misses can yield at least two important types of data. First, it 
can indicate emerging threats to organisational safety (e.g. in terms of syste ms, tasks, 
or skills deficiencies), and this is where much of the academic literature on incident 
reporting has focussed (Hopkins, 2001; NASA, 2001). Second, it can reveal the skills 
and behaviours that are important for navigating hazards and avoiding error after a 
failure has occurred, and this latter aspect is less explored within the incident 
reporting research literature (Van der Schaaf, Lucas & Hale, 2013).  
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Interestingly, this distinction reflects the debate around “safety-I” and “safety-II” 
approaches (Hollnagel, 2014b). Safety-I refers to approaches to safety that focuses on 
error reduction, whereas safety-II refers to approaches that focus on the successful 
navigation of hazards to ensure organisational objectives are met. In industries, such 
as financial trading, where risk-taking is integral to success, both approaches appear 
essential to effective risk management. Yet, in terms of utilising near miss incident 
monitoring to achieve this, the safety-II approach has been less utilised (Huber et al., 
2009; Kleiner et al., 2015).  
 
In the current study, we examine a cohort of near miss incidents collected from a 
financial trading organisation. Drawing on this set of data, we address the following 
objectives:  
1. To determine whether near miss reports contain information on the operator 
skills and systems that detect and prevent error from escalating into failure 
(e.g. a near miss incident), and if so, the patterns and trends revealed by these 
data.  
2. To illustrate how the skills and systems that detect and prevent error and the 
skills that cause error may interrelate, the purpose of which is to establish 
whether specific operator skills and systems are important for avoiding 
particular types of error on the trading floor  
 
This article aims to make three contributions. First, it reveals the operator skills and 
systems that are important for ensuring near misses do not escalate to failure, and thus 
contributes to approaches for improving risk management in financial industries. 
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Second, it demonstrates how data from incident monitoring systems can be utilised to 
identify operator skills and behaviours important for navigating hazards and avoiding 
failure. Third, it considers how data from incident monitoring systems can be 
analysed in a fashion more consistent with a safety II approach.  
 
Learning from near-misses  
Collecting and analysing incident data is central to identifying risks to organisational 
safety, and prioritising and designing changes for avoiding further mishaps 
(Phimister, Oktem, Kleindorfer & Kunreuther, 2003). Near misses in particular are 
useful for learning, as they occur more frequently than failure, and point to events that 
might happen - but can be avoided – in the future (Barach & Small, 2000; Reason, 
2008).  
 
In order to identify the general characteristics of successful systems that collect and 
interpret near miss data, and to identify areas in which the field might develop, we 
consider a number of key research studies reporting on incident monitoring systems. 
Although the review is non-exhaustive, Table 1 lists six of the more commonly 
reported on incident-monitoring systems.  
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Table 1: Features of Incident Reporting Systems in High-Risk Domains 
Author Name of 
incident 
monitoring 
system 
Domain Type of data 
collected 
Positive 
skills  
Negative skills 
Runciman, 
Webb, Lee 
and Holland, 
1993. (AIMS) 
AIMS Aviation 2000 critical 
incident reports 
N/A System failure 
constitutes the 
bulk of the 
contributory 
factors, and 
human failure 
identified in 
approx. 80% of 
the cases 
Staender, 
Davies, 
Helmreich, 
Sexton and 
Kaufman, 
1997 (CIRS) 
CIRS Anaesthesia 60 anonymous 
critical incident 
reports via 
internet 
Concluded 
they are 
unable to 
assess the 
educational 
importance 
of the CI 
reports 
Contributory 
factor of 
communication 
in the operating 
theatre 
Beckmann, 
Baldwin, Hart 
and Runciman 
1996. AIMS-
ICU 
AIMS-ICU Intensive care 536 critical 
incident reports 
obtained from 
seven ICU’s  
N/A  Multiple 
contributory 
factors; 33% 
systems-based, 
66% human 
factor based.  
Billings, 
Lauber, 
Funkhouser, 
Lyman, Huff 
(1976) 
ASRS 
(aviation 
safety 
reporting 
system) 
Aviation Voluntary, 
non-punitive, 
anonymous 
critical incident 
reports. 1407 
reports in the 
first quarter of 
operation.  
N/A Phases of flight 
where the 
incident 
occurred were 
detailed, systems 
issues, 
navigation, 
ground hazards 
etc. 
Davies, 
Wright, 
Courtney and 
Reid, 2000.  
CIRAS 
(Confidential 
Incident 
Reporting and 
Analysis 
System) 
Rail Gathers data in 
three ways; 
initial report 
form or 
telephone call, 
structured 
follow-up 
telephone 
questionnaire, 
in-depth 
interview with 
a researcher.  
N/A Fatigue, lapses 
of attention, 
breaches of 
procedure, 
problems with 
equipment 
CHIRP 
Charitable 
Trust, 1999 
CHIRP 
(Confidential 
Human 
factors 
Incident 
Reporting 
Programme) 
Aviation Confidential 
reports from 
pilots, flight 
deck personnel, 
licensed 
engineers, 
maintenance 
workers in the 
airline industry.  
N/A Does not 
formally request 
information on 
the contributing / 
mitigating 
factors, how the 
incident was 
discovered, or 
suggested 
 154 
 
corrective 
actions 
 
As table 1 indicates, there is no established standard for the design and 
implementation of incident monitoring systems, yet there are a number of common 
features (Gnoni et al., 2013; Goldenhar, Williams & Swanson, 2003; Wu et al., 2010).  
 
First, most reporting systems gather data on both realised incidents and near misses, 
with reports being confidential and anonymous. Second, the systems we reviewed 
report on the causes of error (e.g. fatigue, lapses in attention or teamwork skills such 
as problems in team communication) that precipitate incident occurrence. Third, these 
data are used to provide feedback on the skills and systems that contribute to the 
error, and feed into developments for improving systems and skills (e.g. teamwork). 
Fourth, and most pertinent to the current research, none of the studies report on the 
skills or behaviours used to detect and prevent error. In fact, although most studies 
considered in our review seek to identify the causes of near miss (e.g. pilot fatigue, 
drug administration errors) few, if any studies explicitly investigate the skills used to 
ameliorate error.  
 
The reason for this is unclear, but is likely due to analyses focussing on the causes of 
error, with the aim being to reduce the rate of error that occurs through altering the 
conditions that facilitated their occurrence. For example, in the healthcare domain 
near miss reporting is largely used to consolidate findings on the type of near miss 
incidents (e.g. slips, trips and falls), their causes (e.g. occurring due to problems with 
the facilities) and to target prevention measures (e.g. repairing damaged floors and 
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improving janitorial procedures) (Billings & Reynard, 1984; Shaw et al., 2005; Van 
der Schaff, 1991; Wright & Van der Schaaf, 2004). However, the insights we gain 
from causation are constrained by the difficulty in eradicating some types of error 
(e.g. eliminating all environmental issues, administrative mistakes) and the 
acceleration of technological work (e.g. systems fixes are only a temporary fix to the 
issues as technology is always moving forward). Furthermore, in fast-paced 
industries, where dynamic changes to technology and working practices are necessary 
for success, solutions can focus on the problems of yesterday rather than tomorrow.  
 
Thus, near-miss data may offer a unique insight into the skills and behaviours that 
ensure hazards are mitigated. Where practices or systems are found to be particularly 
effective for catching or mitigating errors, they can be preserved (so they are not lost) 
and trained (e.g. targeting teams or units that have high numbers of errors). This is a 
somewhat positivistic perspective on incident reporting, and is consistent with 
Amalberti’s (2013) description of ‘ultra-resilient’ organisations and Hollnagel’s 
(2014) conceptualisation of “safety-II”.  
 
Ultra-resilient organisations relate to the observation that in many dynamic and fast-
moving industries that manage risk, it is not possible - or in some cases desirable - to 
entirely engineer risk out of the system. For example, in healthcare where procedures 
that create alternative risks for patients are necessary to the delivery of treatments 
(Reader, Reddy, & Brett, 2017), deep-sea fishing where workers operate in dangerous 
weather conditions (Amalberti, 2013), or financial trading where some risk-taking is 
necessary to achieve competitive advantage (Leaver & Reader, 2017). Instead, risk is 
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managed through improving employee skills and system design, and ensuring that 
where risk-taking is not successful, loss is avoided. Reflecting this, the “safety-II” 
approach argues that safety management involves a mixture of both error reduction 
(“safety-I”) and also the identification of the skills and behaviours that enable things 
to go well (and in particular to navigate hazards).  
 
At its core is the observation that, more often than not, safety is effectively managed 
within high-risk organisations, and that the skills and systems that support this ensure 
that organisations are flexible in how they respond to evolving risk (Hollnagel, 
2014b). Yet, there is a lack of data, literature and methods for doing this (Burford, 
Fray & Waterson, 2016; Hollnagel, 2014a; Kleiner et al., 2015). 
  
CURRENT STUDY 
In the current study, we examine whether near-miss reports yield data that is useful 
and can be reliably coded on the skills and systems that prevent incidents from being 
realised (i.e. causing losses). To our knowledge, this is the first study to report these 
data. We are interested in this because it is an aspect of learning from incident 
reporting systems that has been hitherto un-examined, yet appears important for 
contributing to new trends and directions in human factors research.  
 
The study focuses on the high-risk domain of financial trading. Financial trading 
organizations are where traders buy and sell products (e.g., equities, physical 
commodities, financial options) to generate profit and optimize their portfolios. It is 
inherently risky, with systemic failures by traders leading to large fines and economic 
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consequences at a societal level (Leaver & Reader, 2015). Thus, financial trading has 
been recently conceptualised as a high-risk industry where the management of risk, 
and management of human factors issues, is essential to success (Leaver & Reader, 
2016). Because it is an industry that requires both risk-taking (to make money) and 
error reduction (to avoid mistakes) it is a particularly suitable setting for evaluating 
the insights that can be learnt from near misses (as they regularly occur).  
 
 
 
Research Questions 
Our research addresses the following questions.  
 
First, we determine the extent to which the near miss data collected on the trading 
floor contain reliably analysable information on human factors skills that contribute 
to, and prevent, errors. Through analysing these data, we identify the frequency and 
nature of operator skills and systems that ameliorate near misses. For example, how 
teamwork skills such as coordination (e.g. cross checking of information on shared 
tasks) and situation awareness skills such as attention (e.g. during routine task work) 
are key to capturing error on the trading floor. In terms of financial trading, relatively 
little is known about how error is averted on the trading floor and FINANS usefully 
provides a set of collected data and a human factors framework to provide insight into 
the skills used to detect and ameliorate error on the trading floor.  
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Second, we establish whether particular operator skills and systems are important for 
avoiding particular types of error on the trading floor (i.e. combinations of skills). 
This will reveal whether there are specific skills required for managing particular 
errors, and yield implications for training and error management strategies in financial 
trading.  
 
METHOD 
 
FINANS 
This study utilises data collected using the Financial Incident Analysis System 
(FINANS). FINANS is a confidential, voluntary incident reporting system designed 
with input from other incident reporting systems in similarly high-risk domains such 
as the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in aviation. FINANS provides a 
standardised method for collecting data on operational incidents that occur on the 
trading floor, a reliable method for analysing and extracting human factors related 
contributors to operational incidents, and practical insight into how these contributors 
might be ameliorated. A fuller explanation of the merits, reliability and theoretical 
foundations of the FINANS tool can be found in Leaver and Reader (2016).  
 
Fundamentally, the system comprises two parts. The first part is the ‘incident log’. To 
recap, an incident in this context is an event that did lead to (e.g. failure) or could 
have led to (e.g. near miss) losses or unwanted market or credit risk exposure. 
Incidents can be wide-ranging, and include technical systems failure (e.g. pricing tool 
failures), erroneous human input errors, misunderstandings of instructions or 
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procedures between departments (e.g. between a trader and their risk department), and 
rule violations (e.g. late trade entry). This first part of the system has several 
functional components: identification of detection teams, identification of the origin 
of the error (by team), date of incident occurrence and detection, risk type 
classification and text-based description. Detection encompasses the teams involved 
and how the incident was discovered. Description involves the recording of a free text 
narrative that details the event. Data is aggregated and analysed in terms of 
descriptors for each incident (e.g. consequences, where and when incidents occurred). 
   
The second part of FINANS is a taxonomical system for interpreting incidents and 
near misses in terms of contributory factors. The taxonomy consists of a ‘category’ 
and ‘element’ (sub-category) levels. Categories function at a relatively generic level 
(e.g. situation awareness), and elements reflect aspects of activity specific to the 
trading floor environment that illustrate the categories (Flin & Patey, 2011). 
Moreover, each incident can potentially be coded within FINANS as single or 
multiple category and subcategory levels. For example, an incident may be identified 
as caused by teamwork (subcategory coordination) or teamwork (subcategory 
coordination) as well as situation awareness (sub categories attention and gathering of 
information). The full taxonomy used to codify the incidents is provided in Table 2 
below.  
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Table 2. FINANS Human Factors Taxonomy 
Category Associated Elements 
Situation Awareness  Attention (distraction, lack of concentration, divided or overly focused 
attention) 
 Gathering information (poorly organised information, not enough gathering of 
information) 
 Interpretation of informat ion (miscomprehension, assumptions based on 
previous experience) 
 Anticipation (i.e. thinking ahead, judging how a situation will develop) 
 Other 
Teamwork  Role and Responsibilities (e.g. unclear segregation of roles) 
 Communication and exchanging of information between team members  
 Shared understanding for goals and tasks  
 Coordination of shared activities  
 Solving conflicts (e.g. between team members and teams) 
 Knowledge sharing between teams 
 Other 
Decision Making  Defining the problem 
 Cue recognition (e.g. finding and recognising the cues to the decision) 
 Seeking advice on a decision 
 Noise and distraction (e.g. that reduce capacity to take a decision) 
 Bias and heuristics (e.g. over optimism, over confidence) 
 Other 
Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 Authority and assertiveness (e.g. taking command of a situation) 
 Listening 
 Prioritisation of goals (e.g. team / organisational) 
 Managing workloads and resources  
 Monitoring activity and performance of team members  
 Maintain standards and ensuring procedures are followed 
 Other 
Slip/Lapse  Fat Fingers 
 Procedural (not following a protocol, or following a protocol incorrectly) 
 Routinized task (e.g. a loss of concentration) 
 Forgetfulness (forgetting information, or how to perform an activity) 
 Memory 
 Distraction 
 Other 
Human Computer 
Interface 
 Use of the Tools (e.g. spread sheets) 
 Training on the tool 
 System did not detect the error 
 Design of the software and application 
 Maintenance and testing of the tool 
 Other 
  
 
The second part of FINANS importantly allows us collect human factors data through 
the coding framework in order to extract information on the human factors skills that 
influence error on the trading floor and provides more fine grained insight into the 
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skills (e.g. team communication and coordination) and behaviours (e.g. cross 
checking with team members) that are important for averting error.  
 
Procedure 
FINANS was used to collect incident reports in the participating organization from 
January 2014 until January 2016. With the support of the organisation, traders and 
trading support staff were briefed on human factors, non-technical skills and data 
entry in the system in advance of the deployment of the incident log and then asked to 
report the incidents in the log.  
 
Following each reporting month, a trained human factors expert provides feedback 
reports (e.g. historical trends, evolving patterns of risk types) to the participating staff 
and management. Over this period, 1,042 unique incident reports (i.e. each incident 
reporting on a problematic trade was different) detailing an operational incident were 
collected and deemed suitable for analysis (e.g. clear text and a near miss event).  
 
Near miss occurred in 96% of the selected incidents (e.g. 1,000 cases of near miss, 42 
cases of failure). Of the 1,000 near miss incidents, the lead author coded all the cases; 
250 (25%) were coded by a human factors expert in order to provide a reliability 
assessment for coding.  
For the purpose of this study, the author only considered near miss incidents that were 
reported as the aim of the analysis is to uncover how the incidents are caught or 
detected within the organisation.  
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The coding process was made up of five steps; (1) selection of the relevant human 
factors skills category (e.g. situation awareness, decision making, teamwork, 
leadership, human computer interface, or slip/lapse), (2) the selection of the relevant 
subcategory (i.e. element) of non-technical skills (e.g. if situation awareness is chosen 
as a main category, the element(s) can be selected from; distraction, gathering 
information, interpreting information, anticipation of future states), (3) identific ation 
of single team or multiple teams, (4) identification of an on-going state or isolated 
nature of the incident, (5) indication of whether the incident is near miss or a failure. 
Each of the 1,000 incidents were coded in these five steps twice: once to identify the 
set of codes dedicated to the causes of error (e.g. identifying what went wrong) and a 
second time to identify the set of codes dedicated to the skills and systems that led to 
the detection and prevention of error (e.g. identifying what went r ight). The human 
factors codes used in FINANS have been reliably used to extract the skills that 
underpin error in previous studies across a range of incidents (near miss and failure) 
(Leaver & Reader, 2016). The concepts that underpin the coding framework were 
identified through a literature review of relevant concepts in the financial trading 
domain, a review of existing systems successful in place in other high-risk domains 
and feedback from subject matter experts (Leaver and Reader, 2016). In this analysis, 
we follow the assumption that the skills that underpin error are similar to the set of 
skills used to ameliorate error (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008). 
 
ANALYSIS 
The results section reports on the following three analyses.  
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First we assess the reliability of coding for determining the causes of near misses, and 
the identification of factors that led to their detection and prevention. To do this, we 
present the reliability between the two expert coders using Cohen’s kappa statistic in 
order to assure the coding outcomes are consistent and robust (Fleiss, Cohen, & 
Everitt, 1969; LeBreton & Senter, 2007).  
 
Second, to identify the frequency with which various human factors skills cause and - 
for the first time in human factors literature - ameliorate near misses we undertake a 
frequency analysis of the coded incidents. This involved analysing the coded dataset 
to ascertain how often each code or group of codes occurs across the whole dataset in 
order to infer the most influential (e.g. highest occurrence) and least influential (e.g. 
lowest occurrence) skill categories. For example, this analysis reveals which skill 
problems are most likely to generate error (e.g. ‘fat fingers’) and which skills are most 
commonly drawn upon to capture error (e.g. attention).  
 
Third we undertook an analysis of the skills and systems used to detect and prevent 
error and the causes of error together, the purpose of which is to illustrate how the 
skills that cause error and the skills that ameliorate error may interrelate. Specifically, 
by examining the frequency of occurrence (or otherwise) of every binary combination 
of skills we assess the relationships within the human factors codes separately for the 
causes of error and skills and systems that led to the detection and prevention error. 
For example, we explore whether, when near misses are remediated by teamwork 
skills, do situation awareness skills also tend to play a role in the remediation too, or 
do the two factors not occur together? This analysis helpfully contextualises the 
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human factors findings and promotes a deeper understanding of how error is captured 
on the floor.  
 
RESULTS 
Financial trading staff reported 1,000 near miss incident reports through FINANS 
from January 2014 to January 2016. Near miss events accounted for 96% of reported 
errors within this time period (where 4% were classified as failures). This equates to 
less than 1% of trades within the company, and due to the data being generated 
through staff self-reporting, is likely to be an underestimation.  
  
Reliability Analysis 
We examined the reliability of coding between the author and a human factors expert. 
Of the 1,000 incidents, the lead author coded all the cases; 250 (25%) of the cases are 
coded by the third author to provide reliability assessment. Those cases were 
randomly selected from the batch. All incidents had at least one code from the 
FINANS taxonomy applied to explain the incident (e.g. incidents can be coded as 
multiple categories and elements). At the category level, the reliability was generally 
good or substantial2 across both positive and negative categories.  
 
For the causes of error at the category level, the reliability was good for situation 
awareness (k=0.499) and teamwork (k=0.567) and substantial for leadership 
(k=0.647), slip/lapse (k=0.65) and human-computer interaction (k=0.748).  
 
                                                 
2 Good reliability: 0.41 = k = 0.60 and substantial reliability 0.61 = k = 0.80 
(McHugh, 2012) 
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For the skills and system that led to the detection and prevention of error reliability 
was good for situation awareness (k=0.549), teamwork (k=0.503), leadership 
(k=0.453) and substantial for human-computer interface (k=0.655). As decision-
making was never chosen in the coding, there are no reliability statistics for this 
category. This result is similar to previous studies where decision-making was rarely 
chosen when coding incidents (Leaver & Reader, 2016). Furthermore, for the skills 
that help to detect error coded in this study, slip/lapse was never chosen. This result is 
expected due to the nature of the slip/lapse categories (e.g. fat fingers, forgetfulness) 
that would not detect error, but primarily be the cause.  
 
This shows that near miss incidents collected in the financial trading domain can be 
reliably coded for human factors and contain relevant information of the skills that 
cause error and for the first time, indicate that the critical incidents contain 
information of the skills / behaviours that are used to capture error on the trading 
floor.  
 
Skills and systems for detecting error  
Our first analysis establishes the extent to which near-miss data contains information 
on the skills and systems for detecting and preventing error. To provide an overview 
of the data, Table 3 details the occurrences of each human factor category and 
element used in FINANS to classify the causes of error and the skills that led to the 
detection of error.  
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Table 3: Frequency of human factors categories and elements found in the cases (n=1,000) 
  
Causes of error 
Skills and systems that led to the detection and 
prevention of error 
Category 
Category 
Count (% 
overall) 
Subcategory 
Subcategory 
Count (% 
within 
category) 
Category 
Count (% 
overall) 
Subcategory 
Subcategory 
Count (% 
within 
category) 
Situation 
Awareness 
130 (13%) Anticipation 12 (9%) 460 (46%) Anticipation 102 (22%) 
Attention 78 (60%) Attention 123 (27%) 
Gathering Information 40 (30%) Gathering Information 161 (35%) 
Interpreting Information 7 (5%) Interpreting Information 48 (10%) 
Teamwork 205 (21%) Communication 53 (26%) 646 (65%) Communication 96 (15%) 
Coordination 70 (34%) Coordination 112 (17%) 
Roles and Responsibilities 79 (39%) Roles and Responsibilities 340 (53%) 
Shared Understanding 39 (19%) Shared Understanding 79 (12%) 
Decision 
Making 
11 (1%) Bias and Heuristics 9 (82%) 14 (1%) Bias and Heuristics 0 (0%) 
Cue Recognition 3 (27%) Cue Recognition 14 (100%) 
Leadership 113 (11%) Maintaining Standards 27 (24%) 21 (2%) Maintaining Standards 3 (14%) 
Monitoring Activity  87 (77%) Monitoring Activity  17 (81%) 
Slip/Lapse 523 (52%) Fat Fingers 343 (66%) 2 (0.2%) Fat Fingers 1 (50%) 
Memory 56 (11%) Memory 0 (0.0%) 
Procedural 126 (24%) Procedural 0 (0.0%) 
Human-
Computer 
Interaction 
211 (21%) Maintenance and Testing 123 (58%) 154 (15%) Maintenance and Testing 1 (0.6%) 
System Detection 29 (14%) System Detection 84 (55%) 
Use Of Tools 63 (30%) Use Of Tools 50 (33%) 
 
In terms of using FINANS to better understand the human factors that support the 
detection of error in the trading domain, Table 3 shows that all near miss were coded 
with a human factors category, with over half the near miss being caused by slip/lapse 
(52%) and ameliorated by teamwork (65%).  The sections below provide a granular 
description of the skills that cause error and the skills that help trading staff capture 
error (e.g. near miss incident).  
 
Causes of error. Table 3 confirms the findings of previous studies of causes of error 
using FINANS (Leaver & Reader, 2016). The majority of the errors are a product of 
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slip/lapse (52%) problems and issues in human computer interaction (21%). The least 
coded category was decision making (1%).  
 
In absolute terms, the most commonly coded element was fat fingers (343), followed 
by procedural (126) and maintenance and testing of systems (123). As seen in 
previous studies using FINANS, some elements were rarely coded; interpreting 
information (7), cue recognition (3), and bias and heuristics (9); however, unlike 
previous studies, each element was coded at least once in the data coding process.  
 
Skills and systems that led to the detection and prevention of error. Table 3 indicates 
that overwhelmingly the error is detected and prevented by teamwork skills (65%) 
followed closely by situation awareness (46%). Human computer interface skills were 
identified in 15% of the near miss. The least coded category was slip/lapse (0.2%), 
followed by decision-making (1.4%) and leadership (2%).  
In terms of elements, the most commonly coded was role and responsibilities (340), 
gathering information (161) and attention (123). Some elements were rarely coded for 
such as bias & heuristics (0), fat fingers (1), procedural (1), memory (0) and 
maintenance and testing (1).  
 
Our analysis of the frequency of human factors in the set of collected near miss 
incidents shows that slip/lapse and human computer interface are the leading cause of 
error in the financial trading domain, and for the first time in human factors literature, 
identifies that teamwork and situation awareness skills are essential to capturing and 
preventing error.   
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To illustrate the context of the data collection (and the potential for intervention), and 
the types of problems and skills being identified using FINANS, Table 4 provides a 
sample of characteristic codified examples.  
 
Table 4: Example data that could be reported and codified through FINANS  
Incident Description Human Factors problems 
identified in the cases  
Specific behaviours that helped 
to ameliorate the error  
Deals were downloaded with 
incorrect prices, and the wrong 
market parameters were sent 
into pre-publication. The error 
was picked up when a second 
team member noticed a 
discrepancy 
Situation awareness (attention) 
Human computer interface (use 
of tools) 
Teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities) 
Situation awareness (attention, 
gathering information) 
A change in a contractual item 
not communicated between the 
relevant teams and noticed 
during a transaction booking 
Teamwork (communication) Situation awareness (gathering 
information, interpreting 
information) 
Teamwork (seeking out 
information through informal 
communication) 
Entering an extra digit on the 
price (e.g. 0.01 versus 0.1) 
Slip/lapse (fat fingers) Teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities) 
Situation Awareness (attention) 
Out-dated procedures not 
updated in the shared 
communication platform can 
lead to problems in task 
handover  
Slip/lapse (procedures), 
situation awareness 
(anticipation) 
Leadership (maintaining 
standards), teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities, coordination) 
Situation awareness 
(anticipation) 
A hedge transacted by one team 
member for the group exposure 
with delayed communication 
about the details, meaning that 
hours are lost determining an 
alternate hedging scenario  
Teamwork (coordination & 
communication) 
Slip/lapse (procedural) 
Situation awareness (gathering 
of information) 
Teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities) 
The price and volume of the 
deal were inverted 
Slip/lapse (fat fingers, 
distraction) 
Teamwork (roles and 
responsibilities)  
situation awareness (attention) 
 
Table 4 reveals some key features of the reported data: it typically generates from a 
principal cause and then travels through various social (e.g. teamwork) and/or 
cognitive (e.g. situation awareness) layers of defence. For example, error on the 
trading floor is characteristically caused by slip/lapse error (e.g. ‘fat fingers’), this 
might then be compounded by a missed check at the risk control stage (e.g. role and 
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responsibilities) and subsequently detected through a secondary cross-check by 
another alert team member or the back office team before processing the trade (e.g. 
roles and responsibilities, gathering of information, attention).  
 
To expand on the observation that error may be captured due to the interaction of 
multiple skill competencies, we undertook an analysis of the skills and systems used 
to detect and prevent error and the causes of error together, the purpose of which is to 
illustrate how the skills that cause error and the skills that ameliorate error may 
interrelate. 
 
Associations between the causes of error and the skills and systems that detect 
error 
In this analysis we assess whether there are particular relationships within the human 
factors codes for the causes of error and the skills that led to the detection of error. 
For example, the data collected through FINANS indicate that near misses are most 
often remediated by teamwork skills and situation awareness skills, but how often do 
these categories occur together or in isolation? Are these skills remediating a typical 
set of causes? This analysis is exploratory in design and aims to examine whether 
patterns emerge from the coding that shows how error emerges, migrates and is 
captured on the trading floor.  
 
Associations between the causes of error. Of the 1,000 near miss incidents, 195 had 
more than one cause of error. Slip/lapse, the most common cause of error, nearly 
always occurred in isolation. This means that the causes of error are principally one 
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skill or another (e.g. skip/lapse or human computer interface) and less often the result 
of multiple skill problems.   
 
Associations amongst the skills and systems used to detect and prevent error. Multiple 
factors were more common for the skills and systems that detect and prevent error 
than the causes of error. Of the 1,000 near miss incidents, 295 had more than one skill 
or system that detected and prevented error. Situational awareness was often 
identified in conjunction with additional factors when it was attributed to ameliorating 
near misses. Nearly one-third of the 646 near- miss cases where teamwork was a 
factor, situation awareness was also identified as a factor (208). Based on a chi-
squared test, this is a statistically significant relationship (p<0.01^32).  
 
This means that the human factors responsible for causing (81%) and  ameliorating 
(71%) near miss incidents therefore predominantly occurred in isolation. 
Exceptionally, teamwork and situation awareness, the two most frequent human 
factors responsible for ameliorating near misses, were the most likely to occur 
together doing so in just under half (45%) of all near miss where situation awareness 
prevented a near-miss. This analysis reveals that regardless of the cause of the error, 
situation awareness and teamwork are the leading skills used to capture and prevent 
error.  
 
The association analysis preformed in this study shows that slip/lapse and human 
computer interface often occur alone and are the main contributors to error causation, 
whereas the prevention of error is largely a result of teamwork and situation 
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awareness skills. Moreover, regardless of what causes the error, teamwork and 
situation awareness are the preventative skills that protect the organisation from 
failure.  
 
Situation awareness and teamwork skills appear universally important as a ‘last- line’ 
of defence for preventing trading mishaps, no matter the cause. The specific skills that 
are important to capturing error (e.g. gathering of information, attention) are 
supported through processes such as the ability to ask questions, alertness, 
participatory engagement and collaborative working groups. Teamwork skills such as 
roles and responsibilities, coordination and communication are also critical. These 
skills are supported by a strong perception of shared responsibility over team tasks 
and goals, cross-departmental team working sessions and communication aids such as 
internal messaging services, break out spaces and global virtual chat rooms.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
This study identified the role of operator skills and systems for causing and 
preventing error in the domain of financial trading. It revealed the following.  
 
First, similar to past studies (Leaver & Reader, 2016), slip/lapse related errors (e.g. fat 
fingers) are the most frequently coded skill category (52%) as a cause of error. These 
most often occurred in isolation from other human factors problems. Issues around 
human computer interaction are the second most commonly coded human factors 
issue (21%), with human computer interfaces compromising the effective gathering 
and interpretation of information by users.  
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Secondly, and to our knowledge not reported on previously, near-miss reports contain 
useful information about the skills and systems that detect and prevent error. They 
report the attributes and behaviours that prevent errors from becoming realised losses. 
Whereas errors in financial trading are predominantly caused by slip/lapse and 
human-computer interface problems, most near miss are averted by good situation 
awareness (46%) and teamwork (65%) skills. The skills occurred in concert, with 
trading staff vigilance for arising issues (and understanding what they look like, and 
when they occur) and abilities to work with others to resolve them (e.g. sharing 
calculations and task critical information) being essential.  
 
Third, and building on the previous point, no matter the causes of near misses, 
situation awareness and teamwork were the key skills for detecting and preventing 
them. This is to say, situation awareness and teamwork skills appear universally 
important as a ‘last- line’ of defence for preventing trading mishaps, no matter the 
cause. The specific skills that are important to capturing error (e.g. gathering of 
information, attention, roles & responsibilities) are supported through processes such 
as the ability to ask questions, alertness, participatory engagement and collaborative 
working groups. Teamwork skills such as communication between team members 
(e.g. following complex handover of tasks) and clear team roles and responsibilities 
(e.g. vigilance in verifying the data and conclusions published within the team’s daily 
reports) are also critical. 
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Theoretical implications 
The research findings demonstrate the value of analysing near misses in terms of the 
operator skills and systems that prevent the realisation of loss. Through the systematic 
analysis of near miss incidents with robust coding frames, insight can be provided on 
the ‘safety nets’ that prevent everyday errors and problems from resulting in error. In 
the current study, the vigilance and cooperative behaviours of financial trading staff 
were critical to identifying errors and problems produced by system-related issues 
(e.g. human computer interfaces) and slip/lapses. Within domains such as financial 
trading, where risk-taking is inherent to behaviour and systems, such insights are 
critical for managing risk effectively, and are equally important to identify the skills 
deficiencies that underlie failure.  
 
Indeed, within financial trading, the skills that are found to cause error are difficult to 
eradicate and have limited margin for safety improvement (e.g. unrealistic to re-
configure the system interface to perfection or eliminate all ‘fat fingers’ errors). 
Through the analysis of the skills and systems that led to the detection and prevention 
of error we shift the risk management perspective to a positivistic assessment of the 
key skills that prevent error.  
 
Synthesizing the skills that help capture error on the floor helps to build a more 
comprehensive understanding of the migration of error, leading to better informed and 
wider reaching safety interventions. It accepts that risk is ever-present within the 
system, with human operators providing the last- line of defence. This is especially 
important in industries where change (e.g. technological, expansion of business) can 
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occur at a rapid pace, with frequent new threats and dynamic challenges (Dekker, 
2012; Huber, 2009). Within these domains, the true value incident reports are reveal 
what ‘goes well’ rather than ‘what goes wrong’ (S. Dekker, 2014).  
 
Within the academic literature, incident reports have generally not been analysed in 
this way, and this line of thinking connects with wider debates. In particular, those 
around the nature of ‘ultra-resilient’ industries where risk-taking is integral to success 
(Amalberti et al., 2005), the requirement of safe systems to be able to manage rather 
than remove uncertainty (Grote, 2015), viewing human operators as a stable resource 
for risk management in a fast-changing technological industries (S. Dekker, 2014), 
and safety-II approaches to human factors which extoll identifying and recognising 
the value of everyday behaviours that support performance and the navigation of 
hazards (Hollnagel, 2014b). Interestingly, incident reporting data, which is often 
critiqued within these approaches (as they attempt to identify single, changeable, 
causes of incidents), can be used to support and develop this focus.  
 
This appears important as human factors research is applied to domains such as 
financial trading, which are high-risk in nature but can never be entirely reliable or 
safe. Risk-taking and change are integral to organisational success, yet when serious 
errors occur they have profound organisational and economic outcomes. Human 
factors approaches to such domain require a delicate balance in terms of prescribing 
the conditions and systems requisite for ensuring a level of risk control, but also 
recognising the flexibility and skills of operators required for ensuring competitive 
advantage and the avoidance of losses. In the sample of incidents reported on in this 
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study, 4% of the incidents led directly to a loss. Yet it is not clear whether these 
would have been best avoided through better systems and skills that ensured that the 
errors could not happen (potentially constraining other behaviours and acts), or 
vigilant operators who can monitor and respond to emerging hazards.  
 
Practical implications 
In terms of organisational learning and risk management within financial trading, near 
misses provide useful insight.   
 
First, the data indicates the importance of situation awareness and teamwork for 
capturing and resolving error. This has important implications for identifying the 
types of skills and behaviours that are valued by trading organisations, and might be 
shared and trained. Where incidents in financial trading do lead to losses, these can be 
significant. Well- trained (e.g. in terms of vigilance for types of problems, cooperative 
activities) operators may be able to reduce the conversion of near misses to ‘hits’. 
Although this is not a novel insight, for an industry such as financial trading, it is 
somewhat contrary to the socio-technological environment. In financial trading, 
performance is generally considered to be highly individualised (e.g. bonus allocation 
schemes rewarding top performers), with market knowledge and analytical skills 
being especially prized (Willman, Fenton-O’Creevy, Soane, & Nicholson, 2002). Yet, 
our findings shed light on how the collective system acts as a protective layer for the 
organisation, with teamwork (e.g. roles & responsibilities) and situation awareness 
(e.g. gathering of information and attention) skills being essential yet not currently 
recognised, recruited for, or trained. This perhaps also speaks to the role of 
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organisational culture, and the importance of collaborative acts, responsibilities for 
risk management, and perceptions of management commitment to safety (Leaver & 
Reader, 2017).  
 
Second, the data gives insight on organisational changes that might be deleterious for 
risk management. For example, the change or automation of technical systems that is 
important for operators to identify and spot errors (e.g. the automation of daily profit 
and loss calculations). Often in the trading domain, systems and interfaces are 
changed for business development needs, with insights from users and risk managers 
not being sought. Furthermore, trading is a highly globalised industry, with risk 
control functions increasingly being centralised to one geographical location (rather 
than being co- located with traders). The near-miss data revealed that cooperation 
between risk control teams and traders are often important for identifying and 
managing incidents, and changes to working structures may disrupt this. At the 
minimum, ensuring communication between these professional groups (e.g. using live 
running web cams or global chat rooms filtered by activity) would appear essential.    
 
Importantly, the skills that have been identified as essential to capturing error (e.g. 
gathering of information, attention, roles & responsibilities) are supported through 
processes such as the ability to ask questions, alertness, participatory engagement and 
collaborative working groups and these are all behaviours that are promoted in a 
positive organisational (safety) culture. Although the error analysis undertaken in this 
study usefully guides us with granular insights into the behaviours that generate error 
and the skills that are used to capture error, these behaviours are positioned within a 
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much larger cultural frame of the organisation. For example, the behaviours that drive 
the capture of error (e.g. taking the initiative to cross check team members work) are a 
product of the practises and norms that are encouraged and rewarded within the 
organisation. Understanding the culture is therefore important for explaining the 
negative and positive behaviours related to risk-management in financial trading.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The results are constrained by the nature of incident reporting generally, which is 
vulnerable to underreporting and incomplete information about incidents (O’Connor 
et al., 2007). In the trading domain, the need for an individual to be aware that the 
event has occurred, their limited perspective on the incident, and their motivation to 
report constrain incident reporting. Furthermore, only one coder analysed all the near 
miss incidents (with a second coder analysing 25% of the near miss incidents to 
assess inter-rater reliability) and the data analysis was constrained by the clarity of the 
text and the potential biases of trading staff in recalling the incident. Moreover, the 
reliability analysis revealed scope for improving the FINANS taxonomy, and it may 
require further development to tailor it to near miss data. Issues such as stress, fatigue, 
and environmental factors (e.g. culture) were not examined and this could be the 
focus of future work.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the current study, we examined a cohort of near miss incidents collected from a 
financial trading organisation to identify the frequency and nature of operator skills 
and systems that ameliorate near misses and to establish whether particular operator 
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skills and systems are important for avoiding particular types of error on the trading 
floor.  
 
Our analysis reveals that the majority of the errors are a product of slip/lapse (52%) 
problems and issues in human computer interaction (21%). Uniquely, our positivistic 
analysis of the reported near miss incidents show that overwhelmingly error is 
detected and prevented by teamwork skills (65%) followed closely by situation 
awareness (46%). Going further, our research reveals that slip/lapse, the most 
common cause of error, nearly always occurred in isolation. This means that the 
causes of error are principally one skill or another (e.g. skip/lapse or human computer 
interface) and less often the result of multiple skill problems. Exceptionally, 
teamwork and situation awareness, the two most frequent human factors responsible 
for ameliorating near misses, were the most likely to occur together doing so in just 
under half (45%) of all near miss where situation awareness prevented a near-miss. 
This analysis reveals that regardless of the cause of the error, situation awareness and 
teamwork are the leading skills used to capture and prevent error.  
 
The outcomes of this research contribute to approaches for improving risk 
management in financial industries. Furthermore, our research contributes to how 
current data from incident monitoring systems can be analysed in a fashion more 
consistent with a safety II approach (i.e. identify good practice for mitigating, rather 
than reducing, error).  
 
 
 179 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abeysekera, A., Bergman, I. J., Kluger, M. T., & Short, T. G. (2005). Drug error in 
anaesthetic practice: a review of 896 reports from the Australian Incident 
Monitoring Study database. Anaesthesia, 60(3), 220–227. 
Amalberti, R., Auroy, Y., Berwick, D., & Barach, P. (2005). Five system barriers to 
achieving ultrasafe health care. Annals of Internal Medicine, 142(9), 756–764. 
Amalberti, R. (2001). The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. 
Safety Science, 37, 109–126. 
Amalberti, R. (2013). Navigating Safety: Necessary compromises and trade-offs. 
Theory and practice. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. 
Anderson, J. E., Kodate, N., Walters, R., & Dodds, A. (2009). Can incident reporting 
improve safety? Healthcare practitioners’ views of the effectiveness of incident 
reporting. International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 25(2), 141–150. 
Awamleh, R., & Gardner, W. L. (1999). Perceptions of leader charisma and 
effectiveness: The effects of vision content, delivery, and organizational 
performance. The Leadership Quarterly, 10(3), 345–373. 
Bantel, K. A., & Jackson, S. E. (1989). Top management and innovations in banking: 
Does the composition of the top team make a difference? Strategic Management 
Journal, 10(S1), 107–124. http://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250100709 
Barach, P., & Small, S. D. (2000). Reporting and preventing medical mishaps: lessons 
from non-medical near miss reporting systems. BMJ: British Medical Journal, 
320(7237), 759. 
Barr, B., Taylor-Robinson, D., Scott-Samuel, A., McKee, M., & Stuckler, D. (2012). 
Suicides associated with the 2008-10 economic recession in England: time trend 
analysis. BMJ, 345(e5142). 
Beaubien, J. M., & Baker, D. P. (2002). A review of selected aviation Human Factors 
taxonomies, accident/incident reporting systems, and data reporting tools. 
International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, 2(2), 11–36. 
Beunza, D. (2004). Tools of the trade: the socio-technology of arbitrage in a Wall 
Street trading room. Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(2), 369–400. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dth015 
Billings, C. E. (1998). Some hopes and concerns regarding medical event-reporting 
systems: lessons from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System. Archives of 
Pathology & Laboratory Medicine, 122(3), 214. 
Billings, C. E., & Reynard, W. D. (1984). Human factors in aircraft incidents: results 
of a 7-year study. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 55(10), 960–5. 
Retrieved from http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/6497826/reload=0 
Braithwaite, J., Wears, R. L., & Hollnagel, E. (2015). Resilient health care: turning 
patient safety on its head. International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 
27(5), 418–420. 
Brewer, M. (2000). Research Design and Issues of Validity. In C. Reis, H. and Judd 
(Ed.), Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology (pp. 
3–16). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Burford, E.-M., Fray, M. and Waterson, P. (2016). Unpacking Safety-II in action: 
weak signals of potential error in patient handling tasks. In E.-M. Waterson, P., 
Sims, R. and Hubbard (Ed.), Contemporary Ergonomics and Human Factors. 
Daventry. 
 180 
 
Burke, J. E. (1989). Becoming an “insider-outsider&quot; Journal of the 
Anthropological Society of Oxford, 20, 219–227. 
Cacciabue, P. C., & Hollnagel, E. (1995). Simulation of cognition: Applications. In E. 
Hoc, J.M., Cacciabue, P. C., & Hollnagel (Ed.), Expertise and technology: 
Cognition and human-computer cooperation (pp. 55–73). New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Cameron, K. S., & Quinn, R. E. (2005a). Diagnosing and changing organizational 
culture: Based on the competing values framework . John Wiley & Sons. 
Cameron, K. S., & Quinn, R. E. (2005b). Diagnosing and changing organizational 
culture: Based on the competing values framework . (John Wiley & Sons., Ed.). 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Carroll, J. S. (1998). Organizational Learning Activities in High-hazard Industries: 
The Logics Underlying Self-Analysis. Journal of Management Studies, 35(6), 
699–717. http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00116 
Carroll, J. S. (1998). Safety culture as an ongoing process: Culture surveys as 
opportunities for enquiry and change. Work & Stress, 12(3), 272–284. 
Chen, A. Y., Sawyers, R. B., & Williams, P. F. (1997). Reinforcing ethical decision 
making through corporate culture. Journal of Business Ethics, 16(8), 855–865. 
Cooke, N. J., Stout, R., & Salas, E. (2001). A knowledge elicitation approach to the 
measurement of team situation awareness. New trends in cooperative activities: 
Understanding system dynamics in complex environments. Chicago. 
Cooper, M. D. (2000). Towards a model of safety culture. Safety Science, 36(2), 111–
136. 
Cox, S., Flin, R. (1998). Safety culture Philosopher s stone or man of straw. Work & 
Stress, 12(3), 189–201. 
Croskerry, P. (2003). The importance of cognitive errors in diagnosis and strategies to 
minimize them. Academic Medicine, 78(8), 775–780. 
Cumming, D., Dannhauser, R., & Johan, S. (2015). Financial market misconduct and 
agency conflicts: A synthesis and future directions. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 34, 150–168. 
Davies, J. B., Wright, L., Courtney, E., & Reid, H. (2000). Confidential incident 
reporting on the UK railways: The “CIRAS”System. Cognition, Technology & 
Work, 2(3), 117–125. 
Dekker, S. (2012). Just culture: Balancing safety and accountability. Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd. 
Dekker, S. (2014). Safety Differently: Human Factors for a New Era (2nd ed.). Boca 
Raton: Taylor & Francis. 
Dekker, S. W. (2014). The bureaucratization of safety. Safety Science, 70, 348–357. 
Dowd, K. (2009). Moral hazard and the financial crisis. Cato Journal, 29(141). 
Edmonds, T. (2007). The Independent Commission on Banking: The Vickers Report. 
Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. 
Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 
37(1), 32–64. 
Erez, M., & Gati, E. (2004). A dynamic, multi‐ level model of culture: from the 
micro level of the individual to the macro level of a global culture. Applied 
Psychology, 53(4), 583–598. 
Fenton-O’Creevy, M., Nicholson, N., Soane, E., & Willman, P. (2003). Trading on 
illusions: Unrealistic perceptions of control and trading performance. Journal of 
 181 
 
Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 76(1), 53–68. 
http://doi.org/10.1348/096317903321208880 
Fleiss, J. L., Cohen, J., & Everitt, B. S. (1969). Large sample standard errors of kappa 
and weighted kappa. Psychological Bulletin, 72(5), 323. 
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O’Connor, P., Bryden, R. (2000). Measuring safety climate: 
identifying the common features. Safety Science, 34, 177–192. 
Flin, R. H., O’Connor, P., & Crichton, M. (2008). Safety at the sharp end: Training 
non-technical skills. (M. Flin, R. H., O’Connor, P., & Crichton, Ed.). Boca 
Raton: Ashgate Publishing. 
Flin, R., & Patey, R. (2011). Non-technical skills for anaesthetists: Developing and 
applying ANTS. Best Practice and Research: Clinical Anaesthesiology. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.bpa.2011.02.005 
Gadd, S., & Collins, A. M. (2002). Safety culture: A review of the literature. 
Sheffield. 
Garling, T., Kirchler, E., Lewis, A., & van Raaij, F. (2009). Psychology, Financial 
Decision Making, and Financial Crises. Psychological Science in the Public 
Interest, 10(1), 1–47. http://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610378437 
Geyery, A. L. J., & Steyrer, J. M. (1998). Transformational Leadership and Objective 
Performance in Banks. Applied Psychology, 47(3), 397–420. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.1998.tb00035.x 
Glendon, A.I., Stanton, N. A. (2000). Perspectives on safety culture. Safety Science, 
34, 193–214. 
Gnoni, M. G., & Lettera, G. (2012). Near-miss management systems: A 
methodological comparison. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 25(3), 609–616. 
Gnoni, M. G., Andriulo, S., Maggio, G., & Nardone, P. (2013). Lean occupational 
safety: An application for a Near-miss Management System design. Safety 
Science, 53, 96–104. 
Grote, G. (2015). Promoting safety by increasing uncertainty–Implications for risk 
management. Safety Science, 71, 71–79. 
Guldenmund, F. . (2000). The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and 
research. Safety Science. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00014-X 
Guldenmund, F. W. (2007). The use of questionnaires in safety culture research–an 
evaluation. Safety Science, 45(6), 723–743. 
Hartel, C.E.J., Smith, K., Prince, C. (1991). Defining air crew coordination: searching 
mishaps for meaning. In 6th International Symposium of Psychology in the 
Department of Defense (pp. 316–320). Colorado Springs: US Air Force. 
Helmreich, R. L., Anca, J., & Kanki, B. G. (2010). The future of CRM. Crew 
Resource Management, 2, 493–500. 
Helmreich, R. L. (2000). On error management: lessons from aviation. BMJ, 
320(7237), 781–785. http://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.320.7237.781 
Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A. C., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). The evolution of Crew 
Resource Management training in commercial aviation. The International 
Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(1), 19–32. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327108ijap0901_2 
Hicks, M. R. (2004). Trading system complexity. Interactions, 11(4), 38–53. 
http://doi.org/10.1145/1005261.1005262 
Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B., Ohayv, D. D., & Sanders, G. (1990). Measuring 
 182 
 
organizational cultures: A qualitative and quantitative study across twenty cases. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 286–316. 
Hollnagel, E., Wears, R. L., & Braithwaite, J. (2015). From Safety-I to Safety-II: A 
white paper. 
Hollnagel, E. (2014a). Is safety a subject for science? Safety Science, 67, 21–24. 
Hollnagel, E. (2014b). Safety-I and safety–II: the past and future of safety 
management. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Hopkins, A. (2001). Was Three Mile Island a “Normal Accident”?. Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 9(2), 65–72. 
House of Commons Treasury Committee. (2009). Banking Crisis: Reforming 
Corporate Governance and Pay in the City: Ninth Report of Session 2008-09: 
Report, Together with Formal Minutes. 
Howell, J. M., Hall-Merenda, A, K. E. (1999). The ties that bind : The impact of 
leader-member exchange, transformational and transactional leadership, and 
distance on predicting follower performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
84(5), 680–694. Retrieved from 
http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=1193016 
Huber, S., van Wijgerden, I., de Witt, A., & Dekker, S. W. (2009). Learning from 
organizational incidents: Resilience engineering for high‐ risk process 
environments. Process Safety Progress, 28(1), 90–95. 
Hutchinson, A., Young, T. A., Cooper, K. L., McIntosh, A., Karnon, J. D., Scobie, S., 
& Thomson, R. G. (2009). Trends in healthcare incident reporting and 
relationship to safety and quality data in acute hospitals: results from the 
National Reporting and Learning System. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 
18(1), 5–10. 
Itoh, K., Omata, N., & Andersen, H. B. (2009). A human error taxonomy for 
analysing healthcare incident reports: assessing reporting culture and its effects 
on safety performance. Journal of Risk Research, 12(3–4), 485–511. 
Jentsch, F., Barnett, J., Bowers, C. A., & Salas, E. (1999). Who is flying this plane 
anyway? What mishaps tell us about crew member role assignment and air crew 
situation awareness. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society, 41(1), 1–14. 
Johnson, C. W. (2002). Reasons for the failure of incident reporting in the healthcare 
and rail industries. In Components of System Safety (pp. 31–57). London: 
Springer. Retrieved from 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.3120 
Kahn, H., & Cooper, C. L. (1996). How foreign exchange dealers in the City of 
London cope with occupational stress. International Journal of Stress 
Management, 3(3), 137–145. http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01857820 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under 
risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 263–291. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases. (A. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, Ed.). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: a failure to 
disagree. The American Psychologist, 64(6), 515–26. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0016755 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of 
 183 
 
representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3(3), 430–454. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 
Kaplan, H. S. (2003). Organization of event reporting data for sense making and 
system improvement. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 12(90002), 68ii–72. 
http://doi.org/10.1136/qhc.12.suppl_2.ii68 
Kaptein, M. (2011). From inaction to external whistleblowing: The influence of the 
ethical culture of organizations on employee responses to observed wrongdoing. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 98(3), 513–530. 
Kleiner, B. M., Hettinger, L. J., DeJoy, D. M., Huang, Y. H., & Love, P. E. (2015). 
Sociotechnical attributes of safe and unsafe work systems. Ergonomics, 58(4), 
635–649. 
Kuy, S., & Romero, R. A. (2017). Improving staff perception of a safety climate with 
crew resource management training. Journal of Surgical Research, 213, 177–
183. 
Leaver, M. P., & Reader, T. W. (2017). Safety culture in financial trading: an analysis 
of trading misconduct investigations. Journal of Business Ethics. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3463-0 
Leaver, M., & Reader, T. W. (2015). Non-technical skills for managing risk and 
performance in financial trading. Journal of Risk Research, 19(6), 687–721. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2014.1003319 
Leaver M., & Reader, T. (2016). Human Factors in Financial trading. Human Factors 
in Financial Trading: An Analysis of Trading Incidents, 58(6), 814–832. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0018720816644872 
LeBreton, J. M., & Senter, J. L. (2007). Answers to 20 Questions About Interrater 
Reliability and Interrater Agreement. Organizational Research Methods, 11(4), 
815–852. http://doi.org/10.1177/1094428106296642 
Lee, P. K., Cheng, T. C., Yeung, A. C., & Lai, K. H. (2011). An empirical study of 
transformational leadership, team performance and service quality in retail 
banks. Omega, 39, 690–701. 
M. Goldenhar, L., Williams, L. J., & G. Swanson, N. (2003). Modelling relationships 
between job stressors and injury and near-miss outcomes for construction 
labourers. Work & Stress, 17(3), 218–240. 
Macrae, C. (2009). Making risks visible: Identifying and interpreting threats to airline 
flight safety. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 82(2), 
273–293. http://doi.org/10.1348/096317908X314045 
Mahajan, R. P. (2010). Critical incident reporting and learning. British Journal of 
Anaesthesia, 105(1), 69–75. http://doi.org/10.1093/bja/aeq133 
McHugh, M. L. (2012). Interrater reliability: the kappa statistic. Biochemia Medica, 
22(3), 276–282. 
Mearns, K., Kirwan, B., Reader, T. W., Jackson, J., Kennedy, R., & Gordon, R. 
(2013). Development of a methodology for understanding and enhancing safety 
culture in Air Traffic Management. Safety Science, 53, 123–133. 
Mearns, K., Whitaker, S., Flin, R. (2001). Safety climate in hazardous environments: 
a longitudinal, inter-organisational approach. Risk Analysis, 21, 771–786. 
Mearns, K., Whitaker, S. M., & Flin, R. (2003). Safety climate, safety management 
practice and safety performance in offshore environments. Safety Science, 41(8), 
641–680. 
Mearns, K., Whitaker, S. M., & Flin, R. (2001). Benchmarking safety climate in 
 184 
 
hazardous environments: A longitudinal, interorganizational approach. Risk 
Analysis. http://doi.org/10.1111/0272-4332.214149 
Merton, R. K. (1972). Insiders and outsiders: A chapter in the sociology of 
knowledge. American Journal of Sociology, 78(1), 9–47. 
Michel, A. A. (2007). A Distributed Cognition Perspective on Newcomers’ Change 
Processes: The Management of Cognitive Uncertainty in Two Investment Banks. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(4), 507–557. 
http://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.52.4.507 
NASA. (2011). Accident precursor analysis handbook . Washington. 
National Audit Office. (2010). Maintaining the financial stability of UK banks: 
Update on the support schemes. London. 
NHS Improvement. (2017). National Reporting and Learning System. 
Noort, M. C., Reader, T. W., Shorrock, S., & Kirwan, B. (. (2015). The relationship 
between national culture and safety culture: Implications for international safety 
culture assessments. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology. 
Nordlöf, H., Wiitavaara, B., Winblad, U., Wijk, K., & Westerling, R. (2015). Safety 
culture and reasons for risk-taking at a large steel-manufacturing company: 
Investigating the worker perspective. Safety Science, 73, 126–135. 
O’Connor, P., Campbell, J., Newon, J., Melton, J., Salas, E., & Wilson, K. A. (2008). 
Crew Resource Management Training Effectiveness: A Meta-Analysis and Some 
Critical Needs. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 18(4), 353–
368. http://doi.org/10.1080/10508410802347044 
O’Connor, P., O’Dea, A., & Melton, J. (2007). A Methodology for Identifying 
Human Error in U.S. Navy Diving Accidents. Human Factors: The Journal of 
the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 49(2), 214–226. 
http://doi.org/10.1518/001872007X312450 
Oberlechner, T., & Nimgade, A. (2005). Work stress and performance among 
financial traders. Stress and Health, 21(5), 285–293. 
Phimister, J. R., Oktem, U., Kleindorfer, P. R., & Kunreuther, H. (2003). Near‐ miss 
incident management in the chemical process industry. Risk Analysis, 23(3), 
445–459. 
Pidgeon, N. F. (1991). Safety culture and risk management in organizations. Journal 
of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 22(1), 129–140. 
Pidgeon, N. F., & O’Leary, M. (2000, August 1). Man-made disasters: why 
technology and organizations (sometimes) fail. Safety Science. Elsevier. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00004-7 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0925-7535(00)00004-7> 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common 
method biases in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and 
recommended remedies. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879–903. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879 
Power, M., Ashby, S., & Palermo, T. (2013). Risk culture in financial organisations. 
London School of Economics. 
Power, M. (2009). The risk management of nothing. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 34(6), 849–855. 
Rasmussen, J., Pedersen, O. M., Mancini, G., Garnino, A., Griffon, M., & Gagnolet, 
P. (1981). Classification system for reporting events involving human 
malfunctions. Roskilde. 
 185 
 
Reader, T. W., & Cuthbertson, B. H. (2011). Teamwork and team training in the ICU: 
Where do the similarities with aviation end? Critical Care, 15(6), 313. 
Reader, T. W., Reddy, G., & Brett, S. J. (2017). ). Impossible decision? An 
investigation of risk trade-offs in the intensive care unit. Ergonomics, In Press. 
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Reason, J. (1997). Maintenance-related errors: the biggest threat to aviation safety 
after gravity. In Hans M. Soekkha (Ed.), Aviation Safety: Human Factors, 
System Engineering, Flight Operations, Economics, Strategies, Management  
(pp. 465–470). Iepelaan: VSP BV. 
Reason, J. T. (2008). The human contribution: unsafe acts, accidents and heroic 
recoveries. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Reynard, W. D., Billings, C.E., Cheaney, E.S., Hardy, R. (1986). The development of 
the NASA aviation safety reporting system. 
Ring, P. J., Bryce, C., McKinney, R., & Webb, R. (2014). Taking notice of risk 
culture–the regulator’s approach. Journal of Risk Research, 1–24. 
Rouse, W. B., & Rouse, S. H. (1983). Analysis and classification of human error. 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC-13(4), 539–549. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/TSMC.1983.6313142 
Saini, A., & Martin, K. D. (2009). Strategic risk-taking propensity: The role of ethical 
climate and marketing output control. Journal of Business Ethics, 90(4), 593–
606. 
Salas, E., Burke, C. S., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (2000). Teamwork: emerging 
principles. International Journal of Management Reviews, 2(4), 339–356. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2370.00046 
Salas, E., Wilson, K. A., Burke, C. S., & Wightman, D. C. (2006). Does Crew 
Resource Management Training Work? An Update, an Extension, and Some 
Critical Needs. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society, 48(2), 392–412. 
http://doi.org/10.1518/001872006777724444 
Sanne, J. M. (2008). Incident reporting or storytelling? Competing schemes in a 
safety-critical and hazardous work setting. Safety Science, 46(8), 1205–1222. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2007.06.024 
Sarter, N. B., & Alexander, H. M. (2000). Error Types and Related Error Detection 
Mechanisms in the Aviation Domain: An Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting 
System Incident Reports. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 
10(2), 189–206. http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327108IJAP1002_5 
Schein, E. H. (n.d.). Organizational Culture and Leadership (3rd ed.). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Schein, E. H. (2004). Organizational Leadership and Culture (3rd ed.). San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Shahin, A. I., & Wright, P. L. (2004). Leadership in the context of culture: An 
Egyptian perspective. Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 25, 
499–511. 
Shappell, S. A., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2001). Applying Reason: The Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). Human Factors and Aerospace 
Safety, 1(1). Retrieved from http://trid.trb.org/view.aspx?id=717644 
Shaw, R., Drever, F., Hughes, H., Osborn, S., & Williams, S. (2005). Adverse events 
and near miss reporting in the NHS. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 14(4), 
 186 
 
279–283. 
Simon, H. (1991). Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning. Organization 
Science, 2(1), 125–134. http://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.125 
Singh, K. (2008). Relationship between Learning Organization and Transformational 
Leadership: Banking Organizations in India, 1(1), 97. Retrieved from 
http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=719239357905013;res=IE
LBUS 
Turner, B. A. (1994). Causes of Disaster: Sloppy Management. British Journal of 
Management, 5(3), 215–219. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.1994.tb00172.x 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency 
and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), 207–232. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases. Science (New York, N.Y.), 185(4157), 1124–31. 
http://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology 
of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453–458. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683 
Van der Schaaf, T. W., Lucas, D. A., & Hale, A. R. (2013). Near miss reporting as a 
safety tool. Butterworth-Heinemann. 
van der Schaaf, T., & Kanse, L. (2004). Biases in incident reporting databases: an 
empirical study in the chemical process industry. Safety Science, 42(1), 57–67. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.safetylit.org/citations/index.php?fuseaction=citations.viewdetails&ci
tationIds%5B%5D=citjournalarticle_27759_12 
Van der Schaff, T. W. (1991). Development of a near miss management system at a 
chemical process plant. In Butterworth-Heinemann (Ed.), Near miss reporting as 
a safety tool. Oxford: Oxford. 
Vincent, C., Amalberti, R. (2016). Safety in healthcare is a moving target. BMJ 
Quality and Safety, 24, 239–40. 
Vincent, C., Taylor-Adams, S., & Stanhope, N. (1998). Framework for analysing risk 
and safety in clinical medicine. BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.), 316(7138), 1154–
7. Retrieved from 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1112945&tool=pmce
ntrez&rendertype=abstract 
Vlastos, G. (1982). The socratic elenchus. The Journal of Philosophy, 79(11), 711–
714. 
Waring, J. J. (2005). Beyond blame: cultural barriers to medical incident reporting. 
Social Science & Medicine, 60(9), 1927–1935. 
Waterson, P., Robertson, M., Cooke, N.,Militello, L.,Roth, E., Stanton, N. (2015). 
Defining the methodological challenges and opportunities for an effective 
science of sociotechnical systems and safety. Ergonomics, 58(4), 565–599. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2015.1015622 
Weigmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (1997). Human Factors Analysis of Postaccident 
Data: Applying Theoretical Taxonomies of Human Error. The International 
Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7(1), 67–81. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327108ijap0701_4 
Williamson, A. M., Feyer, A. M., Cairns, D., & Biancotti, D. (1997). The 
development of a measure of safety climate: the role of safety perceptions and 
 187 
 
attitudes. Safety Science, 25(1), 15–27. 
Willman, P., Fenton-O’Creevy, M., Nicholson, N., & Soane, E. (2006). Noise Trading 
and the Management of Operational Risk; Firms, Traders and Irrationality in 
Financial Markets. Journal of Management Studies, 43(6), 1357–1374. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00648.x 
Willman, P., Fenton-O’Creevy, M., Soane, E., & Nicholson, N. (2002, June 1). 
Traders, managers and loss aversion in investment banking: a field study. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society. Retrieved from 
http://oro.open.ac.uk/1307/ 
Wright, L., & Van der Schaaf, T. (2004). Accident versus near miss causation: a 
critical review of the literature, an empirical test in the UK railway domain, and 
their implications for other sectors. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 111(1), 
105–110. 
Wu, W., Yang, H., Chew, D. A., Yang, S. H., Gibb, A. G., & Li, Q. (2010). Towards 
an autonomous real-time tracking system of near-miss accidents on construction 
sites. Automation in Construction, 19(2), 134–141. 
Wu, A. W., Pronovost, P., & Morlock, L. (2002). ICU incident reporting systems. 
Journal of Critical Care, 17(2), 86–94. Retrieved from 
http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.elsevier-e4c86ffa-2061-
3b71-b00e-581e7e248274 
Zhao, B., & Olivera, F. (2006). Error Reporting in Organisations. Academy of 
Management Review, 31(4), 1012–1030. 
http://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2006.22528167 
 
  
 188 
 
CHAPTER 6: SAFETY CULTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 189 
 
6. SAFETY CULTURE IN FINANCIAL TRADING: AN ANALYSIS OF 
TRADING MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS 
 
6.1 Preface 
 
The final aim of the thesis is to examine whether risk management in financial trading 
can be understood from a safety culture perspective.  
 
At this point, the research in this thesis expands beyond the focus upon non-technical 
skills and human error, and considers the wider system within which behaviour 
occurs. This is important, because behaviours in relation to risk do not occur within a 
vacuum; they are a product of wider norms, values and institutional systems (Chen, 
Sawyers, & Williams, 1997; Kaptein, 2011; Saini & Martin, 2009). Understanding 
how the macro- level trading environment might shape micro- level risk-related 
behaviours of traders is critical for intervention and change. It is also important for 
conceptualizing financial trading as akin to other high-risk industries.  
 
This aim is addressed in chapter 6 (article 4), entitled “Safety Culture in Financial 
Trading: An Analysis of Trading Misconduct Investigations”. In this chapter, safety 
culture theory is applied to conceptualize and explain failures to manage risk within 
financial trading in a standardized way using FCA Final Notices. A Final Notice (FN) 
is comprehensive legal documentation available in the public domain that examines 
systematic investigations into instances of trading misconduct and set out actions 
taken against companies or individuals for breaches of regulatory requirements. The 
decision to use case study analysis in this chapter was taken based on the nature of 
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safety culture research. The FCA cases increase access to a wider dataset, and this 
supports a better understanding of the context of financial trading and generates a 
robust identification of the commonalities (e.g. shared cultural dimensions) across the 
industry.  
 
To achieve this, a set of Final Notice (FN, n=10) cases were selected based on a set of 
criteria (e.g. related to trading, significant monetary fine, range of organizations), and 
were analysed using content analysis in NVivo to assess whether they could be 
understood within the dimensions and sub-dimensions of a safety culture framework. 
Each FN was analysed by a single coder (Leaver) and 50% of the cases were coded 
by an organizational psychologist (Reader) to ensure reliability.   
 
Analysing the human factors that underpin error in the financial trading domain on 
their own cannot ensure that failure will be avoided. Importantly, the analysis of the 
human factors that underpin operational incidents must be layered with an 
understanding of the culture within the organization; it is meaningless if the culture of 
the organization is not incentivized to act on the information provided from the 
analysis. Furthermore, the chapter counters narratives focusing on traders who are 
unethical ‘rule breakers’, and emphasizes the value of a systemic approach, whereby 
safety culture theory is used to explain why risky behaviours in financial trading 
occur. This work also demonstrates that safety culture shapes how operators behave 
and think in relation to risk, and this is central to understanding the conditions under 
which risk in financial trading can be effectively managed.  
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The journal article that follows was authored by Leaver and Reader (2017) and 
published in the Journal of Business Ethics. Leaver designed the study, collected and 
analysed the data, outlined the article and authored all main drafts, contributing to 
roughly 90% of the content. Reader provided key supervisory support and editorial 
suggestions, and acted a second coder for 50% of the case analysis. Reader 
contributed to roughly 10% of the content. Three anonymous reviewers (experts in the 
field of financial services and human error in high-risk domains) provided critical 
feedback and suggested edits. Additionally, the journal editor provided essential 
editorial and content suggestions that led to structural improvements in the article, and 
ultimately approved the article for publication.  
 
The Journal of Business Ethics has an impact factor of 2.354 and is ranked 2/51 in 
Ethics, and 53/121 for Business Journals. It is also on Financial Times top 50 
academic journal list.  
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7. CRITICAL DISCUSSION  
 
The work undertaken in this thesis re-conceptualizes how we understand financial 
trading (and financial services more generally) in terms of human factors theory and 
contributes to the expansion of human factors theory through its application to the 
financial trading domain. The financial incident analysis system (FINANS) developed 
and tested within this thesis not only allows us to test and provide evidence to this 
premise, but also delivers a contextualized description of the behavioural nature of the 
problems in financial trading and illuminates how these are often a product of 
environmental factors such as culture.  
 
In the sections of the thesis that follow, each of the thesis aims will be addressed. 
Discussions on the implications of the research as well as the limitations are provided 
for each aim.  
 
7.1 Discussion of the aims 
Aim 1. Establishing whether non-technical skills are critical to risk management in 
financial trading 
 
The first aim of this thesis was to establish whether non-technical skills are critical to 
risk management in financial trading. This is important, because it reveals that the 
behaviours and skills of human operators can both create and prevent risk within 
financial trading. This is an integral part of human factors approaches to managing 
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risk in other industries, and through the establishment of its importance in financial 
trading; it provides the first step to re-conceptualising the financial domain using 
human factors concepts.  
 
This aim was addressed in chapter 2 (article 1) through a systematic review of studies 
reporting on non-technical skills and behaviours in the financial domain. The study i) 
identified ‘real-world’ (e.g. non- laboratory) research reporting behavioural data in 
financial trading, ii) examined and synthesized data on non-technical skills (and other 
human factors issues) found to underpin good or poor performance and risk 
management in financial trading and iii) considered the quality and coverage of 
research investigating non-technical skills in financial trading and provided a scope 
for future research.  
 
The results of the systematic literature review show that a range of human factors can 
be usefully used to understand performance in the financial trading domain. For 
example, the review (presented in chapter 2, article 1) revealed a range of decision-
making (e.g. heuristics and biases, intuitive decision-making, emotional regulation) 
and leadership skills (e.g. setting standards, monitoring behaviour, encouraging 
speaking-up) as important for managing risk and performance in financial trading 
environments. Furthermore, the review identified how situation awareness (e.g. 
information search and assessment strategies, vigilance, identifying 'noise' data) and 
teamwork (e.g. avoiding 'role' conflict, communication between traders) are important 
factors in determining trader performance. For example, the literature revealed that 
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problems in non-technical skills, such as managers failing to lead and monitor 
behaviour on the trading floor, traders incorrectly interpreting risk-related data, poor 
communication between traders on critical information pertaining to transactions and 
traders not taking action on identifying irregular trading activities by colleagues, 
undermined risk management and organizational performance.  
 
Implications. The insertion of financial trading into the non-technical skills literature 
is novel, and integrates an industry that previously had not been considered in this 
work. Furthermore, it tested the wider principle that human factors concepts, and in 
particular non-technical skills, are important for understanding risk-management in 
financial trading, and thus should be more formally applied. Besides the clear 
theoretical implication that the results of this work imply: that human factors theory 
can be usefully applied in the trading domain to understand essential aspects of 
performance, the results also have important practical insights. For example, in the 
development of interventions, NTS theory and human factors theory more generally, 
provides an alternative psychological-based method for improving trader 
performance. In fact, rather than focusing on strategies for minimizing cognitive 
heuristics and biases that influence decision-making (Croskerry, 2003), intervention 
strategies can focus on improving trader' situation awareness and decision-making 
through focusing upon team processes.  
 
Additionally, as public interest in the behaviour and actions of traders is growing, the 
formal assessment of human factors and non-technical skills could inform future 
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regulation in this domain. This is currently the case within aviation, and is 
increasingly discussed within other high-risk domains that have recognized the 
importance of non-technical skills for risk management (e.g. healthcare).  
 
Limitations. This work is not without limitations. First, the literature review search 
strategy may have failed to capture relevant papers with important NTS-related 
information. Often, the studies identified in the literature review did not focus on non-
technical skills explicitly (e.g. situation awareness), rather they contained data that 
appeared relevant to NTS concepts and this information was extracted and 
synthesised. Other publications with data relevant to non-technical skills, but not 
reported using the terminology of the strategy, may have been missed.  Second, the 
focus on non-technical skills meant that other factors underlying critical incidents in 
financial trading were not explored. These include political, regulatory and technical 
features (such as the human computer interaction failures) of the trading environment 
that might shape activity. For example, in the process of publication, a peer reviewer 
and human factors expert noted the influence of stress and the importance coping 
strategies in high-risk domains – a topic that was not covered in our analysis – and 
there may be benefit in its inclusion.  
 
Research has shown that traders experience higher levels of stress and anxiety than 
the wider population, with the need to take risks, pressure to perform, and lack of 
control over decision outcomes being associated with poor mental health (Kahn & 
Cooper, 1996; Oberlechner & Nimgade, 2005). Furthermore, traders are less likely to 
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make use of coping strategies, despite stress resistance being identified as a 
characteristic of successful traders (Kahn & Cooper, 1996; Oberlechner & Nimgade, 
2005). Therefore, future iterations of the human factors framework in the finance 
domain could be expanded to include stress management and performance.  
 
The work carried out to achieve the first aim of the thesis effectively demonstrates 
that financial trading can be considered a high-risk domain, where performance is 
shaped by the non-technical skills of the staff and where a combination of social and 
cognitive skills underpin trader performance. Yet, the literature review also reveals 
that human factors research remains at an embryonic stage within financial trading, 
and there is a need to better understand the specific behaviours and cognitive 
strategies that underpin effective trader performance.  
 
Therefore, the results of this systematic literature review provide an empirical basis 
for the development of a system to codify incident reports, to reveal the specific 
cognitive and social skills that underpin error on the trading floor. To achieve this, the 
development of a methodology for collecting reported incidents and interpreting the 
human factors skills that underpin performance in the trading domain is undertaken in 
chapter 3 of this thesis and is described in the following aim.  
 
Aim 2. Developing a methodology for capturing operational incidents within financial 
trading 
 
The second aim of this thesis was to develop a methodology for capturing, and then 
analysing, operational incidents in financial trading. The generation of a robust 
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methodology was essential to the work within this PhD so that data on error and non-
technical skills could be retrieved.  
 
This aim was addressed in chapter 3 through the formal investigation, and synthesis 
of the common features, of existing incident monitoring systems in other high-risk 
domains.  
 
Within financial trading, there was no precedent for incident reporting in terms of 
either methodology for collecting incident data, or defining and understanding what 
constitutes an incident. Therefore, the development of a system for capturing, 
monitoring and analysing operational incidents in the financial trading domain was an 
original application in the trading domain. The data collected through FINANS 
described ‘Operational incidents’, which occur when trading activity results in an 
avoidable financial loss (e.g. making a trade without assessing market related risk) or 
compliance failures (e.g. breach of trading limits), which place the integrity of the 
financial organisation at risk even if no loss has occurred (e.g. overexposure to 
volatile markets: Zhao & Olivera, 2006).  
 
Specifically, chapter 3 described the development of the first part of the Financial 
Incident Analysis System (FINANS), which is the first system to i) collect voluntary 
operational trading incident reports (where trading activity results in an avoidable 
financial loss, for example due to poor decision-making or a compliance breach) from 
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employees working on financial trading floors, and ii) analyze incidents in order to 
identify the human factors issues reported within them.  
 
Chapter 3 reviewed the literature and identified the common features of existing 
incident collection systems used in the aviation, healthcare and rail domains and used 
them to guide the development of the incident reporting system that was then tested in 
Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. The identified and adopted features include; voluntary 
and anonymous reporting, details of the type of event, personnel involved, activities 
leading to the incident and how the event was detected.  
 
The extension of human factors methodology to the financial trading domain is novel, 
and accessed a set of methodology that had previously not been considered in this 
domain. Moreover, the work evidenced the premise that human factors theory and 
concepts are relevant in the trading domain and provided the structure for the formal 
empirical application of human factors concepts in the trading domain.  
 
Implications. The generation of robust methodology presented in this chapter is 
essential to the retrieval of error and non-technical skills in the financial trading 
domain. From a methodological perspective, this research extends the current 
application of human factors tools for extracting the skills and systems that underpin 
error in the financial trading domain and provides empirical evidence for the utility of 
human factors frameworks for understanding error in contemporary high-risk domains 
such as financial trading.  
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Practically, the development of the methodology described in this PhD provides the 
basis of a new approach to monitoring risk in financial trading (e.g. based on human 
factors concepts). This generates a range of implications for the financial trading 
industry, such as the scalability of FINANS. For example, FINANS provides the 
opportunity to share lessons learned on the behaviours and practises that lead to error 
in the domain and this could be used by other organisations that share similar 
characteristics to trading floor where this work was undertaken.  Furthermore, 
FINANS could be used to inform regulation in the financial domain. For example, 
regulators could synthesise the findings from FINANS to generate feedback across 
the domain, to inform new policy initiatives (e.g. training mandates) and guide 
organisational audits (e.g. determining safety or ‘risk’ culture within organisations 
and across the industry more generally).  In addition, FINANS provides the 
opportunity to reflect on current analytic techniques that are applied to understand 
‘operational risk’ and ‘Enterprise Risk Management’ schemes and usefully provide a 
template for a qualitative understanding of error in the financial trading domain. 
Lastly, FINANS could be used to test the impacts of organisational change, such as 
identifying a change in error profiles following a change in senior management or 
helping to identify the success of organisational programs (e.g. compliance 
initiatives).  
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Limitations. The limitations of the tool are similar to those found in other high-risk 
domains, principally that we cannot capture every aspect of performance and the 
opportunities to observe some behaviour and human observer bias (e.g. the trader 
staff’s ability to self-report, report on incidents where they were involved). Some 
aspects of the incident reporting system were not ideal (e.g. database constraints such 
as inability to delete repeatedly reported events) and the use of symbols (e.g. to 
explain formulas) within the narrative section undermined the efficiency of a 
qualitative analysis. Moreover, as the ‘safety maturity’ of the organisation progressed, 
the quality of the reports reflected this, and some elements of the original 
methodology were inflexible to this change (e.g. drop down profiles of r isks were not 
nuanced enough to capture the range of issues in one report). Similarly, as the 
organisation globalised (e.g. subsidiary trading locations), the original organisational 
‘tree’ was difficult to adapt using the Microsoft access software (e.g. the addition of 
new reporting lines disrupted the previous reports reporting lines). These issues could 
be considered in future iterations of the incident reporting system. Yet still, critical to 
the effective utilisation of the incident collection tool is the development of an 
incident analysis system to analyse the events through a human factors lens.  
 
Aim 3. Examining human factors underlying operational incidents within financial 
trading 
 
The third study of the thesis presented in chapter 4 examined i) the frequency and 
consequences of operational incidents in financial trading, and ii) the role of non-
technical skills and other human factors issues as contributors to them. Through the 
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process of analysing incidents, the reliability and validity of the FINANS 
methodology was tested.  
 
This aim is addressed in a two-part study presented in chapter 4 (article 2). Results of 
the study (e.g. kappa scores) indicate that categories within FINANS can be reliably 
used to identify and extract data on human factors-related problems underlying 
trading incidents. In terms of the human-factors problems underlying critical incidents 
in financial trading, slip/lapse related errors (e.g. fat fingers) was the most frequently 
coded category, and occurred often in isolation from other human factors problems 
(e.g. teamwork), and was more likely to be associated with near miss outcomes 
(indicating errors were being caught by trading staff). It is perhaps not surprising that 
slip/lapse errors are more likely to be reported in the operational incident log than 
others (e.g. decision making skills), as they are relatively easy to detect 
retrospectively, and participants may show a bias for reporting less punitive, eas ily 
detected events (e.g. fat fingers, following procedures) than complex, punitive issues 
(e.g. failing to consider options). In general, slip/lapse problems did not lead to 
serious incidents, as they were often fixed quickly through organizational proced ures 
(e.g. team cross checks), and this has also been observed in other industries such as 
healthcare (Vincent & Amalberti, 2016).   
 
In addition, the study reveals that a significant proportion of critical errors originated 
from failings in situation awareness and teamwork processes. This may indicate team-
based processes such as communication and coordination (e.g. cross checking of 
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information, monitoring of information) to influence team situation awareness on the 
trading floor, and resonates with research in healthcare and aviation (Jentsch, Barnett, 
Bowers, & Salas, 1999; Reader & Cuthbertson, 2011). 
 
Notably, relatively few incidents were reported as having leadership or decision-
making problems, and this is contrary to experimental work in the finance domain. In 
fact, the analysis reveals that decision-making is a less present indicator of team 
performance in the trading domain, and this may reflect limitations in the abilities of 
trading staff to self-monitor decision-making activities. Also, the absence of decision-
making may indicate that incident reporting may not be an optimal way to collect data 
on decision-making in financial trading and other forms of study (e.g. observations) 
may be more useful. In terms of leadership, this might be conceptualized as a more 
‘distal’ cause of incidents (e.g. setting and maintaining standards), and perhaps more 
difficult to isolate as a contributory factor to incidents.  
 
Implications. The research undertaken in this chapter marks the expansion of current 
empirical and theoretical applications of human factors theory in financial trading. 
The implications of these results are both practical and theoretical. First, the 
descriptive data isolated in the studies can be used to benchmark the financial trading 
industry against other high-risk industries. This is particularly relevant when 
considering the current regulatory environment. For example, financial regulators 
such as the FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) could use this data to inform future 
conduct policy (such as targets and risk management initiatives). Additionally, our 
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data helps us to contextualize the problems in financial trading and describe them, 
which carries implications for ameliorating risk within financial trading organizations 
through adaptive training strategies and targeted human resource development 
programs to train the identified skills.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, this research extends the current application of human 
factors methodology for extracting human factors to the financial trading domain and 
also provides empirical evidence for the utility of human factors frameworks for 
understanding error in emerging high-risk domains such as financial trading. In fact, 
this is the first study to ever determine the error rate in financial trading and to detail 
the human factors causes of incidents. This work not only achieves the goal of 
determining the relevance of human factors to financial trading, but it also maps of 
the terrain for future risk management in financial trading. For example, in terms of 
the provision of robust methodology for collecting and identifying incident data, the 
establishment of a reliable framework to codify the incidents, analytics to score, the 
description of the human factors skills that underpin error occurrence and a discussion 
of the implications for the wider industry.  
 
Limitations. A first limitation of the empirical studies described in this chapter is that 
incident reporting systems generally suffer from under reporting. Underreporting 
results in a bias in the type of errors reported and reduces the organizations ability to 
quantify and accurately measure how risk management processes are leading to 
improvements in safety and performance. The reasons why underreporting is 
 225 
 
prevalent vary and are well summarized by van der Shaaf & Kanse (2004) in a 
systematic four tier framework; i) fear (e.g. ‘blame culture’, litigation, disciplinary 
action), ii) risk acceptance (e.g. incidents as just ‘part of the job’, or a ‘macho’ culture 
that suppresses reporting), iii) useless (e.g. the perceived attitudes of management, 
lack of follow up actions, handling the incident alone), and iv) practical reason (e.g. 
time constraints, insufficient information, lack of incentives) (van der Schaaf & 
Kanse, 2004). In the scope of the current study, these four principles are relevant and 
underpin the future efficacy of the tool. Yet, measures were taken to stem the impact 
of each limitation. For example, reports were anonymised to prevent undue blame and 
litigation, monthly reports with solutions and feedback measures were distributed to 
all stakeholders to help spread awareness for the usefulness of incident reporting and 
the incident reporting form was made available on each work station with as few 
input variables as possible in order to decrease time spent logging events.  
 
Yet still, it is critical to acknowledge the existence of these limitations in the data (e.g. 
interpretations of broad causality) so that we do not overstate the findings when 
drawing conclusions from the dataset as well as develop a tool with these principle 
limitations in mind (e.g. ensure targeted and active feedback and clear procedures for 
data entry).  
 
A second limitation that is common to both the empirical chapters (chapter 3, chapter 
4 – article 2 and chapter 5 – article 3) is the participant – observer effect.  As the 
introduction to this thesis makes clear, the author cannot claim to be a free value 
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observer. In terms of social reality, the author was particularly conscious of the 
insider / outsider debate in research. As a result of the author’s role as both colleague 
(e.g. insider) and researcher (outsider), she had privileged access to insider knowledge 
and this enabled her to gather intimate knowledge (and a shared experience) of the 
organization and its members, which offers unique insight (Merton, 1972). For 
example, this relationship contributes to an initial level of trust and can lead to open 
exchanges with participants that allows the author access information she might 
otherwise not have access to (e.g. punitive errors, behaviours) and as an unobtrusive 
observer, this also means that she can take advantage of ‘privileged eavesdropping’ 
(Burke, 1989). Admittedly, the author used her ‘insider’ knowledge to understand the 
context of the trading domain and the task work and to modify the theoretical 
frameworks in terms of the participant’s experiences and working environment. For 
example, the author exploited her position as a senior risk analyst to engage with the 
participants, observe and take part in the daily tasks and discuss organisational 
constraints. Throughout the authors time within the organization she engaged with 
trading floor staff in a professional capacity and built social relationships (e.g. 
trustworthiness). During this time, the theory, incident reporting form and models of 
analysis were discussed (formally and informally) and conversations invariably 
centered on limitations, feedback and the generation of incidents.  
 
A fundamental challenge of the insider / outsider relationship is to maintain 
objectivity as a researcher and to resist epistomological tunnel vision (e.g. confining 
the author’s understanding of the working environment to the perspective ascribed by 
the ‘inside’), which can undermine the coding and inferential process. This means that 
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the coding can also be shaped by the experience and impartiality of the researcher and 
this must be considered in the analytical outcomes. For example, the researchers 
experiences in financial trading shaped their preconceptions, attitudes and beliefs and 
their view of the human factors and the incidents reported in the domain are bound to 
be different from those of an ‘outsider’.  
 
Looking back at the broad descriptions of the data, notably, over 90% of the errors 
reported through FINANS described incidences of near miss – where an error 
occurred in the system, but was detected before escalating to failure. Therefore it is 
seemingly relevant to ask: what skills help the organization capture error on the 
trading floor? This question was explored in chapter 5 (article 3), which extended the 
use of FINANS to analyse near miss incidents to identify the skills that are used to 
capture error on the trading floor.  
 
Aim 4. Investigating whether operational incident reports contain data important for 
understanding how operational incidents are averted 
 
The fourth aim of the thesis examined what could be learned in terms of the skills and 
systems important for avoiding operational incidents. This is important, because it 
demonstrated that the skills of human operators can both create and prevent error 
within financial trading and empirically established that incident data contains 
relevant human factors information important to understanding how incidents are 
captured and detected. Moreover, this research has shown that data from incident 
monitoring systems can be analysed in a fashion more consistent with a safety II 
approach (e.g.. identify good practice for mitigating, rather than reducing, error). This 
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aim is addressed in chapter 5 (article 3) “Near Misses in Financial Trading: Skills for 
capturing and averting error”. 
 
This is a unique contribution to both the human factors literature and the financial 
trading domain. Before the work in chapter 5 (article 3) was undertaken, relatively 
little was known about the types of human-factors skills that are used to capture error 
on the trading floor and safety management was largely concerned with safety critical 
industries (e.g. aviation, healthcare, nuclear power).  
 
The analysis revealed that the majority of the errors are a product of slip/lapse (52%) 
problems and issues in human computer interaction (21%). Uniquely, the positivistic 
analysis of the reported near miss incidents has shown that error is overwhelmingly 
detected and prevented by teamwork skills (65%) followed closely by situation 
awareness (46%). Going further, the research reveals that slip/lapse, the most 
common cause of error, nearly always occurred in isolation. This means that the 
causes of error are principally one skill or another (e.g. skip/lapse or human computer 
interface) and less often the result of multiple skill problems. Exceptionally, 
teamwork and situation awareness, the two most frequent human factors responsible 
for ameliorating near misses, were the most likely to occur together doing so in just 
under half (45%) of all near miss where situation awareness prevented a near-miss. 
Moreover, the research has shown that regardless of the cause of the error, situation 
awareness and teamwork are the leading skills used to capture and prevent error. This 
research indicates that trading staff is the last line of defence in capturing error and 
keeping the system safe.  
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This work has reconceptualised finance through the application of human factors and 
effectively challenged the field of human factors to engage with a non-traditional (e.g. 
high-risk, but not safety critical) domain. In doing this, aspects of the prevailing 
worldview in human factors ‘safety’ thinking and financial risk management practises 
are re-considered. This work has identified the need for a ‘New Era’ of error and risk 
management research in the finance domain promotes more human-centred model of 
safety (e.g. supplementing a focus on what goes wrong with a focus on what goes 
right). 
 
Implications. The research shows that the variables that shape local situation 
awareness (e.g. system interface, experience, workload) can be maintained and 
improved through targeted staff training, workload management and user-informed 
system design. For example, the way in which information is presented via the system 
interface (e.g. trading screens) will largely influence situation awareness by 
determining how much information can be acquired, how accurately it can be 
acquired, and to what degree it is compatible with the trader’s situation awareness 
needs.  
 
A further implication of the finding that good situation awareness skills help trading 
staff overcome error refers to the increasingly common automation of work in the 
financial trading domain.  In an age of increasing automaticity in the financial 
services sector (e.g. high-frequency trading, VaR simulation, automation of daily 
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P&L reporting), the findings indicate that trading organizations should heed caution. 
Whilst automation may be useful in overcoming situation awareness attention limits 
(e.g. the idea that individuals have limits to their attention span that are determined by 
individual ability to process information, complexity and workload), automation may 
also lead to front line actors missing out on novel stimuli. This can negatively affect 
situation awareness by undermining the availability of meta-cognitive strategies that 
support the assessment of information in new and challenging work scenarios 
(Endsley, 1995).  
 
The finding that teamwork and situation awareness are the leading cause of error 
prevention in the trading domain offers two key practical insights.  
 
The first is in regards to the current trend towards the globalization of risk control 
functions in the trading domain (centralizing the support role functions in one 
location). Our research indicates that this changing nature of work could have 
deleterious consequences in terms of safety if the skills that are used to detect error 
(e.g. teamwork and situation awareness) are not carefully maintained and trained by 
the organization so that disparate teams can continue to develop a shared 
understanding of their roles & responsibilities and positive perceptions of risk.  
 
The second, drawing on the leading skills that are used to prevent error, is that our 
research has the potential to achieve greater impact on the safety improvement 
outcomes of tailored interventions. For example, when we only focus on the causes of 
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errors, we observe that 20% of the errors are caused by problems in teamwork. 
Therefore, interventions that are informed by this finding have an upper boundary for 
safety improvement of approximately 20%. However, our analysis reveals that 
teamwork is a critical factor in 65% of the cases for preventing error on the floor. 
Through targeting the teamwork skills found to be essential in the prevention of error 
(e.g. shared understanding of roles and responsibilities), we have a potential upper 
boundary for improvement of 65% - significantly more than if we focus only on the 
skill deficiencies that cause error.  In terms of risk management, this has important 
implications for structuring teams and training programs. This effect is further 
enhanced when we consider that regardless of the cause of the error, teamwork and 
situation awareness are the leading skills that prevent error.   
 
Further analysis reveals two distinct findings regarding the non-technical nature of 
error prevention on the trading floor: that a significant proportion of near miss 
incidents are captured using situation awareness and teamwork skills and that 
regardless of the cause of error, teamwork and situation awareness skills are the 
leading skills used to capture the error.  
 
These findings have important implications on how financial trading is 
conceptualized and future interventions. For example, this research establishes that 
the detection of error privileges the team working as a unit, rather than purely 
technical capacities and illustrates the importance of the socio-technical space in the 
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trading domain – in an industry where performance is generally considered to be 
highly individualized (e.g. bonus allocation schemes rewarding top performers).  
 
Although the error analysis undertaken in this study usefully guides us with granular 
insights into the behaviors that generate error and the skills that are used to capture 
error, these behaviors are positioned within a much larger cultural frame of the 
organization. For example, the behaviors that drive the capture of error (e.g. taking 
the initiative to cross check team members work) are a product of the practices and 
norms that are encouraged and rewarded within the organization and therefore any 
conclusions we draw from them should be also be considered through a perspective of 
organizational culture to fully appreciate how the skills that lead to and prevent error 
are developed and supported within the organization. One method for doing this 
would be to use a form of culture analysis (e.g. case study, safety climate survey) to 
identify how the collective values, beliefs and principles of organizational members 
(e.g. the trading staff) support the behaviours that capture error on the floor in order to 
have a comprehensive understanding of error and performance in the financial trading 
domain.  The influence of culture was explored in chapter 6 (article 4), which 
identified how the components of safety culture underpin the generation of error in 
ten high profile cases of trading misconduct in the financial trading industry. 
 
Limitations. The limitations of the study presented in chapter 5 are methodologically 
shared with those in chapter 4 as they share the same framework and analytic 
techniques (e.g. participant / observer effect). In regards to the nature of incident data, 
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the results in chapter 5 are constrained by the nature of incident reporting generally, 
which is vulnerable to underreporting and incomplete information about incidents 
(O’Connor et al., 2007). In the trading domain, the need for an individual to be aware 
that the event has occurred, their limited perspective on the incident, and their 
motivation to report also constrain incident reporting. The reasons why 
underreporting is prevalent vary and are well summarized by van der Shaaf & Kanse 
(2004) in a systematic four tier framework; i) fear (e.g. ‘blame culture’, litigation, 
disciplinary action), ii) risk acceptance (e.g. incidents as just ‘part of the job’, or a 
‘macho’ culture that suppresses reporting), iii) useless (e.g. the perceived attitudes of 
management, lack of follow up actions, handling the incident alone), and iv) practical 
reason (e.g. time constraints, insufficient information, lack of incentives)(van der 
Schaaf & Kanse, 2004). Similar to chapter 4, steps were taken to ameliorate these 
effects such as anonymised reporting to prevent undue blame and litigation, monthly 
reports with solutions and feedback measures were distributed to all stakeholders to 
help spread awareness for the usefulness of incident reporting and the incident 
reporting form was made available on each work station with as few input variables 
as possible in order to decrease time spent logging events.  
 
Furthermore, only one coder analysed all the near miss incidents (with a second coder 
analysing 25% of the near miss incidents to assess inter-rater reliability) and the data 
analysis was constrained by the clarity of the text and the potential biases of trading 
staff in recalling the incident. Moreover, the reliability analysis revealed scope for 
improving the FINANS taxonomy, and it may require further development to tailor it 
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to near miss data. Issues such as stress, fatigue, and environmental factors (e.g. 
culture) were not examined and this could be the focus of future work.  
 
The work that was undertaken to achieve the three sub-aims describes the granular 
features and behaviors that guide the occurrence and detection of error within the 
participating organization. Through a series of three studies, this research maps the 
typical migration of error on a trading floor and empirically test and describe the 
essential recovery mechanisms (e.g. teamwork situation awareness). However, the 
skills, behaviours and practices observed are importantly shaped by the working 
environment and in particular the values, beliefs, expectations and norms within the 
organization (e.g. the culture). Therefore, the final aim of this thesis focused on 
culture as an explanatory variable in organizational failure within the trading domain. 
 
Aim 5. Establishing the utility of safety culture for understand risk-related activities in 
financial trading 
 
 
The final aim of the thesis examined whether risk management in financial trading 
could be understood from a safety culture perspective.  
 
At this point, the research in this thesis expanded beyond a focus on non-technical 
skills and human error, and began to reflect on the wider system within which 
behaviour occurs. This was an important conceptual leap, because behaviours in 
relation to risk do not occur within a vacuum: they are a product of wider norms, 
values, and institutional systems (Chen, Sawyers, & Williams, 1997; Kaptein, 2011; 
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Saini & Martin, 2009). Therefore, understanding how the macro-level trading 
environment might shape micro- level risk-related behaviours of traders is critical for 
intervention and change. It is also important for conceptualising financial trading as 
akin to other high-risk industries.  
 
This issue was addressed in Chapter 6 (article 4) entitled “Safety Culture in Financial 
Trading: An Analysis of Trading Misconduct Investigations”. In this chapter, a safety 
culture framework was applied in order to conceptualize and explain failures to 
manage risk within financial trading in a standardized way drawing on data from ten 
FCA Final Notices. The work in this chapter complements the previous chapter’s 
analysis of human factors that underpin operational incidents with a macro-conceptual 
layer of understanding the culture within the organization. This is essential because it 
is meaningless if the culture of the organization is not incentivized to act on the 
information provided from the analysis. Going further, chapter 6 (study 3) countered 
the prevailing discourse in the financial industry, and in particular in current 
regulation discourse, that tends to focus on traders who are unethical ‘rule breakers’, 
and instead emphasized the value of a systemic approach, whereby safety culture 
theory is used to explain why risky behaviours in financial trading occur. 
 
The content analysis undertaken in chapter 6 (article 4) indicated the relevance of 
safety culture for understanding mishaps within the financial industry and yielded rich 
data on how the organizational environment shaped behaviours in the featured 
organizations.  In fact, the study found that dimensions of safety culture were 
routinely identified as underlying failures in financial trading organizations. For 
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example, in terms of management attitudes regarding negative performance that 
influenced how traders submit false prices in order to achieve productivity goals. In 
addition, based on the absence and presence of safety culture dimensions identified 
within the FNs, an initial framework of cultural dimensions (e.g. the components and 
sub-components) for measuring and evaluating safety culture in financial trading was 
described.  
 
The recognized components (and sub components) are: Organizational 
Communication (ability to speak up, transitions and teamwork across units, trust in 
colleagues), Management Commitment to Safety (blame and culpability, employee 
participation, management safety attitudes, supervisor / management expectations, 
safety motivation, shared belief in the importance of safety), Risk Management 
(appreciations of risk, confidence in safety, conflict between work and safety), Rule 
and Regulations (planning, rule dissemination, safety rules, safety training and drills) 
System Implementation (incident reporting, organization of system access rights, 
resources, systems alerts and controls, systems maintenance).  
 
Lastly, through an examination of how the specific dimensions of safety culture 
related to risk practices reported in the FNs, their utility for explaining risky 
behaviour and practices in financial trading was established. For example, in terms of 
how Management Commitment to Safety influenced trader-pricing positions, Risk 
Management influenced risk escalation and Systems Implementation co mpromised 
the ability of management to detect warning signals.  
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Implications. This study has shown that risk management in the financial trading 
industry can be conceptualised using a safety culture framework, and that in doing so, 
the industry gains access to a set of (tested) tools for measuring organisational culture. 
 
Although this industry is not a tabula rasa in terms of tools to analyses risk culture 
(e.g. surveys, structured questionnaires and scorecards), there are some novel 
practical implications of this research. For example, the work undertaken in this thesis 
can empirically inform the development of culture measurement tools in financial 
trading. The form of these tools may be diverse (see Guldenmund, 2000, for a 
review), however the most common procedure for collecting safety culture data is the 
use of employee cross-sectional surveys.  
 
Through a series of questions, surveys typically measure staff at all levels of an 
organization on their beliefs, values, attitudes and perceptions towards risk. Data is 
associated with organizational outcome data, and triangulated against other culture 
indicators data (e.g. incident reports, customer evaluations). In addition to the 
synergies between the safety culture literature and the FNs, the analysis reveals that 
across all the cases of misconduct, organizational incentives were identified as a cause 
of risky employee behaviour and practices.  
 
The work undertaken in this thesis also outlines potential dimensions of a safety 
culture survey (Chapter 4, article 2, box 2), and a safety culture assessment would 
examine the strengths, weaknesses, and conflicts (e.g. between management and 
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employees) on each cultural dimension. This typ ically leads to remedial action such 
as; training, modification of key processes and communication from management 
(Mearns et al., 2013). Such data also allows for benchmarking and inter-
organizational learning, which is routine practice within aviation, energy, and nuclear 
power (Carroll, 1998; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001; Noort, Reader, Shorrock, & 
Kirwan, 2015).   
 
The safety culture study has drawn from one data source; and there is merit in 
expanding the development and testing of a survey tool with the participation of 
employees in different financial institutions within the UK and globally. This would 
be of considerable use for financial trading organizations (e.g. for learning about their 
culture, addressing problems), and regulators (e.g. to identify best practice, and 
problematic organizations). In addition, research might examine whether the safety 
culture model needs further adaptation to reflect the different nature of organizations 
working in the financial sector (e.g. asset driven organizations versus speculative 
trading houses). In terms of safety culture theory this research would expand current 
empirical work and serve to broaden aspects of the theory through its application to a 
previously un-accessed domain. For the industry, this would be particularly useful in 
terms of providing a tailored assessment of local cultures and could be used to inform 
risk management and training initiatives. In relation to regulation, the results of such 
analyses would be useful in providing a map of the different (and changing) 
organisational cultures and identifying safety trends, sharing lessons learned across 
the industry and providing a guide to advising organisations on how to assess and 
benchmark their organisational culture.  
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Alternative approaches to examining safety culture may not focus on perceptions of 
risk practices, but instead gather behavioural data. For example, through 
systematically collecting and analysing data on trading incidents. Such incidents can 
contain valuable data for avoiding future mishaps (on poor working practices, IT 
systems) and for monitoring risk. Where staff reports incidents voluntarily, this can be 
highly symbolic of the culture (as it indicates a ‘just’ and ‘mature’ culture), whilst 
also revealing issues within the culture (e.g. on the pressures being experienced by 
staff). These approaches (surveys, incident reporting systems) are mainstay 
approaches to monitoring risky and unethical practices in other high-risk domains, 
and would appear equally useful for financial trading.  
 
Limitations. This study has the following limitations. First, the literature review for 
identifying safety culture studies was not comprehensive, and it may have failed to 
capture other dimensions of safety culture important for financial trading. Second, the 
use of FCA FNs is only one method of collecting data on safety culture in the finance 
domain and the data has not been triangulated with other forms of data. This may lead 
to methodological bias, such as common method bias, with assumptions being based 
on one form of data and analysis (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).   
 
Furthermore, the use of FNs as the data source also produces a limitation as they are 
considered secondary sources and their accuracy is difficult to confirm. Third, there 
are limitations in inter-rater coding. As the level of discrimination is quite high in the 
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analysis of textual data with several dimensions, reliability is more difficult to assess 
and careful training of the coders is crucial. Also, judgments about the level of kappa 
that is deemed acceptable in the literature vary and should be considered in the 
interpretation of the results. Lastly, there are other existing culture-based theoretical 
lenses beyond safety culture that could be adopted to analyse these cases such as a 
competing values framework. For example, the competing values framework is a 
widely used cultural framework for profiling the culture of organizations (for a full 
review see Cameron & Quinn, 2005).  
 
Through applying safety culture theory to analyse cases of trading misconduct, the 
dimensions of safety culture have been reliably and routinely identified as underlying 
failures across a variety of financial trading organizations. This counters current 
narratives focusing on traders as unethical ‘rule breakers’ and instead emphasizes the 
influence of social environments upon behaviour in financial institutions.  The results 
indicate that safety culture is a useful conceptual framework through which to 
understand and predict risky and unethical behaviour in financial trading, and also 
informs the development of tools for assessing and invoking culture change.  
 
7.1.1 Summary 
The work undertaken in this thesis re-conceptualized how we can understand financial 
trading (and financial services more generally) in terms of human factors and 
contributed to the expansion of human factors theory through its application to the 
financial trading domain. This work in this PhD has shown the importance of non-
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technical skills for risk management in the financial trading domain and developed a 
new methodology in financial trading for the collection of incident data. Moreover, 
the work revealed that incidents are frequent and caused by human factors skill 
deficiencies and are averted using key non-technical skills such as teamwork and 
situation awareness. Lastly, safety culture provided an essential macro-theoretical 
framework to understand safety and ‘risk’ in financial trading.  
 
The application of human factors theory in the finance domain challenges the field to 
engage with a non-traditional (e.g. high-risk, but not safety critical) domain. The 
socio-technical complexity and intractability of financial trading is reflective of the 
changing economic landscape – where rapid technological change redefines the 
relationship between people and systems, transforms work processes and practise and 
increase operational requirements of operators. Thus, this work contributs to a ‘new 
era’ of human factors research that engages with these domains and promotes a more 
humanist interpretation of safety (e.g. safety as a focus on what goes right) (Dekker, 
2014).  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
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8. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The application of human factors theory in the finance domain challenges the field to 
engage with a non-traditional (e.g. high-risk, but not safety critical) domain. This 
serves to expand the types of domains of interest to human factors researchers, with 
financial trading being a particularly complex domain due to the importance of both 
risk-taking and risk management for organisational success. The application of human 
factors concepts in financial trading has generated meaningful insight into how risk is 
managed in this domain, and extends human factors research into a previously 
unexplored complex socio-technological environment.  
 
8.1 Conclusions of the research 
The work within this PhD has served to reconceptualise financial trading as a high-
risk, ‘ultra-resilient’ industry. The research described the development of a 
methodology for collecting and studying incidents and produced concrete findings on 
the nature and consequence of human factors problems in financial trading.  
Furthermore, this work has shown that the last line of defence within the organisation 
is reinforced by teamwork (e.g. crosschecking of tasks) and situation awareness (e.g. 
attention). Lastly, the work has shown that risk management in the financial trading 
industry can be conceptualised using a safety culture framework, and has generated 
insight into how aspects of organisational culture (e.g. management commitment to 
safety, ability to speak up) can support or undermine ethical behaviour in the financial 
trading domain.  
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On a theoretical level, the insertion of financial trading in the non-technical skills 
literature is quite original, and accesses a set of literature that previously had not been 
considered in this domain. Additionally, the research undertaken in these chapters 
marks the expansion of current theoretical applications of human factors theory in 
financial trading. This expansion challenges the field of human factors to engage with 
a new domain – a high-risk, but not safety critical domain – and therefore provokes 
prevailing aspects of the current human factors ‘safety’ worldview to be re-imagined.  
 
For example, current approaches to managing safety and risk in the human factors 
literature assumes that adverse outcomes can be explained by linear cause-effect 
chains (e.g. Swiss cheese models) and assumes that all adverse outcomes have causes 
which can be found and fixed and that these causes differ from the causes of ordinary 
and successful work. This approach largely limits human factors to niche areas of 
work (e.g. tractable systems) and no longer matches the reality of today’s systems 
(e.g. intractable). the work carried out in this thesis has dealt with a unique challenge 
– to design a methodology to study and improve risk management, utilising safety 
concepts, and apply them to a non-traditional safety domain (e.g. where risk-taking is 
core to the business). This is quite new in the human factors domain and highly 
challenging. However, the challenge to the human factors domain to adapt to today’s 
system is already underway in domains such as healthcare. In fact, most healthcare 
activities can be considered intractable because the setting is complex and 
unpredictable and current research in this domain aims to change the way care is 
currently done, embracing working with complexity rather than against performance 
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variability (Braithwaite, Wears, Hollnagel, 2015).  Yet, a key difference is that in 
healthcare people don’t take risks as deliberately as in financial trading and the 
research in this PhD, which reveals that human operators are both the sources of error 
as well as the protective layer, may hold essential insight for risk-taking and risk 
management in the financial domain.  At a conceptual level, this may mean that 
human factors research could inform effective risk-taking within the financial trading 
domain, mapping out the non-technical skills ‘hazards’ and guiding the training of the 
‘soft’ skills that are necessary to navigating effective risk taking on the floor. This 
would mean drawing on the skills of operators to inform safety decisions – using their 
experience and knowledge to inform risk management. This research resonates with 
the safety II and associated literature (e.g. safety differently) and the work undertaken 
in this thesis provides some of the first research investigating how safety thinking can 
be used differently in a high-risk domain.  
 
The work in this thesis is one of the first empirical attempts to employ human factors 
concepts in a new domain where ‘safety’ is no longer about accidents (e.g. safety 
critical domains). In the case presented in this PhD, this is about financial failure and 
misconduct, yet other high-risk domain that share organisational safety features (e.g. 
socio-technological dependence) might also be relevant (e.g. cyber security). This 
work has shown how underlying problems in financial trading are very common 
human factors issues (that are frequently observed in other domains such as 
healthcare – for example, teamwork), with consequences that are far-reaching. 
Perhaps this is also the case for other domains, particularly domains that similarly 
navigate deliberate risk taking within their daily business. These domains face similar 
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challenges to financial trading (e.g. navigating risk trade-offs, globalisation of 
operations) and could benefit in similar ways such as gaining insight into the skills 
that capture error (e.g. good teamwork skills such as communication) and adapt 
organisational processes to support the maintenance of these essential skills (e.g. 
deploying screen based web cameras to communicate with disparate team members). 
Moreover, the work within this PhD has shown that culture plays a cruc ial role on the 
ethical navigation of risk trade-offs (e.g. influencing the micro- level behaviours that 
shape the macro- level organisational environment) in the trading domain, and this 
lesson could be shared with other emerging high-risk domains in order to help them 
prioritise the development of culture measurement tools.  
 
Finally, the work in this PhD delivers new methodology for collecting, identifying 
and analysing error and informs not only risk management in financial trading, but 
may also be used to inform future safety management in high-risk, but not safety 
critical domains. In particular, this PhD demonstrates the utility of capturing and 
analysing near miss data and this insight should be used to guide future safety 
research in high-risk domains.  
 
8.2 Going forward: ideas for future research  
 
In the following sections, various areas for future research that are rooted in 
organizational intervention and contribute to impactful and actionable outcomes for 
the financial trading domain and broader human factors field of research are 
discussed.  
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8.2.1 Improving non-technical skills 
The research in this thesis has revealed that non-technical skills of trading staff are 
integral to ensuring safe performance in the trading domain and therefore future 
research could focus on improving these skills. In other high-risk domains that face 
similar problems (e.g. time pressure, rapidly evolving situations) to financial trading, 
training programs such as crew resource management (CRM) have been adopted to 
target training the specific non-technical skills that underpin error.  
 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) is an instructional strategy that trains crews to 
effectively use all of their available resources (e.g. people, information, equipment 
and systems) (Helmreich et al., 1999). CRM can take many forms, and has evolved 
through several phases over the past two decades, but it can be conceptualized as a 
team training strategy focused on improving crew coordination and performance. 
CRM is now used as a way to manage human error by focusing on teamwork sk ills 
that will promote error avoidance, early detection of errors and minimization of 
consequences resulting from CRM errors.  
 
The success of CRM programs is variable and due to a lack of longitudinal data to 
assess its organizational impact, its success is mostly anecdotal (Salas, Burke, & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2000). However it has generally been found to produce positive 
reactions (e.g. affective and utility based) enhanced learning (primarily measured 
through attitude change) and desired behaviour change in the cockpit (Salas, Wilson, 
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Burke, & Wightman, 2006). For example, empirical data from the surgical field 
reveals that CRM training can improve the participant’s perception of safety climate 
within the organization (Kuy, & Romero, 2017).  
 
These findings warrant investigation in the financial services domain. For example, 
adapted CRM training could be generated from the core taxonomy identified in study 
1 (chapter 2) and refined in study 2 (chapter 4). The outcomes of the training could be 
triangulated with other safety data – such as incident reporting rates and safety culture 
measurement techniques to enable performance progressions, promote collaborative 
learning initiatives and identify areas for improvement.  
 
In order to successfully contribute to ‘the bigger picture’ of human error and to foster 
organizational learning across the industry, it is recommended that the behaviours' 
and skills that are identified and synthesized through FINANS be expanded to other 
financial service organizations.  
 
8.2.2 Using FINANS to benchmark financial services firms 
A next step in research is the expansion of the application of FINANS more broadly 
to facilitate the benchmarking and assessment of other financial services firms 
industry wide, similarly to how incident collection is done across other high-risk 
industries such as aviation and healthcare. As it stands, we currently do not have a 
good understanding of how the cultures within these firms differ, and cannot 
confidently conclude what good or bad performance looks like relative to 
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performance and activity. Broadening the use of FINANS would help to ascertain 
what is ‘normal’ across the industry and to describe the profiles of what goes wrong 
within and across firms.  
 
For example, in healthcare the National Reporting and Learning System is a central 
database of patient safety incident reports established in 2003 with over four million 
reports across more than 170 acute hospitals (NHS Improvement, 2017). Analysis of 
these reports reveals several trends such as reporting rates over time, relationship with 
type/severity of incidents reported, relationship with hospital size and organizational 
features and relationships with safety culture data. Findings reveal a significant 
relationship between higher reporting rates and a higher proportion of positive 
responses to safety culture survey questions. Reporting rates also appear to improve 
over time across all participating hospitals with regular feedback reports that allow 
the hospitals to benchmark data in comparison to other, similar hospitals. This 
ultimately aims to improve the quantity and quality of data reported. Moreover, 
nationally established procedures for analysis allow hospitals to see, comment on and 
spread the relevant safety lessons learned from reported incidents at the organization 
and specialty level (Hutchinson et al., 2009).  
 
A limitation of FINANS is that it has only been used in one organization and 
therefore the conclusions we draw from the data (e.g. on the number of trades that are 
erroneous) is limited to the profile of this one firm. Rolling out the system to assess 
other firms of generalizable size and structure would help to determine a typology of 
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error within the financial services more broadly. Additionally, the use of FINANS 
over time within participating organizations could lead to the establishment of 
longitudinal trends, which could then be triangulated with other data (such as market 
volatility and other market data) to ascertain whether the risk profile of the 
organization fluctuates in sync with the market. Moreover, we could analyse if there 
is a relationship between, and impact of, risk profile changes (e.g. an increase or 
decrease in risky behaviours and perceptions of risk) as a result of specific 
organizational changes, such as management turnover.  
 
The limitations of expanding the use of FINANS across the financial services would 
be broadly similar to those experienced in the financial trading domain and articulated 
in this PhD. Meaning, the underreporting of error (blame, usefulness, disruption to 
daily procedures) and the importance of establishing reliability of interpreting the data 
(e.g. having human factors experts evaluate the data). Furthermore, across the 
financial services domain, the organizational environments (e.g. cultures) and 
conditions (e.g. task-work) vary, and the system (e.g. FINANS) should consider and 
reflect on these contextual differences.  
 
Therefore, an essential next step is to get a better understanding of the local and 
industry cultures that influence the generation of error.  
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8.2.3 Managing culture 
 
The logical next step in terms of future research in this domain is to extend the final 
study on safety culture through the development and deployment of a culture 
assessment tool. In safety culture research a standard safety climate questionnaire has 
been the principal measurement instrument (Gadd & Collins, 2002; Guldenmund, 
2000).  
 
Safety climate questionnaires are popular given it is a quick methodological 
instrument (e.g. ease of distribution among a large group of participants in a relatively 
short period of time) that yields immediate quantifiable results, enabling researchers 
to produce trend data, identify patterns and compare groups and sub-groups (e.g. 
comparing the perceptions of risk between the traders and risk control teams).  
 
Pre-existing research suggests that a typical survey is composed of a series of 
thematic questions that tap into people’s evaluations of various aspects considered to 
be relevant for safety (e.g. management commitment to safety, rules and regulations). 
This has been detailed across several key papers (Cooper, 2000; Cox, Flin, 1998; Flin, 
Mearns,  O’Connor,  &  Bryden, 2000; Mearns, Whitaker & Flin, 2003; Williamson, 
Feyer, Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997). A proposed survey in the trading domain could 
look to surveying trading staff in a cohort of trading organisations to generate data on 
the generalizability of safety culture concepts within the industry and unpack the 
existence of sub-cultures (e.g. trading versus trading support departments) that exist 
within the domain. 
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Notably, there are several key limitations in administering a safety climate survey, 
both methodological and theoretical, that must be considered. One such challenge is 
the development of a questionnaire that yields enough relevant and valid information 
that facilitates the prioritization of corrective measures and actionable change. To 
overcome this, the results of previous research could be combined to guide the 
development of a new questionnaire. This pragmatic approach would be a good fit for 
the financial trading domain, using the results of the safety culture analysis presented 
in chapter 6 (article 4) to guide its development.  
 
A second key limitation is that with regard to culture, the organization cannot be 
considered a closed system. This means that not only local conditions within the 
organization determine the culture of its members. Schein (2004) contends that when 
an organization has not experienced any serious problems during its existence, that 
there will probably not be a typical culture and its culture will be largely a product of 
external conditions (e.g. national, regional) and the (educational, social-economic) 
background of its workforce (Guldenmund, 2007; Schein, 2004). Therefore, arguably 
a questionnaire would not necessarily draw out culture, but it would draw out 
participant’s espoused values (e.g. attitudes) towards culture, which provide a source 
of raw data to extract an organizational culture from (Schein, 2004). These limitations 
would need to be considered in any future applications of safety culture measurement 
in the financial trading industry.  
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8.2.4 Investigating emergent phenomena within the human factors data  
 
Shared team situation awareness. Findings from the application of FINANS indicate 
that team situation awareness is critical to performance in the financial trading 
domain. In fact, in the most critical cases of error (e.g. failures) the studies found that 
teamwork and situation awareness play a significant role (Leaver & Reader, 2016). 
This observation is shared across other high-risk domains such as aviation, where the 
significant role of shared situation awareness in undermining safety has been well 
documented (Hartel, Smith, Prince, 1991).  Although research indicates that shared 
situation awareness across teams underpins performance; there is currently not a good 
understanding of how team situation awareness it is supported within and between the 
teams.  
 
Future research could focus on understanding how situation awareness is distributed 
across the teams on the floor. This could be investigated in a number of ways. 
Endsley (1993) and Matthews et al (2004) suggest doing this by conducting 
unstructured interviews with subject matter experts, with goal directed task analysis 
and questionnaires in order to determine the relevant situation awareness 
requirements. Also, the Coordination Assessment of Situation Awareness of Teams 
(CAST) uses situational roadblocks and judgments on how the team responds to these 
roadblocks in terms of coordinated perception and action processes in orde r to derive 
a measurement of team situation awareness.  
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Identifying how teams share situation awareness is geared towards the development 
of a holistic representation of knowledge - one that emphasizes the importance of the 
integration of knowledge across team members at the group level (e.g. identifying 
knowledge similarity and distribution) and not just at the individual level (Cooke, 
Stout, & Salas, 2001). This would be beneficial to training intervention in the 
financial trading domain because problems in knowledge symmetry (e.g. team 
members sharing the same mental model of the shared task) and knowledge 
distribution (e.g. the communication and sharing of critical information between front 
office and middle office on shared tasks) underpin performance in this domain.  
 
The relatedness of safety culture and incident reporting. Reflecting on the findings of 
the safety culture research in chapter 6, future research might assess how the 
offending organisations would perform using FINANS. Following the previous point 
about extending the use of FINANS across the industry in order to generate 
meaningful benchmarking abilities and the sharing of lessons learned, FINANS 
outcomes in these organisations could be triangulated with data from safety culture 
measurement. This research would aim to answer questions such as: do organisations 
with a more positive safety culture report less critical incidents (e.g. failures)? Do 
they report more near misses? What do the features of the incidents look like within 
these organisations (e.g. broad descriptions of human factors)? Are these features 
shared across the industry? At a practical level, this research would provide a holis tic 
description of the state of safety across the industry, detailing granular details of the 
skills needed to ensure safety as well as the environmental factors that support ethical 
behaviours. At the theoretical level, this research would be informative for future 
 255 
 
iterations of error research and regulatory frameworks (e.g. industry wide 
frameworks, benchmarking).  
 
Protective Acts. The analysis of trading incidents within this body of research has 
pointed to the phenomena of trading staff committing protective acts (e.g. staff 
vigilantly checking on the task work of other team members to correct error) in order 
to keep the organisation safe. These informal acts of ‘citizenship’ are desirable to the 
organisation as they support resiliency and safety yet they are not (currently) tied to 
the formal reward system (e.g. salary, bonus allocation). This research acknowledges 
the importance of these pro-social behaviours and future research could look to 
monetising this phenomenon in order to further incentivise trading staff to engage in 
them. To achieve this, close attention must be paid to how front line staff successfully 
navigate and capture error (e.g. through the cross checks in order to develop an 
understanding of how staff manage their work flexibly and sa fely). This is consistent 
with a Safety II approach, which supports a proactive management of safety that 
focuses on how everyday performance typically succeeds rather than why it may 
occasionally fail (Braithwaite, Wears, & Hollnagel, 2015.).  
8.3 Final remarks  
Based on this research, we now can conclude that human factors concepts used to 
understand error and improve risk management in other high-risk domains are 
relevant and can be reliably used to interpret incident data in financial trading. 
Additionally, this research identifies the rate of error in trading (approximately 1%) 
and the broad description of the skills that underpin error (e.g. slip/lapse, human 
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computer interaction) and the skills that help the organisation overcome error are 
rooted in the social system (e.g. teamwork and situation awareness). Moreover, 
having successfully mapped out the safety culture concepts that are relevant to 
understanding the behaviours and practises that are featured in cases of financial 
misconduct, we can conclude that culture provides an essential preventative layer of 
defence to ensure organisational safety. 
 
Each aim of this thesis has established the relevance of human factors  concepts in the 
financial trading domain. In doing this, the work contributes to the re-
conceptualisation of the financial trading domain as a high-risk, ‘ultra-resilient’ 
industry where the last line of defence is reinforced by social (e.g. teamwork) and 
cognitive (e.g. situation awareness) skills. The behaviours and practises that have 
been identified and analysed are a product of more widely held beliefs and attitudes 
and this thesis provides evidence that they can be understood using a sa fety culture 
framework. Safety culture shapes how operators behave and think in relation to risk 
and this is central to understanding the conditions under which risk in financial 
trading can be effectively managed. 
 
Furthermore, the application of human factors theory in the finance trading domain 
challenges the field to engage with a non-traditional (e.g. high-risk, but not safety 
critical) domain. This expands the types of domains of interest to human factors 
researchers, with financial trading being a particularly complex domain due to the 
importance of both risk-taking and risk management for organisational success. The 
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application of human factors concepts in this domain has generated meaningful 
insight into how safety is managed in a complex socio-technological domain and 
guides a ‘new era’ of human factors research oriented to the demands of today’s high-
risk domains. 
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